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 The ecclesiastical organization uniquely characteristic of the Christian East is 
the autocephalous (“self-headed,” or self-governing) church, which in the modern 
states of Eastern Europe, Russia, and the Balkans are truly national churches, whose 
boundaries, administrative structures, and identities closely mirror those of the state.  
Conventional wisdom attributes autocephaly to nationalism: Christianity inevitably 
becomes closely associated with national identity in those states whose churches are 
of Byzantine political patrimony, and autocephaly is the organizational manifestation 
of that association.  This study argues that a better explanation for the prevalence of 
autocephaly lies with the church’s institutional framework.  Formal and informal 
institutions, or “rules of the game,” structure the relationships between groups of local 
churches and provide incentives to observe constraints upon actions that restructure 
those relationships.  A restructuring of ecclesiastical relationships implies that an 
alteration in incentives changed the equilibrium.  In the Christian East, enforcement 
of the equilibrium historically has been carried out by the state.   
 This study explores the institutional framework of the Orthodox Church, 
outlining the formal (canon law) and informal (conventions and tradition) rules 
governing organizational change.  These rules are then examined in light of historical 
evidence of how autocephalous churches have come into being throughout the two 
millennia of the church’s existence.  The study concludes that the institutional 
framework of the Orthodox Church, formed within the political context of the Roman 
and later East Roman (Byzantine) Empire, became increasingly incongruent both 
with the changing political geography of Eastern Europe and with the enforcing role 
afforded to secular political authority as imperial structures gave way to modern 
nation-states.  Since the formal institutional rules have proved resistant to change and 
unable to keep pace with the changing political geography, the Orthodox Church has 
relied increasingly upon flexible informal rules which has resulted in a proliferation 
of autocephalous churches.  In addition to locating a more compelling explanation for 
autocephaly within institutional theory, this study argues that the Orthodox Church 
provides a compelling area for exploration of some of the more vexing analytical 
problems in institutional theory, such as why institutions change slowly or even 
appear not to change at all. 
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1Chapter 1: Introduction and Summary 
 Institutions, per Douglass North, “are the humanly devised constraints that 
shape human interaction” and which “structure incentives in human exchange, 
whether political, social, or economic.”1  Federalism, for example, may be understood 
in this sense as an institution: a set of rules whereby the federal government and the 
individual states both have incentives to observe certain constraints on their behavior.
So long as incentives remain for all parties to play by the rules, a self-enforcing 
equilibrium persists with none of the players seeing a reason to change how they 
interact.  If the incentives change, the players may no longer be constrained to play by 
the rules and will tend to restructure their interactions.2
 In the case of the Eastern Orthodox Church, autocephaly – the unique 
ecclesiastical arrangement whereby a particular group of churches is recognized 
collectively as administratively self-governing and independent (autocephalous, or 
self-headed), yet still fully part of the wider communion of churches – could be 
analyzed in a similar way.  Particular to the Orthodox Church are certain institutions 
or rules, both formal (canon law) and informal (custom or convention),3 which 
structure the relationships between groups of local churches and provide incentives 
for those churches to observe constraints upon actions that restructure those 
relationships.  When we do see a restructuring of ecclesiastical relationships – for 
1 Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (New York: 
Cambridge, 1990) 3. 
2 North 86. 
3 North 4. 
2example, when one group of churches becomes administratively independent of 
another – we may look to see if a change in incentives occurred which precipitated 
the change in the equilibrium.  Something must have changed which altered the 
incentives of the players to comply with the institutional constraints.  We could argue 
that the “thing” in question is enforcement of the equilibrium.  In the case of the 
Orthodox Church, such enforcement historically has been carried out by the state. 
 Why is this important?  Conventional wisdom has largely framed the political 
significance of the Orthodox Christian churches of Russia, Eastern Europe and the 
Balkans in terms of their role as agents of religious nationalism, tools of hegemonic 
state policies, or both.  The fact that most of these churches are truly “national” 
churches (in a way that, for example, the Roman Catholic Church of Poland is not, 
insofar as it is administratively subordinated to Rome and not to political authorities 
closer to home) reinforces this view.  The conventional wisdom concerning the 
Orthodox Church overwhelmingly favors the state as the agent behind organizational 
change in the church, specifically, subdivision of groups of churches into 
autocephalous units, or (re)incorporation of previously independent churches into a 
more centrally governed whole.  The argument in this case is that institutions 
particular to the church do not matter, in the sense that they have no effect on 
organizational change.  If we can prove, however, that institutions do matter – that 
specific formal and informal rules do structure the relationships between groups of 
churches, subject to enforcement by the state, and that these relationships are 
restructured as incentives change – then we would have to reject this argument and 
begin the search for a better explanation of organizational change in the Orthodox 
3Church that captures both significance of institutions and the role of the state.  This 
study attempts to offer the beginnings of such an explanation. 
1.1 Objectives and Justification
On the empirical level, we hope to learn something new and interesting about 
the Orthodox Church and why it tends to organize itself in certain ways over time.  
We will note that the church consciously organized itself against the political 
demarcations extant in the Roman Empire, within whose boundaries the church came 
into existence – a principle enshrined in the church’s formal institutional framework.  
We also will note that as those political boundaries changed, the ecclesiastical 
demarcations changed with them.  When the empire ceased to exist and deprived the 
church of a template against which it could organize itself, the church had to adjust to 
a changing political geography as new states evolved in Russia, Eastern Europe and 
the Balkans, and in so doing the church relied less upon the formal institutional rules 
framed during the Eastern Roman (Byzantine) period and more upon the evolving 
informal rules that enabled flexible organizational responses to rapidly changing 
political demarcations and regimes.  The extraordinarily complex organizational 
system (multiple overlapping jurisdictions within single sets of political boundaries) 
observable in the Orthodox Church today is the direct result of the flexibility of these 
informal rules, and is increasingly at variance with the formal institutional framework 
assembled during the Byzantine period.  The state remained significant throughout 
this process, enforcing the equilibrium of institutional compliance when congruent 
4with state interests and incentivizing the recalibration of ecclesiastical relationships 
when not. 
On a theoretical level, we hope to learn something important about how 
formal and informal institutions govern organizational change.  As the church adjusts 
organizationally to evolving political boundaries, we expect to see those adjustments 
reflected in the institutions of the church over time.  Specifically what we expect to 
see is a gradual movement away from the formal institutions of the church (canon 
law) and toward greater reliance on informal institutions.  This will force us to probe 
more deeply the linkages between formal and informal institutions, the pace of 
organizational change, how incentives and enforcement combine to enable a self-
enforcing equilibrium, and why and how self-enforcing equilibriums are disrupted.  
We also hope to open new avenues for research into institutional change itself, why 
institutions in some cases appear to change slowly, or even not change at all. 
The Orthodox Church provides a uniquely interesting object of analysis for 
this purpose.  Like other organizations (for example the United Nations or the 
Chinese Communist Party) it is bound corporately by a common set of formal and 
informal rules that provide its self-identity, govern its behavior, and regulate the 
relationships among its members.  It is not a unitary body insofar as it comprises a 
number of distinct, administratively self-governing (autocephalous) entities.  It is 
more than simply a “community” of members insofar as it is governed by a 
universally accepted set of institutional rules.  The Orthodox churches share a 
common identity and set of institutions, and largely maintain ecclesiastical 
interrelations (manifested through Eucharistic communion and liturgical 
5commemoration of one another’s hierarchs), yet they remain administratively 
sovereign, and the organizational process by which new autocephalous churches are 
formed indicates that the pattern of their interrelations is not fixed.  The appearance 
of a new autocephalous church does not, according to the institutional framework of 
the Orthodox Church, imply a diminution of the whole body of churches.  The 
churches remain ontologically and recognizably the same, and continue to observe the 
same commonly-held institutions.  Autocephaly, in essence, “defines the manner in 
which one church relates to another and the reality behind the term is of the essence 
of the Church itself.”4  The complexity of the Orthodox Church, in terms of the 
variety of organizational forms coexisting under the aegis of a single “organic” body, 
provides ample possibilities for hypothesis testing.  Hence the Orthodox Church is 
analytically interesting if one wants to observe how a common set of institutional 
rules affects organizational change among otherwise sovereign members.  A key 
variable, as we will see later in this study, is the enforcement of those rules. 
1.2 The Object of Study Defined 
The object of this study is the Orthodox Church, specifically the Chalcedonian 
Eastern Christian churches distinct dogmatically from the non-Chalcedonian and 
other Oriental Orthodox churches of the East, and distinct dogmatically and 
organizationally also from the Roman Catholic and Protestant churches of the West.  
Scholarship in politics and history has consistently posited as a definitive 
characteristic the close parallel relationship – one of symphony – between the political 
4 John L. Boojamra, “Problems Concerning Autocephaly: A Response,” Greek Orthodox Theological 
Review 24.2-3 (1979): 194. 
6authorities and the dominant Eastern Orthodox churches of Russia, Central and 
Eastern Europe, and the Balkans.  This salient characteristic of the Orthodox churches 
has manifested itself historically in alternating periods of political ascendancy and 
suppression of the church by secular authorities.  In the modern period, largely 
coincident with the rise of the state, the Orthodox Church has manifested itself largely 
as a loose confederation of autocephalous national churches, with the number of 
autocephalous churches, many with significant émigré populations in other countries, 
increasing over time. 
The two irreducible characteristics of an autocephalous church are the right to 
administer its affairs independently of all other churches, and the right to govern itself 
by selecting and installing its own bishops, including the presiding hierarch (a 
metropolitan bishop or a patriarch).5  In essence the attainment of autocephalous 
status, as a specific form of organizational change, means complete administrative 
independence; an autocephalous church is a self-governing church answerable to no 
higher ecclesiastical authority.  This “content” of autocephaly, however, has not 
remained static.  Early local churches were administratively independent but always 
understood as part of a larger political entity; the idea of a self-governing church as 
the ecclesiastical counterpart to the autonomous state obviously was a later 
development.  Nor did independence preclude the right to appeal to a higher authority 
for resolution of disputes; only later would autocephaly gradually eclipse standard 
protocols determining how self-governing churches were to defer to one another on 
matters of dispute.  Autocephaly is governed by the institutions generated by the 
5 This is amply covered in the literature concerning autocephaly.  See for example Alexander 
Bogolepov, “Conditions of Autocephaly,” St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly 5.3 (1961): 14. 
7church: laws (canons) approved by the church in approved forums (councils), and the 
historical experience of the church in applying those laws.  Its application has evolved 
over time, and that evolution has occurred in response to changes in the political 
geography in which the church has sojourned. 
1.3 The Prevailing Theory and its Alternative 
Why does autocephaly occur?  Contemporary scholarship offers an initial 
answer by highlighting various characteristics of the Orthodox Church (e.g. as a 
vehicle of national identity, as a politically weak agent of state co-optation) that both 
enable these potentially perilous relationships with the state and permit the churches 
to survive them.  Autocephaly, viewed within this framework, becomes in various 
ways an expression of modern nationalism operationalized through the church.  This 
nationalism theory, however, fails us when we attempt to use it to construct theories 
about why and how autocephaly occurs and under what circumstances.  We know it 
fails us when we recognize that autocephaly predates modern nationalism; we know it 
fails us when we see that its monolithic treatment of the church offers little insight 
into how and why the church organizes itself the way it does; and we know it fails us 
when we realize that it cannot tells us why subdivision of churches through 
autocephaly persists even in the wake of the dissolution of strong political control in 
predominantly Orthodox countries.  In short, examining autocephaly as a function of 
nationalism does not help us explain why or how autocephaly occurs in a way that 
conforms to the available evidence. 
8This dissertation will argue that a more satisfying examination of autocephaly 
begins with an alternative theory: that organizational changes in the Orthodox Church 
tend to correspond to changes in the political geography, and that the type and scope 
of these changes is constrained by the institutional framework governing the church.  
According to this theory, where we observe changes in political boundaries, the 
dissolution or consolidation of states, or other political reconfigurations, we should 
expect to see corresponding organizational changes in the church within institutional 
limits.  Formal and informal institutions are key to understanding how and under what 
circumstances those organizational changes occur.  We will argue that the evidence 
bears this out, compelling us to reject the arguments concerning nationalism noted 
above and begin to examine the alternative theory posed here.  
Although attempting to offer a better explanation of organizational change in 
the Orthodox Church by focusing on institutions, this study will leave a number of 
areas unaddressed, most importantly the role of politics both within the church and 
within the state, and the interactions between the two.  For the sake of parsimony this 
study deliberately leaves these questions aside and treats both church and state largely 
as monolithic actors.  Ideally these issues would be raised in future attempts to test 
and further refine the theory offered here.  If this study is at least able to contribute to 
the broader knowledge – of both institutions and the Orthodox Church – by 
examining existing data in a theoretically unique way, it will have fulfilled its 
intended purpose. 
91.4 Structure of Study 
 Chapter 2 will lay out the nationalism theory as the standard and predominant 
explanation for autocephaly.  It also will point out the inadequacies of that 
explanation and point the way toward the alternative theory, which will be developed 
in chapter 3.  Chapter 3 also will introduce the formal definitions of institutions and 
organizations and outline the rudimentary institutional theory that underpins the 
alternative theory.  Chapter 4 will lay out the institutions of the Orthodox Church, 
specifically those that govern organizational change generally and autocephaly 
specifically, and the informal rules surrounding them.  Chapter 5 will examine how 
organizational change has occurred in response to changes in the political geography 
by presenting, comparing and contrasting historical instances of autocephaly.  Based 
on the conclusions drawn in previous chapters, chapter 6 will provide a case study of 
a particular instance of autocephaly which will enable a closer examination of the 
alternative theory.  Chapter 7 will close out the study by drawing organizational 
conclusions about the Orthodox Church and theoretical conclusions about institutions, 
based upon the analysis of the preceding chapters. 
1.5 Sources 
The majority of this study will rely upon information of two types.  One is 
historical information regarding actual instances of organizational change, i.e. the 
circumstances under which specific churches became autocephalous.  The other 
source is the formal and informal institutional “content” of the Orthodox Church, 
namely the canons, ecclesiastical legislation, and accepted rules and principles 
10
governing organizational change among churches.  Both sources of information are 
widely available and largely systematized.  This study, therefore, is less of an attempt 
to develop new and heretofore unknown sources of information than an effort to 
analyze existing information in a new and hopefully innovative way.  Ideally new 
avenues for future research, both with regard to institutional theory in general and the 
Orthodox Church in particular, will become apparent in the course of this study. 
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Chapter 2: Autocephaly as a Function of Nationalism – The Existing Theory 
 This study seeks to understand the predominance of a particular organizational 
form (autocephaly) amongst the Eastern Orthodox churches.  It will argue that a 
useful way of explaining this phenomenon involves a theory which describes the 
church as an organization governed and constrained by an institutional framework, 
comprising formal and informal rules, that is itself durable yet malleable.  This 
alternative theory is necessary because much of the literature dealing with the 
Orthodox Church in general and autocephaly in particular rests on the state-centric 
theory that autocephaly ultimately is a function of nationalism.  Such studies, though 
very useful in characterizing the various modalities of the relationship between 
church and state in the Christian East, particularly in the modern period, tell us 
comparatively little about why and how the church organizes and reorganizes itself in 
certain ways.  This chapter will summarize what we will call for want of a better term 
the nationalism theory, exposing its weaknesses, as a pretext for laying out our 
alternative theory in chapter 3.  Hopefully the alternative theory in turn will enable a 
more substantive contribution to the literature on church-state relations in the 
Christian East by widening the discussion beyond nationalism to include institutions 
and their role in shaping the church as an organization. 
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2.1 Autocephaly as a Function of National Identity 
The pattern of intimacy and acquiescence on the part of the Orthodox 
churches – with the Byzantine Empire, with the Ottoman caliphate, with the Soviet 
apparatus – has been explained alternatively as cause or effect of what could be 
summed up as an inherent tendency in predominantly Orthodox countries to identify 
Christianity with national identity and to amalgamate the church with the state as a 
function of that identification.  An autocephalous church “becomes thus the very 
basis of national and political independence, the status-symbol of a new ‘Christian 
nation.’”6  Studies of church-state relations in confessionally Orthodox countries, 
operating implicitly or explicitly under this theory, largely confine themselves to 
explaining how Orthodox churches were (and are) alternatively tools, collaborators, 
or de facto extensions of the state, and how they have seldom functioned as 
opponents or institutions independent of the state (in contrast to, for example, the 
Roman Catholic Church of Poland during Solidarity or the Ukrainian Greek Catholic 
Church under Soviet rule).7
Ramet, writing near the end of the Soviet period when nationalist resurgence 
in Eastern Europe was becoming a matter of renewed analytical concern, was explicit 
in collapsing the issue of autocephaly down to a matter of national identity and 
national consolidation:
The equation of religious unity with political unity and later with national 
identity became the raison d’etre for autocephaly in the Orthodox world.  
6 Alexander Schmemann, “A Meaningful Storm,” Church, World, Mission (New York: St. Vladimir’s 
Seminary Press, 1979) 98-99. 
7 Some recent studies of the Orthodox Church and the state in the post-Soviet era are starting to 
address the issue of nationalism in new and creative ways.  See for example Christopher Marsh, ed., 
Burden or Blessing? Russian Orthodoxy and the Construction of Civil Society and Democracy
(Brookline: Boston University Institute on Culture, Religion and World Affairs, 2004), 8 Jan. 2005 
<http://www3.baylor.edu/Church_State/orthodoxy1.html>. 
13
Especially with the growth of nationalism in the nineteenth century, to be a 
nation meant to have a church of one’s own, and to be entitled to one’s own 
state.  By contrast, subject peoples, such as Macedonians, Belorussians, and 
Ukrainians, were described as “lacking a true history”; they were said to speak 
the “dialects” of other “historical” nations and were denied the right to have 
their own autocephalous churches.8
The argument thus becomes that the phenomenon of autocephaly only appears with 
the dissolution of the Byzantine Empire and the rise of a new Christian nationalism 
(as distinguished from Byzantine imperial universalism, into which the Orthodox 
Church was subsumed) is a derivation of this view.  According to this interpretation, 
autocephaly
if not in its origin (it was used in various senses before but always 
“occasionally”) at least in its application, is a product not of ecclesiology, but 
of a national phenomenon.  Its fundamental historical connotation is thus 
neither purely ecclesiological, nor “jurisdictional,” but national.  To a 
universal empire corresponds an “imperial” church with its center in 
Constantinople: such is the axiom of the Byzantine “imperial” ideology.  
There can therefore be no political independence from the empire without its 
ecclesiastical counterpart or “autocephaly”: such becomes the axiom of the 
new Orthodox “theocracies.”…[I]t is very significant that all negotiations 
concerning the various “autocephalies” were conducted not by churches, but 
by states: the most typical example here being the process of negotiating the 
autocephaly of the Russian Church in the sixteenth century, a process in 
which the Russian Church herself took virtually no part.9
The advent of nationalist projects in Europe thus entailed, or more accurately 
presupposed, a concurrent dissolution of traditional imperially-defined ecclesiastical 
boundaries in the Christian East, and the construction of new boundaries along 
“national” lines.  Hence, as Roudometof has argued in the case of Southeastern 
Europe, “[t]he institution of separate national churches (Greece 1832, Serbia 1832, 
8 Pedro Ramet, “Autocephaly and National Identity in Church-State Relations in Eastern Christianity: 
An Introduction,” Eastern Christianity and Politics in the Twentieth Century (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1988) 4-5. 
9 Schmemann, “A Meaningful Storm” 98-99, quotation marks and italics in original. 
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the Bulgarian Exarchate 1870) provided the means through which the traditional ties 
of Orthodox Balkan peoples could be severed, and new national ties constructed.”10
2.2 Existing Typologies of Church-State Relations in the Christian East 
Existing studies of autocephaly as a problem of politics and history generally 
proceed from these assumptions, subdividing largely into two categories.  One 
includes geographically driven studies, in which the parameters of the studies are set 
according to national, state, or ecclesiastical boundaries (e.g. Eastern Europe before, 
during, and after communism, or the pre- and post-Soviet Russia and the Russian 
Orthodox Church).  The other categories includes problem-driven studies, in which a 
transnational issue drives the analysis, such as transitions of post-communist states or 
problems of ethnic self-determination (e.g. the Balkans), in which religion is 
identified as a causal or related factor.  Ramet, for example, has identified three basic 
patterns of church-state relations characteristic of the Orthodox churches: nationalism, 
cooptation, and opposition.  While these patterns characterize the Orthodox 
experience in the 20th century, they obviously have deep theological and historical 
roots.  Nor are the patterns static.  Ramet notes that 
[t]he three variables described here may be combined in different ways, and 
these different combinations give rise to different patterns in church-state 
relations.  For example, nationalism may be a source of opposition (as in the 
Serbian case today) or a buttress of co-optation (as in Bulgaria).  Or again, 
opposition of the lower clergy to the hierarchy may figure as an opportunity 
for alliance between regime and lower clergy (as in the postwar Eastern 
European states), may arise in reaction to the co-optation of the hierarchy (as 
has been the case in the Russian Orthodox church in recent years), or may be 
10 Victor Roudometof, “Nationalism, Globalization, Eastern Orthodoxy: ‘Unthinking’ the ‘Clash of 
Civilizations’ in Southeastern Europe,” European Journal of Social Theory 2:2 (1999): 240. 
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irrelevant to the course of church-state relations (as in the case of the Coptic 
church in Egypt).11
The church is typically viewed as coterminous with and a defender of the 
nation, and follows a pattern of alignment with the nation and the state.  Hence, to be 
Serb is to be Orthodox and, in the case of the nation, vice-versa.  Nationalism in this 
context is defined as a “collective affectivity ‘extolling the nation as a supreme value 
and representing it as a dominant principle of societal organization’”12; or 
alternatively as “a set of beliefs and attitudes according to which certain political and 
cultural values believed to be essential for the flowering of a nation are considered to 
have such intrinsic worth that actions and policies that endanger them are held to be 
impermissible in most circumstances.”13  Hence “[n]ational-religious messianism, 
which links religious orthodoxy to a God-given national mission appears to arise at 
times of confrontation with external foes of rival religious affiliation.  The 
consequences of national-religious messianism are the reinforcement of the link 
between national identity and a particular religion and the compulsion of state 
authorities to deal with certain religious organizations as ethnic representatives.”14
The church invariably fulfills this role in confessionally Orthodox Christian countries. 
According to the nationalism theory, national and ethnic self-determination 
manifests itself via an ecclesiastical re-alignment, typically involving the declaration 
of an autocephalous church (e.g. Macedonian from Serbian, Ukrainian from Russian).  
This necessarily makes autocephaly a political, not merely ecclesiological, issue.  For 
11 Ramet 18. 
12 Emerich K. Francis, Interethnic Relations (New York: Elsevier, 1976), quoted in Ramet 6.
13 Kestutis Girnius, cited in Ramet, ed., Religion and Nationalism in Soviet and Eastern European 
Politics (Durham: Duke Press Policy Studies, 1984) 234. 
14 Ramet 7.   
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example, as Ramet has noted, “[o]ften, as in the case of Finland and Poland in the 
1920s, political authorities have favored autocephaly both in the interests of 
excluding foreign ecclesiastical authority and in order to minimize conflicts of 
loyalty.”15
In other cases a concerted effort is made by the state to co-opt the church to 
leverage its legitimacy, influence, or contact with the populace, as a way to harness 
nationalism.  The reasons and political ends of such activities by the state are 
historically varied and do not concern us here.  More interesting are the various ways 
in which co-optation has manifested itself historically.  Ramet has identified four 
such typologies: 
(1) Simple co-optive-nationalist, in which the hierarchy is co-opted and 
espouses a nationalist line endorsed by the regime (examples: contemporary 
Bulgaria, Greece, Macedonia, Romania); (2) nonnationalist dependent, in 
which the church is too weak to offer any resistance to the policy of the state 
(examples: contemporary Czechoslovakia, postrevolutionary Ethiopia, 
Poland); (3) nationalist defiant (independent-oppositionist), in which a 
church’s opposition is organically related to its nationalism; this configuration 
may involve complex-co-optive features (examples: contemporary Serbia, 
interwar Bulgaria); (4) simple co-optive antinationalist, in which an otherwise 
nationalist church is sapped of its nationalist strength by the slow 
strangulation of being “quarantined” from the public and is penetrated and co-
opted by the regime (example: Russia).16
Existing studies also identify a dynamic of opposition by the church to 
hegemonic political authorities.  Sometimes this has manifested itself as active 
opposition to an oppressive government, although this dynamic usually is less 
apparent in confessionally Orthodox countries.  In other cases church-state relations 
may be affected by opposition among factions within the church itself.  Robert Tobias, 
15 Ramet 10.
16 Ramet 18-19. 
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for example, conceptualized a more nuanced set of interactions between church and 
state, a push-pull relationship in which church and state exerted mutual and often 
conflicting influences upon one another, as opposed to Ramet’s more static 
conceptualization.  The state’s attempt to control or subdue the church often occurs 
either through obliteration, cooperation, or transformation of the latter by the former.  
Obliteration (the outright extermination of the organizations of Christianity) 
manifests itself through four typologies: (1) nationalization, in which “[a] national 
church, therefore, must be one which would not exceed the framework prescribed [by 
the state] for performing its religious functions, and…would be loyal to the 
Government in the Government’s administration of governmental responsibilities – or 
at least not oppose the Government.  Within that framework there would be freedom, 
even assistance.”17; (2) nationalization, meaning the effective domestication of 
churches; (3) varying degrees of toleration of religious worship and belief; and (4) 
experimentation with anti-religious propaganda and education. 
Cooperation, as yet another alternative dynamic, might imply at face value an 
autonomous decision by the church to work proactively with the state.  However, 
such cooperation in fact historically occurred under three conditions: (1) “…when 
Communist governments had sufficient confidence in their own position as to be 
unafraid of ties to, or influence of non-Communist bodies”; (2) “…when the Church 
was sufficiently ‘nationalized’ as to accept, and to be accepted in the role of co-
laborer…”;  (3) “…when factors external to the Church-State relationship itself 
17 Robert Tobias, Communist-Christian Encounter in East Europe (Indianapolis: School of Religion 
Press, 1956) 21. 
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demanded or permitted cooperation for mutually desirable ends…”18  In essence, an 
emphasis on cooperation is predicated on the assumption that the church is not an 
autonomous actor within hegemonic states, hence cooperation is a rational response 
to a set of circumstances in which autonomous action is highly limited if not 
impossible.  Tobias identified yet another pattern of church-state interaction which 
might be captured under the term “transformation,” a concerted attempt by the state to 
change the nature and substance of the church as an organic reality, rather than just its 
exterior framework.  This might occur either through active indoctrination of values 
like secular humanism, or through “malnutrition”19 and neglect, until Christianity is 
rendered into a secularized or pseudo-religion devoid of any capability of resistance. 
2.3 Limitations of the Nationalism Theory 
The nationalism theory, to summarize, reduces the phenomenon of 
autocephaly solely to a function or “symptom” of nationalism, places analytic 
primacy on the state, and views the church largely as a vehicle for the expression of 
nationalist sentiments.  However, it would be as much a mistake to describe 
autocephaly solely in terms of nationalism as it would be to describe “the history of 
the nations of Eastern Europe [as] a function of the triumph of nationalism over 
imperialism”20 – in fact, the reality is considerably more complex.  This most 
certainly is not to say that nationalism was not an important phenomenon in the 
ecclesiastical organization of the Christian East.  Undoubtedly from the 1800s 
18 Tobias 90-91. 
19 Cf. Nathaniel Davis, A Long Walk to Church: A Contemporary History of Russian Orthodoxy
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1995). 
20 Stephen Fischer-Galati, “Church and State in Contemporary Romania,” The Byzantine Legacy in 
Eastern Europe, ed. Lowell Clucas (New York: Columbia, 1988) 287. 
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forward the proliferation of states in the former imperial territories (Ottoman, 
Hapsburg, etc.) coincided with the concomitant growth of autocephalous churches, 
and those two phenomena were related.  Yet nationalism in Eastern and Southern 
Europe (in the predominantly Orthodox areas) was highly variegated in the 1800s.  
The Greek territories, for example, enjoyed cultural and linguistic conduits by which 
Western European nationalist ideas arrived and catalyzed the movement toward an 
independent Greek state (characterized in part by the legal recognition of Orthodox 
Christianity as the dominant religion).  Bulgaria, by contrast, lay near the center of 
the Ottoman territories and received foreign nationalistic ideas much more slowly.  
Slavs in the Balkans, at least initially, were isolated by the lack of education and a 
common identity, and only later began to coalesce under the pressure of Hapsburg 
and Ottoman imperial misrule.21  “The conventional view that the French Revolution, 
the communications revolution caused by Napoleon’s campaigns, and German 
philosophic teachings combined into a force that occasioned national and nationalist 
reverberations throughout the continent does not hold in the case of the southern 
Slavs.”22  Yet in all cases the formation of autocephalous churches accompanied the 
emergence of these new states.  Therefore nationalism alone is an insufficient 
explanation for the organizational changes that occurred within the churches in these 
territories.
 The nationalism theory also presupposes a somewhat oversimplified view of 
the political history of the Christian East, one which views the Byzantine imperial 
legacy as having stunted the development of new permutations of the relationship 
21 These arguments will be traced out in greater detail in chapter 5. 
22 Ivo J. Lederer, “Nationalism and the Yugoslavs,” Nationalism In Eastern Europe, ed. Lederer and 
Peter F. Sugar (Seattle: University of Washington, 1969) 401. 
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between church and state conducive to the growth of civil society.  According to this 
argument, nationalism, when projected onto the political landscape of Eastern Europe 
during this period, accomplished more of a transposition of the Byzantine legacy onto 
a different political context than a transformation of the legacy itself.  Hungarian 
philosopher Jeno Szucs, in an analysis of Western Europe, noted that “[t]he West’s 
separation of the sacred and the secular, the ideological and political spheres, was 
uniquely fruitful, and without it the future ‘freedoms,’ the theoretical emancipation of 
‘society,’ the future nation-states, the Renaissance and the Reformation alike could 
never have ensued.”23  Mihaly Vajda, another Hungarian, indicated: “The really 
important feature of West European development from the Middle Ages onwards was 
the gradual separation of state and society.  Out of West European political and social 
disintegration and fragmentation there arose new urban communities within which the 
attitudes and behavior of individuals were shaped less and less by tradition … And – 
most importantly – relations among various social groups were settled by contract.”24
The beginnings of a civil society (in the sense of the formation of organizations and 
activities independent from political authorities and the state), appearing in the West 
by the 13th century, was altogether absent or at best greatly delayed and malformed in 
the East.  Thus 
In the West, significantly, it was increasingly assumed that ‘civil society’ 
should control the ruler and/or the state, whereas the much weaker forms of 
‘civil society’ that have emerged (if at all) in eastern Europe…have usually 
been seen as acting in opposition to the ruler/state.  In other words, while the 
West assumed an increasingly co-operative and consensual relationship 
between ‘civil society’ and the ruler/state, the East assumed a more combative 
23 Quoted in Robert Bideleux and Ian Jeffries, A History of Eastern Europe: Crisis and Change (New 
York: Routledge, 1998) 16-17. Full text in John Keane, ed., Civil Society and the State: New European 
Perspectives (London: Verso, 1993). 
24 Quoted in Bideleux and Jeffries 17.  Text in Keane (1993). 
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and antagonistic relationship between its relatively stunted ‘civil society’ and 
its generally stronger rulers and states.25
The result, according to the nationalism theory, is the enduring pattern of church-state 
relations visible in Eastern Europe through the 20th century.  This pattern has been 
characterized more politely in some studies as, for example, the “tactful pliancy” 
necessary for the Orthodox churches to survive in the face of typically hegemonic 
states.26  Less polite have been the descriptive terms generally characteristic of other 
studies, which have described the Orthodox churches as ceasaropapist, obsequious, 
compliant, slavish, subservient, and analogous in form and content to the Oriental 
despotisms of the Far East.27
 This characteristic subservience has been attributed to the enduring Byzantine 
political philosophy institutionalized within the church.  This philosophy, in its 
idealized form, could be described as 
The existence of a hierarchy of subordinate states revolving in obedient 
concord round the throne of the supreme autocrat in Constantinople, whose 
authority, in its rhythm and order, reproduced the harmonious movement 
given to the universe by its Creator.  [The] idea of the Byzantine oikoumene
[“inhabited realm”]… had strong religious overtones: for, as the emperor was 
God’s vicegerent on earth, and the empire the pattern and prefiguration of the 
heavenly kingdom, so was this supranational Christian community the God-
appointed custodian of the one true Orthodox faith, destined to fulfill this role 
until the last days and the coming of the Antichrist. … So firmly rooted was 
this concept of the universal empire, centered in Constantinople, that 
Byzantium’s bitterest enemies in Eastern Europe implicitly accepted it.28
The nationalism theory assumes that this political philosophy was in fact so firmly 
entrenched that it survived the advent of the modern nation-state in the West and 
25 Bideleux and Jeffries 18. 
26 See for example Steven Runciman, The Orthodox Churches and the Secular State (Auckland: 
Oxford University Press, 1971) 93, and also preface and chapter V. 
27 See, for example, the study by Bideleux and Jeffries. 
28 Dimitri Obolensky, The Byzantine Commonwealth: Eastern Europe, 500-1453 (New York: Praeger, 
1971) 272-73. 
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persisted under the guise of nationalism, or alternatively a Pan-Hellenic or Pan-Slavic 
chauvinism.  
The historical evidence suggests a slightly more complex picture, however.  In 
contrast to a model in which Byzantine political philosophy is propagated under the 
guise of modern nationalism, some studies have demonstrated that there was a fairly 
complete disjuncture between the Byzantine heritage and, for example, the evolution 
of the Russian and (later) the Balkan states toward more Western political 
philosophies.  Rather than the continuation of Byzantine political philosophy in the 
guise of Moscow as “Third Rome” (surviving both old Rome and Constantinople), or 
the juxtaposition of Western and Eastern political development suggested by Vajda 
and Szucs, there is instead evidence to suggest that pragmatic political considerations, 
rather than Byzantine universalism, were becoming important in Russia’s 
development as the dominant Eastern Christian state.  An examination of Russian 
foreign policy interests in the 15th and 16th centuries, for example, reveals that “in 
place of the medieval conception of a hierarchy of states, presided over by the 
Byzantine emperor, Ivan III and his successors were guided by the notion of a family 
of European nations whose sovereigns were equal in status.”29 Realpolitik
considerations focusing on irredentist claims in Kievan territories, necessitating peace 
with the Ottoman Empire, meant that “’Moscow the Second Kiev,’ not ‘Moscow the 
Third Rome’ was the hall-mark of [Russian] foreign policy” during that period.30  The 
religious messianic content of Byzantine universalism did not necessarily always 
29 Obolensky 365-66. 
30 Obolensky 365-66. 
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translate into organizational principles for the Russian church, which found itself 
existing within a state influenced increasingly by Western political principles.   
It is in the Realpolitik of Ivan III, Basil III and Ivan IV that we can detect the 
clearest signs of Russia’s ‘turning away’ from the political heritage of 
Byzantium.  And it is significant that this process, which began in the late 
fifteenth century, coincided with the growth of the country’s diplomatic and 
cultural relations with the West.  Two and a half centuries later, after the 
westernizing reforms of Peter the Great, Russia became – as she had been in 
the eleventh and twelfth centuries – an integral part of the European state 
system.31
Another example can be found in Romania, another confessionally Orthodox 
country with its own autocephalous church and a complex history that defies simple 
categorization under the nationalism theory.  Viewing the present organizational 
configuration of the Romanian church (autocephalous, with a patriarchate) through 
the prism of nationalism is reductionistic, presuming as it does a great deal about both 
the national history of the modern Romanian state and the role (and efficacy) of the 
church in national consolidation and the attainment of national goals.  While it is 
beyond the scope of this study to examine the Romanian case in any detail, it is worth 
heeding Stephen Fischer-Galati’s warning that 
The nationalist interpretation of the history of the Romanians is flawed in 
several major respects.  First, it is absurd to argue that the primary purpose of 
the Romanians has been, throughout their history, the reestablishment of the 
unitary, national, state of their Dacian ancestors and making the supreme 
sacrifice in battle for the attainment of that goal.  Second, it is equally absurd 
to argue that the ultimate socio-political goal of the Romanians was the 
establishment of a national-socialist order of the right or of the left or, for that 
matter, of a bourgeois democratic one.  Finally, it is as erroneous to ascribe a 
decisive role to the Orthodox Church in promoting the attainment of the 
presumed ultimate goals of the Romanians as it is to exponents of other 
ideologies, doctrines, or dogmas.32
31 Obolensky 367. 
32 Stephen Fischer-Galati, “Relations Between Church and State in Contemporary Romania: 
Orthodoxy, Nationalism, and Communism,” in Clucas 288, italics added. 
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A final problem with the nationalism theory is a deceptively simple one – the 
anteriority of autocephaly itself to nationalism.  Autocephaly as an organizational 
form of the Orthodox Church predates modern nationalism by many centuries, 
appearing fairly early in the church’s history.  As will be demonstrated in more detail 
in chapters 3 and 4, the formal and informal institutions of the church, which govern 
and constrain the implementation of autocephaly, is itself a unique product of the 
political environment in which the church was born (the Roman Empire) and lived 
(the later Byzantine empire, the Ottoman period, imperial and Soviet Russia, etc.).  
The theory advanced in this study – that autocephaly as a form of organizational 
change is a response to changes in political boundaries (the “geography”), constrained 
by the institutional framework of the church, and subject to enforcement – greatly 
predates the advent of nationalism and nationalist revolutions in Europe.  Generally 
speaking, changes in the church’s organizational structure correspond to changes in 
the political boundaries in which the church is situated, and this tendency toward 
what is called territorial accommodation33 is observable in the first five centuries of 
Christianity’s existence within the Roman Empire.  Certainly it occurs well before the 
emergence of national identity and nationalist projects in Europe.  Hence it is 
mistaken to characterize autocephaly as a “symptom” of modern nationalism. 
To reiterate, this is not to say that nationalism was not a factor, indeed an 
important one, in the establishment of autocephalous churches during the last three 
centuries.  Certainly the conflict, for example, between the forces of pan-Hellenism 
and pan-Slavism in Eastern and Southern Europe (which paradoxically witnessed 
33 A term used by Pierre L’Hullier, Francis Dvornik, Dimitry Pospielovsky, and others.  See chapters 3 
and 4 of this study. 
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fragmentation, rather than consolidation, along religious and national lines) point to 
the importance of national aspirations.  One need look no further than a statement by 
Russian hierarch Porfirii Uspenskii in the mid-19th century: “Russia from eternity has 
been ordained to illumine Asia and unite all the Slavs.  There will be a union of all 
Slav races with Armenia, Syria, Arabia, and Ethiopia and they will all praise God in 
Hagia Sophia.”34  A curious symmetry with these words can be found in another 
statement attributed to one Greek advocate of pan-Hellenic irredentism of the same 
period: “Our country is the vast territory of which Greek is the language, and the faith 
of the Greek Orthodox Church is the religion.  Our capital is Constantinople; our 
national temple is [Hagia] Sophia, for nine hundred years the glory of Christendom.  
As long as that temple, that capital, and that territory are profaned and oppressed by 
Mussulmans, Greece would be disgraced if she were tranquil.”35  Nationalism and 
national identity (imagined, constructed, or otherwise) matter in the history of modern 
Eastern Europe, and this study does not attempt to argue otherwise.36  It will argue, 
however, that we need to look beyond nationalism to explain the organizational 
changes we observe in the Orthodox Church. 
34 Cited in Theofanis G. Stavrou, “Russian Policy in Constantinople and Mount Athos in the 
Nineteenth Century,” in Clucas 225. 
35 Nassau W. Senior, “A Journal Kept in Turkey and Greece in the Autumn of 1857 and the Beginning 
of 1858” (London, 1859) 358, cited in Richard Clogg, “The Byzantine Legacy in the Modern Greek 
World: The Megali Idea,” in Clucas 253. 
36 The classic example of the close interrelationship between nationalism and autocephaly is the case of 
post-Soviet Ukraine.  There is a large and growing body of research on this particular topic.  For 
background on the growth of Ukrainian national identity and national construction against the 
backdrop of the legacy of Austrian, Polish, and Russian rule see, for example, Andrei S. Markovits and 
Frank E. Sysyn, eds., Nationbuilding and the Politics of Nationalism: Essays on Austrian Galicia
(Cambridge: Harvard University Ukrainian Research Institute, 1982). 
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2.4 Summary and Assessment 
An extensive treatment of nationalism in this context is well beyond the scope 
of this study, and the objective here is not to claim that nationalism was an 
unimportant or irrelevant factor either in church-state relations or in the church as a 
vehicle of national identity or national aspirations.37  We will grant the tremendous 
importance of nationalism and not deny that it is germane to the problem – 
autocephaly – at hand.  However, the argument here is that treating autocephaly as a 
function both of nationalism and of the instinctive subservience of the church to the 
state characteristic of the Christian East is insufficient.  This study remains focused 
on autocephaly as a form of organizational change, and argues that there are reasons, 
institutional in nature, why the Orthodox Church assumes the organizational forms it 
does, which have nothing to do with nationalism. 
To find these reasons we need to focus on the church itself as an organization 
governed by a specific institutional framework and in so doing hopefully 
problematize new areas for future research.  To focus analytically on the church 
requires an alternative theory that takes the church as its object, which nationalism as 
an existing theory does not do.  The enduring organizational patterns particular to the 
Orthodox Church are shaped by the church’s institutional framework, and this 
framework reflects the environment of the Roman Empire in which the church 
evolved.  Taking an analytical approach that places analytical primacy on the 
institutional framework, which predates in its origin the modern period, may in fact 
37 There is an abundant literature on this topic. In the case of Russia and the Russian church, an 
insightful and generally respected study can be found in Edward C. Thaden, Conservative Nationalism 
in Nineteenth Century Russia (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964). 
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provide a more complete explanation for the organizational patterns we observe in the 
modern period.  As one specialist has noted, 
One may suggest that the difficulty which some historians have experienced 
in explaining how the political independence of the medieval peoples of 
Eastern Europe could be reconciled with their recognition of the emperor’s 
supremacy will appear less intractable if their links with the empire are 
viewed not from the standpoint of modern inter-state relations, nor in terms of 
a conflict between ‘nationalism’ and ‘imperialism,’ but in the context of the 
Byzantine Commonwealth, that supranational community of Christian states 
of which Constantinople was the center and Eastern Europe the peripheral 
domain.38
Our exploration of the institutional framework of the Orthodox Church and the way 
in which it enables and constrains organizational change will be the focus of the next 
three chapters. 
38 Obolensky 277. 
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Chapter 3: Autocephaly as Organizational Change Under Institutional 
Constraints – The Alternative Theory 
This study seeks to understand the predominance of a particular organizational 
form (autocephaly), and in chapter 2 we found nationalism to be an unsatisfactory and 
insufficient explanation.  Our task then is to develop an alternative theory, and in 
doing so we will define the church as an organization governed by, and 
simultaneously influencing, specific and enduring institutions.39  Our alternative 
theory argues that (1) organizational changes in the church (autocephaly being a 
predominant one) tend to correspond to changes in political boundaries (the 
“geography”), (2) the church’s institutional framework constrains agents’ efforts to 
implement those organizational changes, and (3) the effectiveness of those 
institutional constraints depends upon the credibility of enforcement.  According to 
this theory, where we observe changes in political boundaries, the dissolution or 
consolidation of states, or other political reconfigurations, we should expect to see 
efforts to implement corresponding organizational changes in the church, within 
institutional limits, subject to enforcement by a third party (usually the state).  To the 
extent this theory holds, we must look in two places – the institutional framework and 
39 There is a large literature on institutions, transactions costs, and organizations.  This discussion 
draws heavily upon analysis and insights drawn from, among others, North, Institutions, Institutional 
Change and Economic Performance; Oliver Williamson, The Mechanisms of Governance (New York: 
Oxford, 1990); North, Structure and Change in Economic History (New York: Norton & Co., 1981); 
North and Barry Weingast, “Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing 
Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England,” The Journal of Economic History XLIX.4 (1989): 
803-32; Williamson, “Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural 
Alternatives,” Administrative Science Quarterly 36.2 (1991): 269-97; Stefano Fiori, “Alternative 
Visions of Change in Douglass North’s New Institutionalism,” Journal of Economic Issues 36.4 (2002) 
1025-44; William Dugger, “Douglass C. North’s New Institutionalism,” Journal of Economic Issues
29.2 (1995): 453-59. 
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the political geography – to understand why the church has certain organizational 
forms at given points in history, and why those forms endure and change under 
different circumstances.   
3.1 Autocephaly as Accommodation to the Political Geography 
We begin with the assertion that the organizational form of the church at any 
given time is intimately related to the political geography, meaning the political 
boundaries of the state in which a particular church is embedded.  The reconfiguration 
of that geography – the devolution of an empire into discrete states, for example – 
prompts corresponding changes to the church’s organizational form.  This may 
happen for many different reasons.  Sometimes it is untenable for a single church to 
maintain relationships of dependency or hierarchy across new political boundaries 
(e.g. with the governance structures and funds residing in one newly-formed state, 
and a subordinate diocese residing in the other), forcing what was once a single 
ecclesiastical unit to subdivide into administratively autonomous units.  Often (as 
noted in chapter 2) it has proven politically advantageous for ecclesiastical 
boundaries to mimic political ones.  Self-government for a church suddenly 
embedded within a newly autonomous political unit is not automatic, however, and 
organizational change cannot occur without restriction.  Institutional constraints limit 
the ability of agents to effect organizational change through the redrawing of 
ecclesiastical boundaries.  Autocephaly presupposes the meeting of certain 
institutionally-mandated criteria, and third-party enforcement must be credible to 
ensure those institutional rules are adhered to. 
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What are those institutionally-mandated criteria?  Simply put, autocephaly 
presumes a degree of ecclesiastical development on the part of the nascent 
autocephalous church in order for it to be validly declared self-governing: 
[A] part of the Orthodox Church claiming to be autocephalous must be 
sufficiently mature to organize its own ecclesiastical life; it must have a 
sufficient number of parishes and parishioners, the possibility of training new 
clergymen, and a hierarchy canonically capable of making subsequent 
appointment of new bishops”… significantly with regard to the latter, the 
capability to not only ordain (per Apostolic canon 1 requiring only two 
bishops), but also the ability to appoint (per First Ecumenical Council canon 4, 
requiring at least three ruling bishops).40
This in turn means that autocephalous churches cannot arise ex nihilo, necessarily 
because, given the role of apostolic succession in the church (the idea of unbroken 
continuity of the church hierarchy back to the apostolic period), the very identity of a 
particular local church, embodied in the person of its senior-most bishop, must come 
via ordination by other bishops in another (parent) church.  Hence
Since no autocephalous Church has the right to appoint bishops for any but 
her own dioceses, a bishop of a new Church originally had to be appointed by 
ruling bishops of one of the established Autocephalous Churches to a diocese 
of that particular [nascent autocephalous] Church.  As a result, the whole 
church region claiming autocephalous status must be part of an [existing] 
Autocephalous Church, her diocese, or her mission.41
Therefore it is axiomatic that “[n]ew churches always originate from existing 
autocephalous Churches…Any ecclesiastical region which was not part of an 
Autocephalous Local Church and whose administration was not organized by that 
Church, may not claim to be autocephalous.”42  In other words, a parent church 
begets a subsidiary, and per the institutions of the church, the autocephaly of the 
40 Bogolepov 14. 
41 Bogolepov 14. 
42 Bogolepov 15.  
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mature subsidiary comes with the formal consent of the parent.  All these criteria for 
autocephaly form part of the institutional framework governing organizational change.  
These formal and informal rules will be probed more deeply in chapter 4. 
Since particular churches are located within specific political territories (e.g. 
empires, kingdoms, states), the administrative or ecclesiastical demarcations of the 
church typically corresponded fairly closely to the political demarcations of that 
territory (although that correspondence began to collapse in what we will term the 
post-national period, outlined in chapter 5).  Rearrangement of those political 
demarcations necessarily entails a corresponding rearrangement of ecclesiastical 
boundaries.  To the extent that process of rearrangement of political boundaries yields 
an independent political entity, the ecclesiastical counterpart often is an 
autocephalous church.  The autocephalous church is administratively independent and 
is characterized by “the coincidence of [its] jurisdictional boundaries with those of the 
corresponding state.”43  The “corresponding state” plays a significant role as a third-
party enforcer of institutional rules governing organizational change, and acts as the 
logical protector of the church located within its political boundaries.  As we will see 
in chapter 4, the institutional framework actually presupposes, and to a large extent 
depends upon, this unique role for the state. 
Our alternative theory therefore suggests that in conditions of relative political 
quiescence we expect to see a corresponding degree of stability in the church’s 
internal organization (for example, the ecclesiastical organization of the church in its 
earlier centuries corresponded largely to the major metropoles and provincial 
43 J Kamires, Greek Encyclopedia for Religion and Ethics, cited in John H. Erickson, “The 
Autocephalous Church,” The Challenge of Our Past 92. 
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boundaries of the Roman Empire, so long as the empire remained intact).  Redrawing 
of boundaries within principalities or empires, the devolution of empires into discrete 
states, political upheavals within and among states, or all three of these phenomena, 
tend to result in corresponding changes in ecclesiastical organizational forms.  This 
tendency by the church toward “territorial accommodation,”44 manifesting itself 
during the period of the Eastern Roman (Byzantine) Empire in what some specialists 
have termed a “Byzantine theocracy,”45 persisted even after the collapse of the empire 
itself.  The imprimatur by the state of ecclesiastical organization continued to be 
considered by the church as a necessary precondition for organizational decisions and 
was instrumental in the notion of the coincidence and co-location of state and church 
persisting through the 20th century.46
Therefore, to understand why autocephaly occurs we must note those changes 
in the political geography (the independent variables) that prompt the church to make 
particular organizational changes (the dependent variable) according to constraints 
imposed by the institutional framework.  As we will see in a brief survey of empirical 
data in chapter 5, factors favoring organizational change include, but may not 
necessarily be limited to: (1) a disjuncture, often prolonged, between ecclesiastical 
and political boundaries; (2) an irregular, disrupted, or dysfunctional ecclesiastical 
relationship between the parent and subsidiary churches which must be renegotiated; 
and (3) an alignment of incentives among agents favoring organizational change.  The 
44 Cf. L’Hullier, Pospielovsky and others. 
45 See for example Alexander Schmemann, “Byzantine Theocracy and the Orthodox Church,” St. 
Vladimir's Seminary Quarterly 1.2 (1953). 
46 Schmemann, “Problems of Orthodoxy in America,” St. Vladimir's Seminary Quarterly 8.2 (1964): 
67-85.
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extent to which institutional rules are able to constrain the activities of these agents 
toward change is contingent upon the credibility of enforcement.  Relative quiescence 
in the political geography – where agents perceive the organizational status quo meets 
their needs, where incentives for change are low and costs high – tends to create 
conditions less conducive to organizational change. 
3.2 The Institutional Framework: Contractual Relationships and Transaction 
Costs
We now turn to the institutional framework itself, a topic that will occupy the 
rest of this chapter and much of the next.  Institutions “exert patterned higher-order 
effects on the actions, indeed the constitution, of individuals and organizations 
without requiring repeated collective mobilization or authoritative intervention to 
achieve these regularities.”47  Organizations in turn “are created with purposive intent 
in consequence of the opportunity set resulting from the existing set of 
constraints…and in the course of attempts to accomplish their objectives are a major 
agent of institutional change.”48  Specific autocephalous churches – organizations – 
exist in distinct places, times, and political circumstances, but all are derived from 
and adhere to a set of shared arrangements and constraints – institutions – which 
govern their configuration and interrelationships.
What do these interrelationships look like?  New Institutional Economics has 
drawn a helpful distinction between the institutional environment (i.e. the “rules of 
47 Ronald L. Jepperson, “Institutions, Institutional Effects, and Institutionalism,” The New 
Institutionalism in Organizational Sociology, ed. W.W. Powell and P.J. Dimaggio (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1991): 143-163, cited in Clemens and Cook, “Politics and 
Institutionalism: Explaining Durability and Change,” Annual Review of Sociology 25 (1999): 444-45. 
48 North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance 5. 
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the game”) and institutions of governance (e.g. markets, or in the case of the church, 
hierarchies).49  If it is true, as Oliver Williamson has noted, that “institutions of 
governance operate at the level of individual transactions,”50 then it is useful to focus 
analytically on the institutions of governance that determine how ecclesiastical agents 
relate to, or contract among, one another.  Doing so will help us understand how 
organizational change occurs and the role institutions play in constraining the 
activities of those agents. 
Williamson reminds us that “[g]overnance is also an exercise in assessing the 
efficacy of alternative modes (means) of organization.  The object is to effect good 
order through mechanisms of governance.  A governance structure is thus usefully 
thought of as an institutional framework in which the integrity of a transaction, or 
related set of transactions, is decided.”51  The institutional framework of the church 
thus determines the ordering and shape of churches as organizations, and these 
organizations – for our purposes considered as analogous to economic agents – 
contract with one another according to constraints imposed by the institutional 
framework.  Because “[t]aking the institutional environment as given, economic 
agents purportedly align transactions with governance structures to effect 
economizing outcomes,”52 and because these contractual interactions are not cost free 
(due to the lack of perfect information, the need for enforcement, etc.), particular 
churches as economic agents will try to contract in such a way as to minimize 
transaction costs.  We know this because transactions, “which differ in their attributes, 
49 Oliver Williamson, The Mechanisms of Governance (New York: Oxford, 1996) 4-5. 
50 Williamson 5. 
51 Williamson 11. 
52 Williamson 5. 
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are aligned with governance structures, which differ in their cost and competences, so 
as to effect a discriminating – mainly a transaction cost-economizing – result.”53
Particular churches therefore are aligned in contractual relationships governed 
by an institutional framework, which with credible enforcement makes defection 
from those institutional rules costly.  The interrelations between particular churches, 
as with any other organization, can be considered contractual because they include 
the exchange of goods and services which comprise a web of interdependent linkages.  
These relationships may be either hierarchical – as with parent-subsidiary 
relationships – or horizontal – as between self-governing autocephalous churches.  In 
all cases and at all levels, however, the relationships are contractual: clergy – needed 
by the bishop to perform sacramental functions locally in the bishop’s stead – cannot 
legally perform those functions without the bishop’s authorization, and should the 
priest fail to discharge his duties in the prescribed manner that authorization can be 
withdrawn.  A subsidiary bishop is dependent upon a patriarch for the chrism used to 
anoint laity and, historically, consecrate emperors, and this could be withheld should 
the patriarch see the need to censure a subordinate.   A subsidiary church is dependent 
upon its parent, at least initially, for funds, clergy, and organizational support, while 
the parent eventually may come to rely upon the subsidiary as a source of revenue, 
resources, and influence.  A nascent autocephalous church requires official 
recognition from its parent and/or other autocephalous churches to validate its own 
autocephaly.  In all cases and at all levels, an institutional framework binds the 
contracting “parties” (ecclesiastical organizations) together according to rules that 
provide incentives for both enforcement and compliance. 
53 Williamson 12. 
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However, the institutional framework alone is insufficient to fully enforce 
contracts and prevent defection, and some sort of third-party enforcer is necessary to 
ensure compliance.54  By enforcement we mean specifically the activities of a third 
party – in this case, the political authority or state – to ensure rules are adhered to and 
contractual relationships honored.  However, the same power that enables the state to 
enforce contracts also enables the state to break them, and hence political authorities 
have been able to reconfigure – often unilaterally – ecclesiastical boundaries 
commensurate with rearrangements of the political geography.  For the same reason 
unrestrained ecclesiastical “recontracting” occurs when the state is not present as an 
enforcer.  This janus-faced depiction of the state as contract enforcer and breaker 
alike is not surprising in light of North's analysis: 
Third-party enforcement means the development of the state as a coercive 
force able to monitor property rights and enforce contracts effectively, but no 
one at this stage in our knowledge knows how to create such an 
entity.  Indeed, with a strictly wealth-maximizing behavioral assumption it is 
hard even to create such a model abstractly.  Put simply, if the state has 
coercive force, then those who run the state will use that force in their own 
interest at the expense of the rest of society.55
Historically in the Christian East the political authority (originally the imperial 
authority, later the state) played this role, ensuring that the organization of the church 
was stable and uniform when necessary, and in a shape generally conducive to state 
interests.  Empirically, we note that during those periods when the state was absent as 
enforcer or redefined its relationship with the church in adversarial rather than 
cooperative terms, church organization invariably broke down. 
54 Technically, the state as third party enforcer “enforce[s] agreements such that the offending party 
always had to compensate the injured party to a degree that made it costly to violate the contract.”  See 
North 58. 
55 North 59. 
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There have been two long periods when Christianity did not enjoy the support 
of the state: the three centuries before Constantine and the two centuries since 
the eighteenth century when some European states and the United States 
abandoned Christianity as the state religion.  Even some European countries, 
such as England, which kept a state church, relaxed their efforts to compel 
unity. The experience of both periods suggests that when it is left to its own 
resources, Christianity is very prone to split over disputes concerning belief, 
organization, and discipline.56
Church and state, particularly in the Christian East as noted in chapter 2, existed in a 
relationship characterized by bargaining and negotiation.  The state, occupying the 
role of enforcer of the church’s institutional rules governing organization, was 
permitted by the church occasionally to exploit this relationship to pursue its own 
interests.  The church ceded some control to the state to secure its own protection and 
survival.  The state in turn accepted the church to help ensure its own legitimacy.  We 
note empirically that periods of political turbulence involving, for example, regime 
change and the demarcation of new political boundaries would result in renegotiation 
of this relationship according to the institutional rules established by the church with 
the consent of the state.  Since because of these rules ecclesiastical boundaries tend to 
follow political ones, these renegotiated relationships often would manifest 
themselves in organizational changes within the church, e.g. the establishment (or 
occasionally the abolishment) of autocephalous churches, changes which themselves 
presuppose the restructuring of relationships among particular churches. 
A restructuring of the organizational relationships between churches (i.e. from 
hierarchical to horizontal, subsidiary to autocephalous) presupposes a fundamental 
realignment of bargaining power, objectives, and interests (i.e. a change in relative 
prices) between the parent church and its subsidiary.  Since autocephaly presupposes 
56 Joseph H. Lynch, The Medieval Church (London: Longman Group, 1992) 11, italics added. 
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a recalibration of the relationship between parent and subsidiary from one of 
dependence to one of independence, a change in the institutional equilibrium 
governing the relationship between parent and subsidiary is a precondition for 
autocephaly to occur.  Institutional equilibrium may be defined as 
a situation where given the bargaining strength of the players and the set of 
contractual bargains that made up total economic exchange, none of the 
players would find it advantageous to devote resources into restructuring the 
agreements.  Note that such a situation does not imply that everyone is happy 
with the existing rules and contracts, but only that the relative costs and 
benefits of altering the game among the contracting parties does not make it 
worthwhile to do so.  The existing institutional constraints defined and created 
the equilibrium.57
The conditions noted in section 3.1 as “conducive” to organizational change are so 
designated because they enable a disruption of this equilibrium – an exogenous shock 
to the system precipitating organizational change.  Empirically this means that 
instances of organizational change (e.g. autocephaly) usually occur “illegally,”58
which is to say through the breaking of (defection from) the contractual relationship, 
governed by a common institutional framework and enforced by the state, between 
two ecclesiastical parties.  When the state is either in an adversarial role or absent as 
an enforcer, the costs of defection are further reduced (particularly when defection is 
in the state’s interest), and it becomes possible for organizational changes to occur 
(e.g. autocephaly) that are contentious and disputed by both parties.  The parties may 
appeal to the same institutional framework, but without third-party enforcement 
57 North 86. 
58 “Illegal” meaning specifically violation of the institutional rules on which the relationship was based, 
or in other words, defection.  This characterization of the way in which autocephaly historically has 
been declared was used recently by Robert Taft in interview with John J. Allen, published in The 
National Catholic Reporter 6 Feb. 2004, Religious Information Service of Ukraine, 13 Feb. 2004 
<http://www.RISU.org.ua>.
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resolution of such disputes typically remains elusive, and the contended 
organizational changes tend to remain in place.  As we will see in chapter 5, this 
tendency – evidenced by an increasing number of organizational splits, subdivisions, 
and fractures – is what we observe with increasing frequency in the experience of 
Orthodox churches particularly from the 18th through 20th centuries. 
 New Institutional Economics thus provides analytical insights – in terms of 
institutions, organizations, mechanisms of governance, transaction costs and 
enforcement – that are useful for understanding, albeit in a very rudimentary way, 
why and how autocephaly occurs.  Next we will consider the institutional framework 
governing organizational change, a discussion that will carry over into chapter 4. 
3.3 The Institutional Framework: Councils, Ecclesiastical Legislation, and the 
State
What comprises the institutions of governance of the Orthodox Church?  The 
church derived its understanding of autocephaly gradually and incrementally, and this 
process must be located within the broader evolution of the church’s understanding of 
governance.  From its very beginning the church recognized that matters of dogma, 
ecclesiastical discipline, and administration affecting the whole community of 
Christians were to be discussed by representatives drawn from particular local 
churches, duly assembled in council.  For the canons or laws voted by a council to be 
considered binding, the council had to acquire a universal or “ecumenical” status, 
meaning that it represented the interests of, and its decisions were accepted and 
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acknowledged to be binding upon, all the churches.  The first seven such general 
councils (as distinguished from regional synods convened to resolve purely local 
problems), jointly recognized as ecumenical by both Western and Eastern 
(Chalcedonian) churches, voted much of the canonical legislation from which the 
institutional rules governing organizational change were and are derived.59
According to one 11th century Byzantine historian, these councils “were 
named ecumenical, because bishops of the whole Roman Empire were invited by
imperial orders and in each of them…there was discussion of the faith and a vote, i.e. 
dogmatic formulae were promulgated.”60  The councils thus received imperial as well 
as ecclesiastical sanction and therefore could be considered universal insofar as they 
were binding on the church throughout the whole of the “inhabited realm” 
(oikoumene) of the empire.  Hence the concept of legislation through council is rooted 
in the political relationship that existed between the Roman Empire and the church, 
and in Roman law.  Byzantine political philosophy specified a role for the political 
authority (the emperor) that delineated clearly his position as the enforcing agent for 
the institutions of the church in the Christian East: 
The basic principle was laid down in the Code of Justinian: between the 
emperor and the Church there is symphonia, ‘harmony’.  In this music, the 
complementary voices have each their own part.  The emperor realizes in the 
public forum the dogmatic faith determined by the bishops.  He summons 
synods, and actualizes their decisions, but he does not define the Symbol, the 
faith of the Church.  This was the fundamental theory, transgressed on 
numerous occasions, but never abandoned.61
59 There has been no council convened since the second council in Nicaea in 787 that the Orthodox 
churches consider to be ecumenical.  Hence there has been no universally-accepted formal canonical 
legislation governing or clarifying the content of autocephaly since then. 
60 Cedrenus, Hist I, 3, ed, (Bonn, 1838) 39, cited in Meyendorff, “What is an Ecumenical Council?” 
Living Tradition 54, italics added. 
61 Aidan Nichols, Rome and the Eastern Churches: A Study in Schism (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 
1992) 142.  See also Francis Dvornik, Early Christian and Byzantine Political Philosophy (Washington: 
Dumbarton Oaks, 1960). 
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The need within the church for universal episcopal consensus was expressed 
through councils thus convened.  Emperors on the eastern side of the empire played 
the role of political protector (enforcer) of the universal (meaning, at that time, 
coextensive with the Roman Empire) church, and hence bore the authority to convene 
councils, so “[t]he word ‘ecumenical’ itself reflects the Byzantine politico-religious 
view of society.”62  A given council’s ecumenical status thus presupposed both 
imperial imprimatur and participation (and approval) by all, or the majority of, 
particular churches.  No council truly had all bishops present by any means, however, 
and just because a council convened did not necessarily mean it automatically would 
attain “ecumenical” status.63
The organizational structure (ecclesiology) of the church in its early centuries 
conformed to the political boundaries of the Roman Empire.  Likewise, the earliest 
church councils were informed by and conformed to the rules and practices of the 
Roman senate, with the emperor playing a key role in the convocation of the early 
councils.  However, since in Roman legislation the emperor did not have voting rights 
in the senate, the emperor likewise in the transposed context of the church council did 
not have voting rights, which were reserved exclusively for bishops.  So a continuity 
in function was preserved with regard to the emperor in the newly Christian empire,64
and this continuity evolved into the durable concept of symphony between church and 
state that would continue to characterize the Christian East up through the 20th
62 Meyendorff 53-55. 
63 Meyendorff 53-55. 
64 Francis Dvornik, The Ecumenical Councils (New York: Hawthorn, 1961) 9-17. 
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century.  This had important organizational implications, because changes in church 
organization by definition had political as well as ecclesiological overtones: 
According to the principle of harmony (symphonia) between Sacerdotium and 
Imperium, problems related to the formation, abolishment and adjustment of 
boundaries of large Church entities necessarily needed imperial involvement.  
In fact, this is understandable because such actions usually had political 
implications.  Yet, a point should be underlined: In those matters, imperial 
government could hardly make an arbitrary decision.  It had to take into 
account the ancient customs of the Church, especially when they had been 
confirmed by nomocanonical legislation.65
Therefore canonical legislation properly is understood to operate as an institutional 
constraint on attempts by agents to change church organization, even if one of those 
agents was the state itself. 
The state, therefore, has always occupied a unique role with regard to 
organizational change in the church.  However, unlike the almost unrestricted sphere 
of influence vis-à-vis the church ascribed to the state in the nationalism theory, the 
state’s role in fact was confined largely to the area of enforcement.  During the 
Roman and Byzantine periods the imperial role vis-à-vis the formation of the 
church’s institutional framework remained significant, particularly given that the 
Byzantine emperor had a responsibility for both civil and ecclesiastical law.66
Contrary to the assumptions of the nationalism theory, which ascribes organizational 
change largely to politics and the state, the church’s institutional framework, though 
envisioning a critical role for the state, subsumed sources of authority unique to the 
church.  Those sources of authority, comprising both formal and informal rules, were 
65 Pierre L’Hullier, “Accession to Autocephaly,” St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly 37.4 (1993): 
275, italics added. 
66 J.M. Hussey, The Orthodox Church in the Byzantine Empire (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986) 300.  See 
also Nichols 140-41. 
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well defined by the 5th and 6th centuries: scripture (the Gospels); apostolic traditions 
(recorded often in scripture such as the Book of Acts but handed down via church 
tradition); patristic sources (varied in content but generally referring to the 3rd, 4th,
and 5th century “fathers” of the church whose writings were recognized to be highly 
influential and often normative); and the decisions of the councils themselves, in 
terms of dogmatic and disciplinary canons voted at those councils; and finally, 
imperial legislation (decisions by emperors on ecclesiastical matters, although those 
touching on dogmatic issues ultimately were validated or rejected in council).67
These latter two phenomena – ecclesiastical and imperial legislation concerning 
church affairs – meant there were two sources of canon law, which were brought 
together as nomocanons.  The church thus had a broad and often disparate 
institutional framework to draw upon with regard to disciplinary and organizational 
issues (such as autocephaly), and many efforts by later canonists to reconcile and 
systematize these various sources did not necessarily bring about uniformity of 
opinion and legal precedent.68  The framework presupposed, however, a specific role 
for the state as protector and enforcer. 
3.4 Institutional Change: Evolution of the Framework 
 We have noted that the church has an institutional framework that governs 
organizational change.  Our theoretical understanding of institutions, however, also 
presupposes that the institutional framework itself changes, often in conjunction with 
the activities of the organizations they govern, as indicated in North’s definition in 
67 To be discussed in greater detail in chapter 4. 
68 Hussey 304-06. 
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section 3.2 above.  However, we must attempt to understand with somewhat greater 
clarity the actual mechanisms by which institutions change.  Doing so will help us 
test our alternative theory and refine our understanding of the institutional framework 
of the church.  One theoretical approach to characterizing institutional change starts 
with two presuppositions.  First is the idea that “actors not only have preferences over 
institutions, but also compete to bring about their preferred versions of them.  
Institutions are thus contested.”69  The second presupposition is that changes in the 
environment – specifically in this case, the political geography in which the 
institutional framework is embedded and in which the church as organization operates 
– is relevant to understanding how and under what circumstances institutional change 
occurs.  Shifts in the political geography, as already described in our alternative 
theory, can precipitate organizational change.  However, such shifts, insofar as they 
affect or modify the foundation (for example, the notion of Byzantine theocracy) on 
which the institutional framework is built, can change the institutions themselves.  
“[I]f institutions rest on and reflect a particular foundation (whether efficiency-based, 
or power-based, or cultural)…then they should change as a result of shifts of these 
underlying conditions.”70  Alternatively, “[i]nstitutions rest on a set of ideational and 
material foundations that, if shaken, open possibilities for change.  But different 
institutions rest on different foundations, and so the processes that are likely to disrupt 
them will also be different, though predictable.”71
69 Jeffrey Stacey and Berthold Rittberger, “Dynamics of Formal and Informal Institutional Change in 
the EU,” Journal of European Public Policy 10.6 (2003): 861. 
70 Kathleen Thelen, “How Institutions Evolve: Insights from Comparative-Historical Analysis” 
(manuscript), cited in Stacey and Rittberger 864. 
71 Kathleen Thelen, “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics,” Annual Review of Political 
Science 2 (1999): 397, cited in Lindner 916. 
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 Institutional change therefore can be defined as “the introduction of new rules 
or rule interpretations that supplement or replace existing rules and interpretations.”72
Johannes Lindner has described a useful typology involving two forms of institutional 
change: those that cause formal changes (actual alterations) to the institutional rules, 
and those that do not.  According to this typology, agents recontracting among one 
another gravitate toward options for interpreting the institutional framework in ways 
most conducive to their own organizational interests and that involve least risk and 
cost.  Three such options do not formally change the institutional rules.  One of these 
is unilateral reinterpretation of the rules to the advantage of a particular agent, usually 
when the threat of sanction by a third-party enforcer is low, which is an option 
involving least risk and cost to the agent.  A second option involves joint 
interpretation by two or more agents, which is “often preferred to formal rules 
changes because the less binding nature of joint interpretation inflicts lower 
sovereignty costs, and allows agents to change the agreements more easily.”73
Another option is third-party interpretation, in which agents, particularly when facing 
the undesirable possibility of unilateral interpretation by one agent or another, resort 
to adjudication by a third party.  This option risks, however, an interpretation of the 
institutional rules unfavorable to some or all the agents, and therefore is the costliest 
of the three mentioned so far.  A fourth option, unlike the previous three, involves 
formal change to the institutional rules and therefore is the highest-risk option, 
necessarily because “[c]ontracting costs and uncertainty over outcomes are high.  A 
formal change entails the risk that the whole package of formal rules is renegotiated, 
72 Johannes Lindner, “Institutional Stability and Change: Two Sides of the Same Coin,” Journal of 
European Public Policy 10.6 (2003): 913. 
73 Lindner 914. 
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including previously accepted rules.”74  Per Thelen,75 institutions rest on and are 
stabilized by specific foundations or “mechanisms of reproduction” of enduring 
institutions, the disruption of which is conducive to institutional change.  The stability 
of a coalition of agents with a vested interest in the existing institutional framework, 
prohibitively high costs associated with switching to a new institutional framework, 
and a durable preference for small-scale informal changes in lieu of formal 
institutional changes, are all reproduction mechanisms which, when disrupted, open 
the door to institutional change.76
 Using this analysis we can envision scenarios of formal and informal 
institutional change within the Orthodox Church.  As we will see in the next two 
chapters, the conditions or environment in which the church’s institutional framework 
is embedded change over time.  Furthermore, organizational agents prefer certain 
interpretations of formal and informal institutional rules (for example, those justifying 
a unilateral move toward autocephaly) over others, according to their own interests, 
and vie with one another to operationalize those interpretations.  Those agents may 
pursue a variety of options, at varying levels of cost, to achieve their objectives 
without risking formal changes to the institutions of the church.  One church might 
interpret the rules in such a way as to justify its own unilateral declaration of 
autocephaly, risking censure from other churches but facing little risk legal or 
political sanction (option one above).  A small coalition of two or more churches 
might agree upon a mutually-acceptable interpretation of the institutional framework 
that legitimizes organizational decisions in their mutual interest, an option preferable 
74 Lindner 915. 
75 Thelen, Historical Institutionalism 397, cited in Lindner 916. 
76 Lindner 916-19. 
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to unilateral action by one church but less risky than any attempt at formal rule 
change (option two above).  If unable to find a common interpretation of the rules 
acceptable to all, the churches might submit to arbitration by a third-party enforcer 
(usually the state) (option three above).  The most radical option (number four above), 
involving the highest cost and risk to all agents, would entail formal change to the 
institutional rules, which in the case of rules governing autocephaly is accomplished 
only through general council.  If the balance of power shifts in favor of a pro-change 
coalition of churches, if the costs of change decrease substantially relative to the costs 
of maintaining the institutional status quo, and/or if informal changes are no longer 
able to stave off the need for formal modification of the institutional framework, a 
general council presumably would convene and all churches would face the shared 
risk of embarking on a contentious process of formal institutional change, the 
outcome of which would be uncertain.  
 What we have, then, is a roadmap of rudimentary but useful indicators that 
will help us detect conditions under which changes to the church’s institutional 
framework might occur.  We will revisit these conditions in chapter 7 in an attempt to 
see if institutional change has occurred and, if it has, to characterize the type of 
change we have observed. 
3.5 Summary
Our alternative theory holds that the organizational shape of the Orthodox 
Church at any given time – manifested in the set of contractual relationships between 
its various local churches – is determined by its institutional framework and the 
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political geography in which it is embedded.  This alternative theory, by focusing on 
the institutional framework, goes much further than the nationalism theory in 
explaining how and why organizational change occurs.  Changes in the political 
geography are accommodated organizationally by the church according to constraints 
imposed by the institutional framework.  Autocephalous churches are the result of 
recalibrated contractual relationships between formerly united parent and subsidiary 
churches, with the state as a third party agent usually exercising a decisive role in the 
fate of the contractual relationship.  While the content of the institutional framework 
governing autocephaly is diverse and subject to multiple interpretations, autocephaly 
invariably is justified in specifically institutional terms.  So long as enforcement 
remains credible, defection from the organizational norms imposed by the 
institutional framework will remain costly; when enforcement decreases, those costs 
decrease and defection becomes increasingly likely.  Changes to the institutional 
framework, characterized in a variety of ways, can accompany organizational 
changes, depending upon the risk tolerance of the agents, the costs involved, and 
(again) credibility of enforcement.  With this theory in mind, we now turn to a more 
detailed exploration of the sources and content of the institutional framework itself. 
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Chapter 4: The Institutional Framework
 The previous chapter laid out our alternative theory and sketched, largely in 
theoretical terms, the conditions conducive to organizational change, how the 
institutional framework governs and constrains organizational change, the role of 
enforcement, and the way in which institutions themselves are modified by the 
organizations they govern.  This chapter will attempt to flesh out the alternative 
theory by describing in specific terms the content of the institutional framework of 
the Orthodox Church governing organizational change.  It will demonstrate how the 
institutional framework of the church evolved in the political geography of the 
Roman Empire and incorporated the organizational adaptations the church made to 
that geography.  The variety of rules in that framework – concerning territorial 
accommodation, the prioritization of sees, the rights of bishops and historically 
independent churches, and the role of established customs of administration – provide 
the institutional parameters governing autocephaly as a form of organizational change.  
How those parameters actually guided organizational change, and the role of state 
enforcement, will the subject of our historical survey in chapter 5. 
4.1 Territorial Accommodation and the Institutions of the Church 
The institutional rules governing the organization of the church evolved in the 
political context of the Roman Empire, and the church’s organizational patterns were 
profoundly and irrevocably shaped by Roman political and legal practices.  This 
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situation was accelerated by the legalization of the church under Constantine I (306-
337) and the subsequent adoption of Christianity as the official religion of the empire.  
The division of the empire into eastern and western halves under Diocletian (284-
305), and the survival through the 15th century of the eastern half as the Byzantine 
Empire with its capital in Constantinople, framed the various forms of ecclesiastical 
organization in the Christian East in terms that far outlived the political circumstances 
in which they arose.77  These organizational forms were validated and codified in 
ecclesiastical legislation voted at early church councils, and it is this legislation 
(formal rules), along with ancient custom and interpretations and applications of 
ecclesiastical legislation (informal rules), which comprise the bulk of the institutional 
framework governing church organization. 
It is important to reiterate that autocephaly, as a particular form of church 
organization, was not an invention of the church promulgated through ecclesiastical 
legislation.  Rather, the ecclesiastical legislation recognized and codified a form of 
organization already in existence.  Ecclesiastical boundaries by design largely 
corresponded to the political boundaries in which the church existed, and some 
churches were, by virtue of their unique situations or ancient prerogatives, self-
governing, while others were integrated into broader ecclesiastical structures.  As one 
specialist has noted: 
Even before the establishment of Christianity as the favored religion of the 
state, before structures of coordination were defined in written form by 
conciliar canons, ecclesiastical organization in the Roman Empire already was 
modeled along the lines of civil administration.   Roughly speaking and with 
several important exceptions, the churches of each province, headed by the 
metropolitan (i.e., the bishop of the capital city) and the other bishops, 
77 See overview in “Byzantine Christianity and Greek Orthodoxy,” Blackwell Dictionary of Eastern 
Christianity (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001) 97-102. 
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constituted what was in effect an autocephalous unit.  They were
autocephalous; they did not become autocephalous nor were they granted
autocephaly by some higher authority.78
This extant system of ecclesiastical organization, which presumed an organic linkage 
with political geography, enabled the church in the eastern part of the empire to 
organize itself in a coherent and consistent way.  The geography did not remain static, 
however, and as we will see in chapter 5, the church had to continually adjust its 
system of self-organization in tandem with corresponding changes in the political 
geography.  These adjustments were governed by the institutional framework as it 
evolved largely during the first five to seven centuries of the church’s existence. 
This deliberate correspondence of ecclesiastical to political boundaries, which 
has been termed by later scholars as territorial accommodation, 79 had three 
implications, per L’Hullier.  First, the primordial and irreducible ecclesiastical unit, 
the local church gathered around its bishop, could be unified into higher-level units 
that corresponded to civil boundaries such as provinces.  Second, territorial 
accommodation enabled a purely political prioritization of churches (as opposed to 
prioritization justified exclusively by divine right, as with Rome) in which bishops 
located in provincial capitals (metropolitan bishops) assumed a senior status among 
all local bishops; this later allowed certain important metropoles to emerge as 
ecclesial centers of gravity whose spheres of influence expanded over time.  Third, it 
permitted the church to acquire a political philosophy, reflected in its institutional 
framework, in which the emperor possessed a divinely instituted responsibility for the 
78 Erickson, The Challenge of Our Past 94, italics in original. 
79 As noted in chapter 3, this term is used by, among others, L’Hullier and Dvornik as an analytical 
category.  It was not a term used by the church at the time. 
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entirety of the Christian realm, even though his prerogatives did not extend to the 
sacerdotal.  The cumulative result was the integral role played by emperors (and 
subsequent political authorities) in the life of the church and the very close 
identification of church ecclesiology with political organization.80  The institutional 
rules governing autocephaly evolved directly from ecclesiastical legislation enacted 
in this context.
Territorial accommodation also provides the context for understanding 
autocephaly itself as an organizational form.  The institutions of the church, in the 
political context of the Roman Empire, mandated that all bishops in a given civil 
province were charged with coming together to elect and consecrate a new bishop 
among them (a minimum of three bishops were required), and the bishop of the 
metropolis of that province was recognized as the senior-most bishop (the primate) 
among the college of bishops.  To the extent no higher or external authority was 
required for the election and consecration of bishops, that territory, unified under its 
metropolitan bishop, constituted what could be described as a functionally 
independent or autocephalous unit. 
Although nowhere in the primary sources informing the institutional 
framework is the term “autocephaly” per se defined, some secondary sources (such as 
commentaries on disciplinary canons) have derived and applied the term in the 
context of primary sources.81  Three interpretations of how churches legitimately are 
to become autocephalous have coalesced over time, predicated upon the institutional 
80 Pierre L’Hullier, “Problems Concerning Autocephaly,” Greek Orthodox Theological Review
XXIV.2-3 (1979): 166. 
81 Lewis J. Patsavos, “Canon Law of the Orthodox Church,” course manual, Holy Cross School of 
Theology, 1975, 21. 
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rules governing church organization as they evolved over the first five to seven 
centuries of the church’s history.  Generally, autocephaly legitimately may be granted 
(1) by the nascent subsidiary’s parent church, (2) by the Ecumenical Patriarchate in 
Constantinople as the preeminent see, or (3) by an ecumenical council.  A fourth 
possibility, in which the validity of a new autocephalous church is predicated upon its 
recognition by the community of existing autocephalous churches, implies an even 
more contentious process than the other three and has almost never been observed in 
practice.82  In recent cases where churches are declared autocephalous, that act of 
organizational change consistently is justified on the basis of one of these three 
interpretations – which is to say, in specifically institutional terms.  This is not to say 
that the process is not contentious, however, and when the state is in either an 
adversarial role or absent as an enforcer, and the costs of defection from contractual 
relationships are reduced, organizational change occurs with little practical restriction 
by the institutional framework.  Historical cases of autocephaly will be examined in 
chapter 5 in the hope of demonstrating this phenomenon. 
82 These four scenarios are examined in, among others, Bogolepov, “Conditions” 11-37.  A council 
recognized by the Orthodox Church as ecumenical has not convened in over 1,000 years.  Other 
councils that have convened since the 9th century in both the Eastern (Orthodox) and Western (Roman 
Catholic) churches have been recognized in the East as purely local synods with no universal 
applicability.  Preparations for a general council among all the Eastern Orthodox churches were 
occurring through the mid-1990s but work on that project all but ceased due to a variety of political 
complications.  For more on the role of local councils see Timothy Ware, The Orthodox Church, 2nd ed. 
(New York: Penguin Putnam, 1997) 202-03.  For an insightful analysis of which councils are 
considered ecumenical and binding by both sides see Francis Dvornik, “Which Councils are 
Ecumenical?” Journal of Ecumenical Studies 3.2 (1966): 314-28.  For a further discussion on the role 
of ecumenical councils vis-à-vis the granting of autocephaly see L’Hullier, “Accession to 
Autocephaly” 281-85. 
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4.2 Sources of Institutional Content 
As noted in chapter 3, ecclesiastical legislation in the Eastern (Orthodox) 
Church was never standardized into a singular internally consistent corpus to the 
same extent as in the Western (Roman Catholic) Church.  Five basic sources, 
however, underpin the Orthodox Church’s formal institutional framework.  These are, 
per Meyendorff and others: (1) Conciliar and patristic sources (comprising the canons 
of the ecumenical (universal) and local councils along with writings by individual 
authors widely accepted as authoritative); (2) Imperial legislation (such as the Code 
of Justinian, although in cases of conflict between canons and imperial laws canons 
were understood as taking precedence, and imperial legislation that contradicted 
Christian dogma could not be accepted); (3) Codifications of ecclesiastical legislation 
(compilations such as the influential Nomocanons in Fourteen Titles assembled under 
Patriarch Photios, which systematized a large body of ecclesiastical legislation and 
became highly influential in the Slavic churches beyond the Byzantine Empire); (4) 
Commentaries (such as those by Theodore Balsamon, John Zonaras, and Alexios 
Aristenos, all 12th century canonists who issued authoritative commentaries and 
interpretations of ecclesiastical legislation); and (5) Official decrees by church 
hierarchs (patriarchs and synods of bishops, with the Patriarch of Constantinople 
preeminent particularly following the mutual estrangement between the Eastern and 
Western churches).83
83 John Meyendorff, “Ecclesiology: Canonical Sources,” Byzantine Theology: Historical Trends and 
Doctrinal Themes (New York: Fordham, 1976) 79-88.  See also Ware, 199-207; and Patrick Viscuso, 
“A Late Byzantine Theology of Canon Law,” Greek Orthodox Theological Review 34.3 (1989): 203-
19.
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The church also developed and accepted informal rules as well.  These came 
often in the form of longstanding customs and convention (“ancient tradition”) that 
predated formal legislation, as well as later interpretations and applications of the 
formal legislation that, even if not codified, became normative.  Pastorally the church 
applied informal rules through the use of economia (“economy”), properly 
understood as the flexible interpretation of formal rules.  According to Joseph Allen,  
Economia is the means by which the hierarchs of the Eastern Church can face 
– and bypass – certain rigid and narrow restrictions imposed by the letter of 
canon law.  It allows them to accommodate ecclesial regulations to each 
particular context as it arises.  Economia is never considered for use in cases 
touching upon the basic doctrines – the dogmas – of the faith.  Its function is 
to respond to those regulations inherited from the past whose time and 
relevance are past.84
Economia is best understood as operative in individual cases of episcopal discretion 
involving issues surrounding application of canon law (as in rules regulating marriage, 
divorce, ordination, church discipline, etc.).  It is less germane to “corporate” issues 
such as church organization and autocephaly.  However, it reveals the Orthodox 
Church’s ability and tendency to rely on informal institutional rules that provide 
elasticity where the formal rules do not.  As L’Hullier has noted, 
In many cases, the canons merely endorsed customs which were seen to be 
legitimate.  To the extent that written law (canons and imperial laws) gained 
ground, custom was more or less limited to the domain of precedents.  We 
could, it is true, quote the statement of Metropolitan Zachary of Chalcedon at 
the time of the Council of St. Sophia (879-880): “custom has a tendency to 
outweigh canons,” but we must not overestimate the significance of a 
statement formulated during a discussion or take it as a fundamental principle 
of Byzantine church law.  Appealing to custom remains limited, as we can 
84 Joseph J. Allen, “Economia as the Critical Principle in Making Decisions of Priesthood and 
Marriage,” Vested in Grace: Priesthood and Marriage in the Christian East, ed. Joseph J. Allen 
(Brookline: Holy Cross, 2001) 3-4, italics in original.  See also Meyendorff, “Ecclesiology: Canonical 
Sources” 89-90. 
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clearly see in reading the Nomocanon in XIV Titles and the commentaries of 
Balsamon on this work.85
We will see this “endorsement” of ancient custom encoded in the formal 
institutional rules themselves.  The five sources of formal institutional rules, though 
enumerated here as discrete categories, in practice usually found their way into the 
institutional framework in a cumulative fashion, reinforced by informal rules.  For 
example, the elevation of the status of the Patriarchate of Constantinople to a 
preeminent position within the Eastern church – a significant and durable feature of 
church organization in the Christian East – was the combined result of conciliar 
legislation (canon 28 of the council of Chalcedon, to be discussed below), patriarchal 
decrees (encyclicals by patriarchs from the 13th and 14th centuries asserting 
“universal” leadership), and authoritative commentaries (e.g. by Balsamon, also 
discussed below).86  However, it is the disciplinary canons voted during the major 
general councils of the first seven centuries of the church’s history that form the 
foundation of the institutional framework governing church organization, and analysis 
of these particular canons will occupy much of the rest of this chapter.  The texts of 
the canons themselves, though seemingly obtuse at times, are of great importance 
given the weight they carry, and must be examined in their entirety to ensure that 
their context remains as clear as possible. 
85 L’Hullier, The Church of the Ancient Councils: The Disciplinary Work of the First Four Ecumenical 
Councils (New York: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1996) 2.   
86 Meyendorff, “Ecclesiology: Canonical Sources” 86-87. 
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4.3 Conciliar Sources: The Institutionalization of Territorial Accommodation 
Evidence of the essential or primordial organizational principle of territorial 
accommodation can be found in ecclesiastical legislation adopted during the first 
general council, convened at Nicaea in 325, particularly in canon 4 voted by the 
council:
It is by all means desirable that a bishop should be appointed by all the 
bishops of the province. But if this is difficult because of some pressing 
necessity or the length of the journey involved, let at least three come together 
and perform the ordination, but only after the absent bishops have taken part 
in the vote and given their written consent. But in each province the right of 
confirming the proceedings belongs to the metropolitan bishop.87
This canon formalizes the role of the bishops of the province, headed by the bishop of 
the metropolitan center of that province, in appointing new bishops for that province, 
and hence “[t]his decision implied that the civil provinces…constituted the 
geographical boundaries on which the territorial organization of the Church was 
henceforth to be modeled.”88  As the term territorial accommodation (a later academic 
appellation, not to be found in conciliar legislation) implies, this system of 
organization was intended to provide institutional rather than dogmatic content by 
which the church could regularize its organizational life.89  This can be seen in 
exceptions to the rule recognizing long-standing administrative customs particular to 
certain areas and the recognition that “exceptional rights” or unique prerogatives 
applied to the major metropolitan centers of Alexandria, Rome and Antioch.90  These 
exceptions were summed up in canon 6 of Nicaea: 
87 Translation taken from Norman P. Tanner, ed., Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, Volume I: 
Nicaea I to Lateran V (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown, 1990) 7. 
88 L’Hullier, The Church of the Ancient Councils 38. 
89 L’Hullier, “Problems Concerning Autocephaly” 170. 
90 Bogolepov 15. 
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The ancient customs of Egypt, Libya and Pentapolis shall be maintained, 
according to which the bishop of Alexandria has authority over all these 
places, since a similar custom exists with reference to the bishop of Rome. 
Similarly in Antioch and the other provinces the prerogatives of the churches 
are to be preserved. In general the following principle is evident: if anyone is 
made bishop without the consent of the metropolitan, this great synod 
determines that such a one shall not be a bishop. If however two or three by 
reason of personal rivalry dissent from the common vote of all, provided it is 
reasonable and in accordance with the church's canon, the vote of the majority 
shall prevail.91
Diocletian’s reforms, which multiplied and reordered the provinces in the empire, 
threatened to limit the existing special prerogatives (extending beyond a single 
province) of the metropolitan bishops of Rome, Antioch, and Alexandria, and canon 6 
sought to preserve these rights while limiting other metropolitan bishops to what was 
traditionally customary, i.e. with the bishop of Jerusalem as referenced in canon 7,92
which states: 
Since there prevails a custom and ancient tradition to the effect that the bishop 
of Aelia [Jerusalem] is to be honoured, let him be granted everything 
consequent upon this honour, saving the dignity proper to the metropolitan.93
This early legislation suggests that the church was recognizing as legitimate 
systems of organization already in place which in fact were reflections of the political 
geography of that time.94  What is important from the perspective of church 
organization is that the Nicaean council established general rights for metropolitan 
bishops; significantly, however, it envisaged no jurisdictional power greater than that 
of the metropolitan bishop, nor did it presume the complete autonomy of each local 
church – both of which were concepts that were incorporated into the institutional 
91 Tanner 8-9; per Tanner footnote 2, see also Apostolic canons 34 and 35. 
92 L’Hullier, “Problems Concerning Autocephaly” 172; and L’Hullier, The Church of the Ancient 
Councils 45-53. 
93 Tanner 9. 
94 L’Huller, The Church of the Ancient Councils 53-56. 
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content of the church later on. 95  We can find proof of this in the fact, for example, 
that the key word “metropolitan” was subsequently deleted, evidently during the 5th
century, from the text of canon 6 to bolster the justification for the increasing 
consolidation of jurisdictional power into major sees (e.g. pentarchy) (in other words, 
the key sentence of canon 6 reportedly originally read: “…In…the other provinces the 
prerogatives of the metropolitan churches are to be preserved”).96
4.4 Conciliar Sources: Pentarchy and the Prerogatives of the Major Sees 
Conciliar legislation of this period reflected the tension between the 
consolidation of jurisdictional power into major sees and efforts to uphold and protect 
the rights of metropolitan and local bishops.  The general council convened at 
Constantinople in 381 clarified and extended territorial accommodation and 
established special prerogatives for the bishop of Constantinople analogous to those 
afforded to the major metropoles of Rome, Alexandria, and Antioch.97  This 
legislation would become important later on both in the evolution of the pentarchic 
organization of the church and in the legitimization of autocephalous churches after 
the collapse of the empire.  At the same time, canon 2 recognized the independence 
and administrative sovereignty of the metropolitan bishops, and specifically the 
sovereignty of the bishops of Alexandria, Antioch, Asia Minor, Pontus, and Thrace:98
Diocesan bishops are not to intrude in churches beyond their own boundaries, 
nor are they to confuse the churches: but in accordance with the canons, the 
bishop of Alexandria is to administer affairs in Egypt only; the bishops of the 
95 L’Hullier, “Ecclesiology in the Canons of the First Nicene Council,” St. Vladimir’s Theological 
Quarterly 27.2 (1983): 126. 
96 L’Hullier, “Ecclesiology in the Canons of the First Nicene Council” 128. 
97 L’Hullier, The Church of the Ancient Councils 115-19. 
98 Bogolepov 13, and also L’Hullier, The Church of the Ancient Councils 118-19. 
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East are to manage the East alone (whilst safeguarding the privileges granted 
to the church of the Antiochenes in the Nicene canons); and the bishops of the 
Asian diocese are to manage only Asian affairs; and those in Pontus only the 
affairs of Pontus; and those in Thrace only Thracian affairs. Unless invited, 
bishops are not to go outside their diocese to perform an ordination or any 
other ecclesiastical business. If the letter of the canon about dioceses is kept, it 
is clear that the provincial synod will manage affairs in each province, as was 
decreed at Nicaea. But the churches of God among barbarian peoples must be 
administered in accordance with the custom in force at the time of the 
fathers.99
Importantly, there were churches outside the political geography of the 
Roman Empire that did not fit into this system of territorial accommodation, which 
created anomalous organizational arrangements.  An example of this is the Church of 
Armenia.  De facto independent of Caesaria by the late 300s or so, it lay beyond 
Pontus outside the eastern boundary of the empire (“among the barbarian peoples”), 
and canon 2 reflects the accommodation – the formalization of a previously informal 
rule, as it were – by the church to this political reality.100   This interpretation was 
affirmed much later in the writings of Theodore Balsamon, the 12th century Byzantine 
hierarch and canonist, who noted in a commentary on canon 2 that by the time of the 
council at Constantinople “every ecclesiastical province was autocephalous.”101
Commentaries such as Balsamon’s both reflected the contemporary understanding by 
the church of its own history in granting autocephaly, and provided a foundation for 
future justifications of autocephaly.  It therefore comprises, along with canon 2 itself, 
part of the content of the institutional rules governing autocephaly. 
99 Tanner 31-32.  Tanner notes that “[n]o copy of the council’s doctrinal decisions…has survived.  So 
what is presented here is the synodical letter of the synod of Constantinople held in 382, which 
expounded these doctrinal decisions, as the fathers witness, in summary form…”  Tanner 21. 
100 L’Hullier, “Accession to Autocephaly” 271. 
101 Cited in L’Hullier “Accession to Autocephaly” 269. 
61
The second article adopted by the council that forms part of the institutional 
framework is canon 3: 
Because it is new Rome, the bishop of Constantinople is to enjoy the 
privileges of honour after the bishop of Rome.102
This canon enabled a reprioritization of the five major sees within the church (the 
other three being Jerusalem, Alexandria, and Antioch), elevating the status of 
Constantinople commensurate with its status as the imperial capital and center of 
political power, which would become important in later definitions of its prerogative 
to grant and recognize autocephalous churches.103  Significantly, this canon (and the 
other six adopted at the council) were not accepted by the see of Rome.  While 
eventually acknowledging the reprioritization of sees (of which it legitimately 
remained the first), Rome never accepted an abrogation of its unique authority and 
prerogatives which it saw as derived not from political arrangements but by divine 
institution.104  This would be a significant factor in the growing estrangement and 
eventually permanent schism between the Eastern and Western Churches.105
102 Translation taken from Tanner. 
103 L’Hullier, The Church of the Ancient Councils 119-22. 
104 In reference to this particular event Aidan Nichols has noted: “Whilst this move was mainly anti-
Alexandrian [against the rising pretensions of that see], it also imperiled Roman primacy, since the 
ground for promotion was that Constantinople is the new Rome.  The following year, 382, pope 
Damasus held a synod which, inter alia, protested against the passing of this canon, stoutly maintaining 
that the Roman church owed her primacy to the decrees of no episcopal assembly, but directly to 
Christ himself.  For Damasus, indeed, Rome was the sedes prima Petri apostoli, the ‘first see of the 
apostle Peter’.  More, the see of Rome is now spoken of as sedes apostolica, the apostolic see 
simpliciter – as though no others worth mentioning existed. …The claims of Constantinople compelled 
Rome to move further along the road to a fully efficacious primacy, gathering together her earlier titles 
into the compendious counter-claim to be the exclusive inheritor of all the New Testament tells us of 
the prerogatives of Peter.”  Rome and the Eastern Churches: A Study in Schism 163. 
105 Blackwell Dictionary of Eastern Christianity 414.  Cf. also the Catholic Encyclopedia entry on the 
“First Council of Constantinople”; and Tanner 23.  For additional background on information on the 
historical, cultural, and theological causes of the growing East-West estrangement, see among others 
Deno John Geanakoplos, Byzantine East and Latin West: Two Worlds of Christendom in Middle Ages 
and Renaissance (Oxford: Blackwell, 1966); J.M. Hussey, The Orthodox Church in the Byzantine 
Empire (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986); Steven Runciman, The Great Church in Captivity (New York: 
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A local synodal council convened in Constantinople in 394, dealing with 
issues particular to the eastern part of the empire, also affirmed the territorial 
accommodation principles outlined at Nicaea and validated the status of 
Constantinople as “New Rome,” the bishop of which would be second in rank after 
the Roman pontiff.  The rationale for this decision was that Constantinople “lay 
outside the standard system of the administrative division of the Roman Empire into 
prefectures, dioceses and provinces,”106 and was entitled to conciliar recognition of its 
preeminent position. 
4.5 Conciliar Sources: Prerogatives of Local and Metropolitan Bishops
Ecclesiastical legislation continued to uphold the rights of bishops and stress 
the relationship between a bishop’s territory and civil boundaries, particularly in the 
case of metropolitan bishops.  A local council, convened in Antioch in 341, 
recognized that in addition to the right to validate and confirm election of bishops 
within his province, the metropolitan bishop also had the right to oversee and provide 
pastoral care over the whole of the province.  Furthermore, the metropolitan bishop 
was to enjoy primacy of honor over other bishops of the province but not direct 
administrative authority over them, preside over provincial synod of bishops, and 
control the right of appeal to the emperor.107  Canon 9 noted that “It behooves the 
bishops in every province to acknowledge the bishop who presides in the metropolis” 
– and therefore, Bogolepov has concluded that “in the middle of the 4th century the 
Cambridge, 1968); and John Meyendorff, Imperial Unity and Christian Divisions (New York: St. 
Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1989). 
106 L’Hullier, “Accession to Autocephaly” 282. 
107 Canons 9, 19, 20, and 11, respectively. L’Hullier, “Accession to Autocephaly” 268-69. 
63
territorial principle was recognized as paramount for the establishment and 
government of ecclesiastical districts, regardless of whether or not it conformed to the 
national principle.  The national principle was significant only so far as it coincided 
with the territorial principle, but it could never override it.”108
The following general council, convened at Ephesus in 431, had the primary 
purpose of resolving dogmatic disputes with the church and formalizing distinctions 
between heterodox and orthodox Christian beliefs.  One resolution, however, later 
was recognized by the Orthodox churches as normative in terms of justification for 
autocephaly.  This resolution centered on an affirmation of the independence of the 
particularly ancient Church of Cyprus, again on the basis of longstanding custom 
(again, formalizing a previously informal institution) rather than political geography, 
against claims of hegemony by the See of Antioch.  The full text of the particular 
resolution from the council governing the regulation of the Church of Cyprus is 
important and reads as follows: 
The most reverent bishop Rheginus and with him Zenon and Evagrius, 
revered bishops of the province of Cyprus, have brought forward what is both 
an innovation against the ecclesiastical customs and the canons of the holy 
fathers and concerns the freedom of all. Therefore, since common diseases 
need more healing as they bring greater harm with them, if it has not been a 
continuous ancient custom for the bishop of Antioch to hold ordinations in 
Cyprus—as it is asserted in memorials and orally by the religious men who 
have come before the synod — the prelates of the holy churches of Cyprus 
shall, free from molestation and violence, use their right to perform by 
themselves the ordination of reverent bishops for their island, according to the 
canons of the holy fathers and the ancient custom. 
The same principle will be observed for other dioceses and provinces 
everywhere. None of the reverent bishops is to take possession of another 
province which has not been under his authority from the first or under that of 
his predecessors. Any one who has thus seized upon and subjected a province 
108 Bogolepov 16. 
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is to restore it, lest the canons of the fathers be transgressed and the 
arrogance of secular power effect an entry through the cover of priestly office.
We must avoid bit by bit destroying the freedom which our lord Jesus Christ, 
the liberator of all people, gave us through his own blood. It is therefore the 
pleasure of the holy and ecumenical synod to secure intact and inviolate the 
rights belonging to each province from the first, according to the custom 
which has been in force from of old. Each metropolitan has the right to take a 
copy of the proceedings for his own security. If any one produces a version 
which is at variance with what is here decided, the holy and ecumenical synod 
unanimously decrees it to be of no avail.109
Significantly, one of the three Cypriot bishops present at the council (the 
above-mentioned Rheginus) was the elected head of the Church of Cyprus, and the 
formal conciliar recognition of that church’s independence was also a recognition by 
the churches represented of the validity of his election, which occurred at the hands of 
the bishops of Cyprus (and not those of Antioch).110  The Orthodox churches 
subsequently have derived from this particular resolution, among others, the two 
defining characteristics or “inalienable rights” of the autocephalous church (of which 
Cyprus was considered a prototype): the right to control its internal affairs 
(administrative independence) and the right to appoint its own bishops (ecclesiastical 
independence).111  This particular resolution is significant insofar as it recurs often in 
subsequent ecclesiastical disputes regarding the legality of a particular church’s move 
toward autocephaly.  The case of Cyprus invariably is referenced as a clear and 
unambiguous affirmation of the sovereignty of bishops and legitimacy of independent, 
autocephalous churches. 
109 Tanner 68-69, italics added.  Tanner also cross-references Nicaea I canons 6-7; Constantinople I 
canon 2; Apostolic canons 34-35; Antioch 341 canons 9, 13, and 22; and Sardica 342-43 canons 3, 11 
and 12.  Tanner 68, footnote 1.  
110 Bogolepov 13. 
111 Bogolepov 13. 
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4.6 Conciliar Sources: Prerogatives of the Major Metropolitan Sees 
As noted earlier, local sovereignty and structural pluralism coexisted, often 
uneasily, with a steady drive toward consolidation of the churches around a 
hierarchical taxonomy of major sees.  The general council convened at Chalcedon in 
451 voted an important piece of ecclesiastical legislation, canon 28, which has been 
interpreted subsequently by Orthodox churches as deconflicting and resolving in a 
definitive way the jurisdictional and supra-metropolitan rights of the sees of 
Jerusalem, Antioch, and Constantinople; recognizing the jurisdictional claims of 
Constantinople over the civil dioceses of Pontus, Asia, and Thrace; and raising 
Constantinople’s status to equal that of Rome.  Such a resolution was necessary 
because of the tension developing between the roles of metropolitan bishops (the 
bishops of the capital cities of each province) versus the rights of the bishops of the 
major sees.  As L’Hullier has noted 
There was a conflict between two conceptions of church organization: 
according to the more ancient law, each province was normally to enjoy 
autocephaly; strictly limited exceptions were allowed in the cases of Rome, 
Alexandria and Antioch.  According to the new law which had not yet 
received official approval, there was a tendency for a generalized control by 
the major sees to develop over vast areas.  This was to result in the 
constitution of the patriarchates.112
This canon, while institutionalizing the organizational arrangement emerging in the 
Christian East, was rejected in the West by the See of Rome on the argument that it 
112 L’Hullier, The Church of the Ancient Councils 277. 
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ran counter to the disciplinary canons of Nicaea and abrogated the rights of particular 
local churches.113  Canon 28 reads as follows: 
Following in every way the decrees of the holy fathers and recognising the 
canon which has recently been read out – the canon of the 150 most devout 
bishops who assembled in the time of the great Theodosius of pious memory, 
then emperor, in imperial Constantinople, new Rome – we issue the same 
decree and resolution concerning the prerogatives of the most holy church of 
the same Constantinople, new Rome. The fathers rightly accorded 
prerogatives to the see of older Rome, since that is an imperial city; and 
moved by the same purpose the 150 most devout bishops apportioned equal 
prerogatives to the most holy see of new Rome, reasonably judging that the 
city which is honoured by the imperial power and senate and enjoying 
privileges equaling older imperial Rome, should also be elevated to her level 
in ecclesiastical affairs and take second place after her. The metropolitans of 
the dioceses of Pontus, Asia and Thrace, but only these, as well as the bishops 
of these dioceses who work among non-Greeks, are to be ordained by the 
aforesaid most holy see of the most holy church in Constantinople. That is, 
each metropolitan of the aforesaid dioceses along with the bishops of the 
province ordain the bishops of the province, as has been declared in the 
divine canons; but the metropolitans of the aforesaid dioceses, as has been 
said, are to be ordained by the archbishop of Constantinople, once agreement 
has been reached by vote in the usual way and has been reported to him.114
Another important piece of legislation voted by the council pertaining to autocephaly 
is canon 17, which the Orthodox churches have viewed as yet another affirmation of 
the validity of territorial accommodation as an institutional rule: 
Rural or country parishes belonging to a church are to stay firmly tied to the 
bishops who have possession of them, and especially if they have continually 
and peacefully administered them over a thirty-year period. If, however, 
within the thirty years any dispute about them has arisen, or should arise, 
those who are claiming to be wronged are permitted to bring the case before 
the provincial synod. If there are any who are wronged by their own 
metropolitan, let their case be judged either by the exarch of the diocese or by 
the see of Constantinople, as has already been said. If any city has been newly 
113 Tanner 76.  Tanner also cross-references Constantinople I canon 3; and Apostolic canon 34.  Tanner 
99, footnote 3.  Tanner notes that this particular canon, unlike the others, does not appear in the 
standard Latin translation provided by Dionysius Exiguus.  Tanner 76.  See also the discussion in 
Blackwell’s Dictionary of Eastern Christianity 414.  For a detailed exegesis of this particular canon see 
L’Hullier, The Church of the Ancient Councils 267-96. 
114 Tanner 76, italics added. 
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erected, or is erected hereafter, by imperial decree, let the arrangement of 
ecclesiastical parishes conform to the civil and public regulations.115
The last phrase confirming the conformity of ecclesiastical parishes to municipal 
patterns further justifies organization of ecclesiastical boundaries along political 
lines.116  Although this canon, like the ones before it in previous councils, was the 
result of a resolution passed against the political backdrop of the Roman Empire (and 
in fact was limited in scope to the political geography as it existed at that time), it has 
been taken to mean more generally that whatever the political context, ecclesiastical 
boundaries validly may conform (and in fact should conform) to political ones.  This 
interpretation was likewise reflected in the decisions of the local African council 
convened at Carthage between 419 and 424.  In reference to the independence of the 
Church of Carthage, the council affirmed that “all matters should be determined in the 
places where they arise.”117
 Another issue relevant to autocephaly can be found in canon 12, which 
governed the treatment of bishops who had been raised to status of metropolitan when 
the civil province in which he operated was divided in two, creating two metropolitan 
seats where there used to be only one: 
It has come to our notice that, contrary to the ecclesiastical regulations, some 
have made approaches to the civil authorities and have divided one province 
into two by official mandate, with the result that there are two metropolitans 
in the same province. The sacred synod therefore decrees that in future no 
bishop should dare do such a thing, since he who attempts it stands to lose his 
proper station. Such places as have already been honoured by imperial writ 
with the title of metropolis must treat it simply as honorary, and that goes also 
115 Tanner 95, italics added.  Tanner also cross-references Nicaea canon 6; Apostolic canons 74; 
Antioch (341) canons 14-15; and a long list of canons from Carthage (419).  Tanner 95, footnote 1. 
116 See for example the discussion in Bogolepov 15. 
117 Bogolepov 13. 
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for the bishop who is in charge of the church there, without prejudice of 
course to the proper rights of the real metropolis.118
In this case, obviously the original metropolitan had an incentive to oppose the 
creation of a second metropolitan seat, entailing as it would the loss of prestige and 
income, and the church’s solution was to make the newly-created metropolitan an 
“autocephalous” archbishop (an honorary title only, as canon 12 stipulates) directly 
answerable to the Patriarch of Constantinople.  This administrative arrangement, 
which was applied until it fell out of use in the Middle Ages, was qualitatively 
different than those archbishops (such as the archbishop of Cyprus, as referenced in 
the Council of Ephesus, above) who were functionally independent of the 
patriarch.119  This usage of term “autocephalous” is distinct from the usage under 
examination here, implying as it does external dependency (in sense of a direct 
linkage to the patriarch) rather than the absence of that dependency, and this different 
usage can be confusing.  Given that this usage really is a distinct entity altogether, it 
will not be considered further in this examination, but we mention it given its 
historical significance: there were at least 24 of these autocephalous archbishoprics in 
existence in the Byzantine Empire by the middle of the 11th century, presumably due 
to repeated provincial reorganizations.120
118 Tanner 93.  Tanner also cross-references Nicaea canons 6-8; Constantinople I canons 2-3; Ephesus 
canon 8; and Apostolic canon 34.  Tanner 93, footnote 1. 
119 Hussey 325.  See also L’Hullier, “Problems Concerning Autocephaly” 167. 
120 See map 3 in Hussey. 
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4.7 Other Conciliar Sources Governing Church Organization 
In terms of institutional rules governing organizational change, the remaining 
general councils largely reiterated and codified the essential principles laid out during 
the pervious three centuries.   The next general council whose legislation was to 
inform the institutional rules governing autocephaly convened at Constantinople “in 
Trullo” in 692.  This council planned to vote a series of disciplinary canons since the 
two previous (fifth and sixth) general councils (of 553 and 680-81, both convened at 
Constantinople) had not done so.  It therefore was intended as a completion of or 
addendum to both councils, hence its title Quinisextum or Penthekte (“Fifth-
Sixth”).121  Many of the disciplinary canons recapitulated those promulgated in 
previous general councils.  Once again, however, the canons particular to church 
organization were not accepted by Rome and consequently were not normative in the 
Western Church.122  Canon 36, recalling canon 28 of Chalcedon (381) and canons 2 
and 3 of Constantinople I (451), recognized the pentarchic arrangement of sees 
according to rank: 
Renewing the enactments by the 150 Fathers assembled at the God-protected 
and imperial city, and those of the 630 who met at Chalcedon; we decree that 
the see of Constantinople shall have equal privileges with the see of Old 
Rome, and shall be highly regarded in ecclesiastical matters as that is, and 
shall be second after it. After Constantinople shall be ranked the See of 
Alexandria, then that of Antioch, and afterwards the See of Jerusalem.  
Canon 38 reiterates the critical content of canon 17 of Chalcedon: 
The canon which was made by the Fathers we also observe, which thus 
decreed: If any city be renewed by imperial authority, or shall have been 
121 See entry in The Catholic Encyclopedia, vol. IV (1908). 
122 The Catholic Encyclopedia, vol. IV (1908). 
70
renewed, let the order of things ecclesiastical follow the civil and public 
models.  
Both of these canons formed part of the institutional framework that later governed 
the establishment or recognition of autocephalous churches following the collapse of 
the Byzantine Empire.   
The next general council at Nicaea, convened in 787, did not vote disciplinary 
canons pertinent to autocephaly or other issues of church organization.  The 
subsequent council which convened in Constantinople in 869-70, although designated 
as ecumenical in the Western Church after the 11th century, never attained that status 
in the Eastern Church.  Its disciplinary canons were not observed in (Chalcedonian) 
Eastern Christendom and do not form part of its institutional framework, being absent 
from its collections of canon law and commentaries on the same.123
4.8 Later Application of Institutional Rules: Four Examples 
The application of the canons and resolutions cited can be observed in the 
changing contractual relationships between various local churches in the centuries 
following the collapse of the Byzantine Empire (resulting in the loss of the church’s 
traditional third-party enforcer).  Institutional rules that had justified or codified the 
existence of autocephalous churches within the empire were cited as precedents to 
justify autocephaly of new churches under a radically reconfigured political 
123 See Tanner 157.  For a more in-depth discussion of the differences in understanding between the 
Eastern and Western Churches over which councils properly are to be considered universal in scope, 
see Francis Dvornik, “Which Councils are Ecumenical?” 314-28. 
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geography.  One example of this dynamic can be seen in the edition of the “Rudder” 
(Kormchaia Kniga), a compendium of ecclesiastical regulations published by Russian 
Patriarch Nikon in 1653, which among other things justified the autocephaly of the 
Russian Church and the severing of its over six-century ecclesiastical dependence 
upon the Patriarchate of Constantinople.  The justification for the Russian Church’s 
autocephaly was based on three premises: First, drawing upon canonical precedents 
noted above, the development of a nation into a self-governing state means that an 
equivalent change can and should occur in the local church.  Second, administrative 
dependencies of one church upon another (in this case the Patriarch of 
Constantinople’s exclusive right to ordain Russian metropolitan bishops) imposed 
unnecessary hardships on the Russian church.  Third, Moscow considered itself 
“worthy of the Patriarchal dignity, since Moscow [in a status analogous to 
Constantinople] was a royal city of the Russian Kingdom.”124  Antecedents to all 
three premises can be found in the canons cited above, and in fact the canons, 
combined with their previous application in other churches, provided the institutional 
basis for the autocephaly of the Russian church.  But the impetus behind the 
declaration of independence also had political (and dogmatic) overtones: as will be 
noted in chapter 5, the declaration of union by Constantinople with Rome, although 
accepted in the ancient see of Kiev, was never accepted in the whole of the Russian 
church and prompted the establishment of a new see, of patriarchal dignity, at 
Moscow.
124 Bogolepov 17. 
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In a second example, Patriarch Alexis of Moscow in 1948 reiterated the 
principles laid out in the 1653 Kormchaia Kniga necessitating the autocephaly of the 
Russian Church, again affirming the ecclesiastical self-sufficiency (via adequate 
number of ruling bishops) of the Russian Church, the location of the Russian Church 
within a separate state, Russia’s national distinctness, and necessity of local self rule 
through appointment of its own bishops.125  All of these rationales were justified as 
canonical, congruent not only with the decisions of councils (formal rules) but also 
validated historically by church practice (informal rules). 
A third example can be found in the letter from Patriarch Joachim III of 
Constantinople in 1879 recognizing the autocephaly of the Church of Serbia, which 
affirmed establishment of autocephalous churches “not only in conformity with the 
historical importance of the cities and countries in Christianity, but also according to 
political conditions of the life of their people and nation.”  The letter, specifically 
citing canon 28 of Chalcedon and other precedents, noted that “[t]he ecclesiastical 
rights, especially those of parishes, usually follow the political subdivision of the 
country and the government concerned.”  The letter then proclaimed the 
independence of the Church of Serbia on the basis of (1) the new political
independence of Serbia itself, and (2) the formal written requests of Serbian Prince 
MiloĞ Obrenoviü and Archbishop Michael of Belgrade to Constantinople for 
autocephaly “conforming with the political independence of the state [of Serbia].”126
In a fourth example, Ecumenical Patriarch Gregory VII of Constantinople, in 
a tomos of November 1924, affirmed the validity of territorial accommodation as 
125 Bogolepov 18-19. 
126 Cited in Bogolepov 17-18. 
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justification for recognizing the autocephaly of the Orthodox Church in Poland.127
Gregory cited in this decision canon 17 of the Council of Chalcedon and canon 36 of 
the Council in Trullo.  Interestingly, the tomos Gregory published also echoed many 
of the same arguments made just four years earlier in the unsuccessful attempt by the 
Ukrainian Church to declare autocephaly from the Church of Russia.128  Justification 
of autocephaly in institutional terms is not in and of itself a guarantee that the 
contractual relationship between parent and subsidiary will be successfully 
renegotiated and autocephaly granted, particularly if, as in the Ukrainian case, the 
state is in an adversarial position relative to the church and autocephaly is not in the 
state’s interests.  However, it is useful to note that even the unsuccessful attempts at 
securing autocephaly rely on the same institutional rules as the successful events of 
autocephaly.  The institutional framework, even when transposed onto a vastly 
different political geography, continues to provide the rules by which organizational 
change in the church is to occur.  Enforcement by the state remains, however, a 
critical factor in the efficacy of those rules in actually governing and constraining 
change.
4.7 Summary 
The institutional framework of the church evolved in the political geography 
of the Roman Empire and incorporated the organizational adaptations the church 
made to that geography.  That framework comprised a variety of formal and informal 
127 Bogolepov 18. 
128 Andre Partykevich, Between Kyiv an Constantinople: Oleksander Lototsky and the Quest for 
Ukrainian Autocephaly (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta, 
1998) 58-59. 
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rules concerning territorial accommodation, the prioritization of sees, the rights of 
bishops and historically independent churches, and the place of established customs 
of administration, particularly for those churches outside the political boundaries of 
the Roman Empire.  This framework, when transposed onto different (post-Roman or 
post-Byzantine) political geography, continued to have a normative effect upon 
organizational change in the church.  Chapter 5 will attempt to demonstrate, through a 
chronological survey of organizational changes, how the institutional framework 
governed and constrained organizational change as the political geography shifted 
and the role of the state as enforcer waxed and waned.  Hopefully this survey, and the 
specific case study to follow in chapter 6, will enable us to assess the validity of our 
alternative theory, and also to draw meaningful conclusions both specifically about 
organizational change and more generally about institutions and their durability. 
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Chapter 5: Organizational Change, Institutional Enforcement, and the State: 
Evidence and Trends 
Our alternative theory states that the church organizes itself in consistent ways 
against the political geography governed and constrained by the church’s institutional 
framework.  This chapter will lay out historical evidence demonstrating that the 
organizational shape of the church changed significantly over time in conjunction 
with changes in regimes and shifts in political boundaries, as the theory would 
suggest.  We will observe the state’s role in the enforcement, recalibration, and 
breaking of ecclesiastical relationships.  Additionally, we will note the extent to 
which the institutional framework has been efficacious in governing and constraining 
organizational change in the context of third-party enforcement.  We have argued that 
formal and informal rules structure the relationships between groups of local churches 
and provide incentives to observe constraints upon actions that restructure those 
relationships, subject to enforcement by the state, and in chapters 3 and 4 we laid out 
much of the content of those rules.  This chapter will sketch historical instances of 
organizational change (e.g. restructuring of ecclesiastical relationships) and the 
circumstances behind them. 
Why is this examination of historical data necessary?  To reject the notion that 
institutions are not relevant to the discussion of organizational change in general and 
autocephaly in particular, we must demonstrate how the organizational structure of 
the church has changed over time in response to changes in the political geography, a 
process governed by the institutional framework and subject to state enforcement.  A 
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survey of the evidence suggests that the church’s historical experience has been 
characterized by organizational elasticity and what Meyendorff has called structural 
pluralism.129  Where we see state advocacy of organizational change we also see 
recourse to institutional rules governing how those changes are to occur and what 
their eventual shape should be.  The organizational shape of the church bends 
(elasticity) and assume diverse forms, sometimes even within a single set of political 
boundaries (structural pluralism), but always within the confines set by the 
institutional framework – provided the state plays a credible role as enforcer.  Where 
the state is absent in this role or assumes a hostile posture vis-à-vis the church, the 
constraints of the institutional framework break down and elasticity and pluralism 
increase to a level inconsistent with the institutional framework. 
While a detailed organizational history of the church is well beyond the scope 
of this limited project, a brief survey of evidence supporting the above-mentioned 
conclusions is in order.  For this purpose it is useful to categorize the organizational 
history of the church into four (arguably arbitrary) periods:130  The first is the imperial 
period, in which a legalized church organized itself first within the Roman empire 
(including the consolidation of churches into the five major patriarchates of Rome, 
Constantinople, Jerusalem, Antioch, and Alexandria, plus traditionally independent 
churches such as Cyprus and Georgia) and later within Eastern Roman (Byzantine) 
empire.  The second is the post-imperial, which saw the subordination of the church 
in the East to the non-Christian Ottoman Empire and the emergence of autocephalous 
129 John Meyendorff, Imperial Unity and Christian Divisions (New York: St. Vladimir’s Seminary 
Press, 1989) 58. 
130 This is a derivation of a typology introduced by Alexander Schmemann in “A Meaningful Storm,” 
Church, World, Mission (New York: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1979) 85-116. 
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churches in Russia and the Balkans.  The third is the national period, in which the 
independent church became the definitive symbol of the independent nation-state, a 
trend which became pronounced with the rising tide of nationalism in Europe as the 
Ottoman Empire collapsed.  The fourth is the post-national period, characterized by 
the disintegration of nation-states and the failure of nationalism, émigré Christian 
populations no longer located within their respective Orthodox countries, and the 
collapse of traditional ecclesiastical organizational models.  These divisions are not 
meaningful in an historical sense and are intended only as an analytical aid for the 
purposes of this study.  The phenomena these periods are intended to capture in fact 
overlap in some cases (e.g. the beginnings of the national period with the end of the 
post-imperial period).  Throughout all four periods autocephaly functions as an 
“index” issue telling us much about how organizational changes in the church – 
through the recalibration and breaking of contractual agreements and the role of the 
state as enforcer – are governed and constrained by the institutional framework. 
5.1 The Imperial Period
This period can be located between the legalization of the church in the 
Roman Empire under Constantine in the 4th century through the final collapse of the 
Byzantine (Eastern Roman) Empire in the 15th century.  We present such a long span 
of time as a single period only because of the ongoing presence of some sort of 
imperial, Christian authority which provided both an organizational reference point 
and an enforcing agent for the church.  This would cease under Ottoman rule and 
would assume a very different form in the national period, when the state became the 
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organizational reference point but there was no supranational enforcing authority, 
which would have direct organizational consequences for the church.
We observe during the imperial period two significant and durable trends in 
ecclesiastical organization – territorial accommodation and the pentarchic 
arrangement of sees – both of which were determinative, albeit in different ways, of 
the evolution and application of the institutional rules governing autocephaly.
Whether these two trends opposed, overlapped, or co-existed with one another was 
largely determined by the shape of the political geography at any given time.  But 
both persisted throughout the span of this lengthy period. 
5.1.1 Territorial Accommodation 
We first must recall that initially during this period, as noted in chapter 4, 
particular churches that had always existed independently de facto (either through 
“ancient custom” or prestige) were recognized in ecumenical councils as being 
independent de jure (Rome, Alexandria, and Antioch at the first council, Thrace, Asia 
Minor, and Pontus at the second, Cyprus at the third, Constantinople and Jerusalem at 
the fourth).131  A conscious effort seems to have been made by the church to ensure 
that ecclesiastical administration corresponded closely to imperial administrative 
boundaries, irrespective of the national composition of the particular church.  This 
effort seems to reflect both Roman political philosophy and the pragmatic recognition 
of the organizational principles required within a multinational empire. 
The institutional rules governing autocephaly as a form of organizational 
change evolved within this context.  “In the Byzantine canonical texts the adjective 
131 Bogolepov 22. 
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‘autocephalous’ most frequently designated individual ‘archdioceses’ which were not 
dependent upon a regional metropolitan and his synod, but were appointed either by a 
patriarch or by the emperor directly.”132  Eventually, a consensus of sorts emerged 
that “a new autocephalous church could only be established for a nation lying within 
the borders of a state independent of that of the Mother Church,” so that from the 9th
century forward, as the Balkan nations gained independence as discrete states, they 
established churches within the boundaries of those states.133  Later, the Church of 
Russia extended and developed this into a principle of “an autocephalous church in an 
independent state.”134  With the rise of the importance of the Church of Russia, an 
ongoing rivalry began between Moscow and Constantinople over which patriarchate 
had authority to grant autocephaly to a nascent subsidiary.  By the 20th century the 
issue of validation of any autocephaly by the growing community of autocephalous 
churches came to the fore with the (re)independence of many formerly independent 
churches.135  Hence autocephaly as such has roots in the early tendency toward 
territorial accommodation and the institutional rules that evolved from that tendency. 
5.1.2 The Pentarchic Arrangement of Sees 
A second trend is the emergence of a pentarchic arrangement of sees, in which 
five ecclesiastical centers acquired dominant roles in church governance according to 
a fixed hierarchical order.  What we see reflected in the ecclesiastical legislation 
outlined in chapter 4 is the gradual process of consolidation of ecclesiastical units 
132 John Meyendorff, “The Catholicity of the Church,” footnote 1, originally published in St. 
Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly 17.1-2 (1973): 5-18. 
133 Bogolepov 16. 
134 Bogolepov 17. 
135 Bogolepov 30-34. 
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first into provinces that conformed largely to civil administrative divisions, with 
major sees either acquiring for themselves or receiving conciliar validation or 
sanction of special “rights” surpassing those of, for example, a given provincial 
metropolitan bishop.  Metropolises with their major bishoprics spawned churches in 
outlying townships and territories and maintained pastoral responsibility for them, 
leading to a pyramidization136 of bishoprics with the major metropolitan bishoprics at 
the top.  Provinces were consolidated into dioceses – another imperial governmental 
unit – with various major sees emerging to exercise varying degrees of authority over 
those dioceses.  By the 6th century the system had largely crystallized into the 
following jurisdictional arrangement of major sees: Rome exercised authority 
increasingly over the western provinces; Constantinople over the dioceses of Pontus, 
Asia, and Thrace; Alexandria over Egypt; Antioch over the dioceses of the East (sans 
Cyprus and Palestine); and Jerusalem over the Palestinian provinces.  This was the 
“pentarchic” arrangement that would prove so durable and increasingly normative in 
later centuries.  In addition to these major sees were those that exercised practical 
jurisdiction but whose status was never institutionalized, such as Thessalonica’s 
jurisdiction over Macedonia, Bulgaria, and Greece (i.e. the prefecture of Illyricum, 
sans the diocese of Dacia); and Justiniana Prima over the diocese of Dacia; and 
Cyprus, which remained a functionally autocephalous province (as recognized by the 
council of Ephesus).137
What is important about the pentarchic arrangement is not the territories 
themselves (now long lost to history) within the spheres of influence of these five 
136 Thanks to George Majeska for suggesting this term.  See also L’Hullier, The Church of the Ancient 
Councils 117. 
137 Meyendorff, Imperial Unity and Christian Divisions 278-80. 
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sees, but rather that there remained a durable recognition, long after their political 
significance waned, that these sees continued to possess unique authority and 
influence in matters of church organization.  Pentarchy thus existed in a very tense 
relationship with territorial accommodation, which generated other organizational 
models in response to changes in the political geography (eventually resulting in the 
coterminous relationship between state and ecclesiastical borders during the national 
period, and the breakdown of that relationship in the post-national period, as we will 
see below). 
5.1.3 Structural Pluralism 
It was the reign of the Emperor Justinian (527-580) that saw the emergence of 
the five major sees of Rome, Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem, an 
arrangement that became part of the Church’s institutional framework as the proper 
system of ecclesiastical order, coextensive with the oikoumene or “inhabited realm” 
of the empire.  However, the pentarchic arrangement, unlike the system of universal 
papal jurisdiction evolving slowly in the Latin west, did not actually correspond to the 
reality of the “de facto structural pluralism” of the church in which several 
overlapping organizational systems already coexisted within one political context 
(e.g. autocephalous Cyprus, major sees-cum-patriarchates, the unique structures of 
the very ancient Armenian and Georgian churches).138  We observe a tension between 
138 Meyendorff, “Imperial Unity and Christian Divisions” 58-59.  The emphasis on apostolic 
foundation, rather than pragmatic political considerations, as a way of ordering and giving precedence 
and priorities to the major sees illustrates the growing difference of opinion between East and West.  
Francis Dvornik has argued that this probably was influenced by the ancient conceptualization of the 
Roman primacy according to its apostolic origin, which was increasingly emphasized when the capital 
was moved to Constantinople due to papal fears of increased encroachment by Constantinople on 
Rome’s preeminence.  There were reciprocal fears in the East of papal administrative encroachment on 
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the normative “ideal” of pentarchy and the organizational reality of structural 
pluralism in response to various political realities within the empire and beyond its 
(shifting) borders.  This tension would grow after the Byzantine and particularly the 
Ottoman periods, when the disjuncture between institutional rules framed in an 
imperial environment and the new political landscape of nation-states became acute. 
This process of jurisdictional expansion of the five major sees led to a relative 
decline in the number and size and autocephalous provinces and churches, reducing 
them to autonomous (limited self-governance) status in the cases of Pontus, Asia, and 
Thrace vis-à-vis Constantinople, from the end of the 4th century to the middle of the 
5th century.139  This was followed by a trend which continued through the Middle 
Ages whereby the degree of strength of the civil provincial structure became 
inversely proportional to the degree of ecclesiastical centralization of patriarchal 
authority, a trend which was a product of administrative reforms under Emperor 
Heraclius in the 7th century.140
Another area of disconnect between the normative value assigned to pentarchy 
and the reality of structural pluralism was the growth in the jurisdictional importance 
of the see of Constantinople vis-à-vis the other eastern patriarchates during this period.
Hussey points out that Constantinople’s increasing preeminence was due in part to the 
decreasing political influence of Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem, which by the 7th
century founds themselves outside Byzantine imperial boundaries after the Muslim 
the ancient privileges of the Eastern sees.  Pentarchy is an example, per Dvornik, of this shift in 
thinking with regard to apostolicity and ecclesiastical organization from the perspective of the Eastern 
Church. 
139 L’Hullier, “Accession to Autocephaly” 272-75. 
140 George Ostrogorsky, History of the Byzantine State (New Brunswick: Rutgers, 1969) 132-33, cited 
in L’Hullier, “Accession to Autocephaly” 277. 
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conquests of Eastern and North African territories, and competing with the 
monophysite and Nestorian churches separated since the council of Chalcedon over 
dogmatic disputes.  Constantinople as the center of the eastern half of the empire 
increased in importance and rose to a position of undisputed functional preeminence 
among the eastern sees.141  We see this reflected in the institutional framework of the 
church discussed in chapter 4 – both pentarchy and the special privileges of 
Constantinople are incorporated into the institutional rules of the church, yet both 
reflect unique and distinct realities of the political geography. 
 Both pentarchy and the preeminence of Constantinople were examples of the 
church’s organizational response to the political landscape.  The church used the 
mechanisms at its disposal – ordering sees by both imperial and ecclesiastical legal 
acts – to conform itself in a useful way in relation to political realities such as re-
drawn borders and shifts in political prominence of different metropolitan centers.  
Pragmatic legal and political reasoning lay behind these changes, and it is this 
pragmatism that is reflected in the institutional framework of the church, as attested, 
for example, by the canonist and hierarch Theodore Balsamon (referred to in the 
previous chapter), whose commentaries on the canons informed the institutional 
framework governing autocephaly (and many other issues as well).  As Erickson has 
noted,
Balsamon has little use for the more metaphysical aspects of pentarchic theory 
or for any other purely theological approach to church order.  While he 
devotes an entire treatise to describing and defining the powers and 
prerogatives of the five patriarchates, he is relatively uninterested in their 
mystical or symbolical significance.  Rather, for Balsamon, patriachates,
primacies, special prerogatives and other aspects of supra-episcopal 
organization are established by means of legal acts, which in turn have been 
141 Hussey, The Orthodox Church in the Byzantine Empire 297-99. 
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framed in response to various special circumstances – above all, political 
circumstances.  Time and again Balsamon points out that Constantinople, like 
Rome before it, was honored because it is the imperial city.142
This political pragmatism underpinning church organization enabled the state to play 
its third-party role in the enforcement, recalibration, and breaking of ecclesiastical 
relationships between local churches.  It was, for example, a political leader, Tsar 
Boris of Bulgaria, rather than a hierarch who first assigned the title of patriarch to the 
Archbishop of Bulgaria, thus changing qualitatively the status of the Bulgarian 
church.143  However, we also observe in the history of the church evidence of the 
constraining effect the institutional framework had upon this pragmatism.  On one 
hand, we note that during this period the imperial role increased in the setting of 
ecclesiastical borders, the establishment of patriarchates, the elevation of the status of 
bishoprics, and other ecclesiastical recalibrations.  On the other hand, “from the time 
of Justinian onward, the Byzantine East considered the pentarchical system as an
immutable order independent of the factual reality” – suggesting pentarchy over time 
became fully part of the institutional framework with quasi-dogmatic status – and this 
entailed the disestablishment of previously autocephalous churches in favor of greater 
consolidation into the five major sees.144  Thus, starting in the 7th century, “a 
discrepancy arose between the claims of universality of the Byzantine State and the 
fact of the dramatic reduction of its territory,”145 meaning that the now institutionally-
enshrined hierarchical ordering of sees was confronting changed political geography, 
142 Erickson 102, italics added. 
143 L’Hullier, “Accession to Autocephaly” 288-89. 
144 L’Hullier, “Accession to Autocephaly” 285. 
145 L’Hullier, “Accession to Autocephaly” 285, italics in original. 
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necessitating new organizational responses that did not fit into the pentarchical 
arrangement.  
5.1.4 Example: The Church of Bulgaria 
There were already at this time several particular churches outside the 
Byzantine imperial boundaries which because of their location fit neither the pattern 
of territorial accommodation nor that of pentarchy, and our examination of them will 
overlap somewhat with the post-imperial period.  One of these, as noted above, was 
the Church of Bulgaria.146  The emergence of the nascent Bulgarian state, predicated 
upon a growing political, religious and linguistic identity distinct from the Byzantine 
Empire, was mirrored by the emergence of an autocephalous Bulgarian church.  The 
cyclical waxing and waning of Bulgarian political independence until the Ottoman 
period is mirrored by the granting and withdrawing by civil authorities of the 
autocephaly of the Bulgarian church.  The first tsar, Boris, sought independence for 
the church in Bulgaria precisely because he feared Greek ecclesiastical (and hence 
Byzantine imperial) control over the emerging Bulgarian state, and exploited the 
schism between Rome and Constantinople during the mid-800s (over the irregular 
election of Photios as Patriarch of Constantinople) to seek ecclesiastical independence, 
along with a concomitant recognition of Boris’ political sovereignty as king, first 
unsuccessfully from Rome and then later successfully from Constantinople.147  By the 
10th century Bulgaria had effectively decoupled itself from the Byzantine Empire and 
146 On this discussion of the Bulgarian church during the imperial period see L’Hullier, “Accession to 
Autocephaly” 288-90; Dennis P. Hupchick, The Balkans: From Constantinople to Communism (New 
York: Palgrave, 2002) chs. 2 and 3; and Dennis P. Hupchick and Harold E. Cox, The Palgrave 
Historical Atlas of Eastern Europe (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001). 
147 Hupchick, The Balkans 43. 
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acquired the status of an independent state: a peace treaty in 927 with the Byzantine 
emperor secured political recognition of the Bulgarian throne and acknowledgement 
by the Ecumenical Patriarch of a Bulgarian patriarchate, and hence autocephaly.148
Under Tsar Simeon Greek clergy were replaced with native Bulgarian clergy and the 
archbishopric (eventually located at Ohrid) was elevated to the status of patriarchate, 
successfully replicating the Byzantine political model by which an autocephalous 
church, together with a sovereign king, were viewed as the sine qua non of the 
independent Christian state.149
Protracted fighting between Bulgarian and Byzantine forces between the late 
10th and early 11th centuries caused fluctuations in the political geography as the 
Bulgarian kingdom gained and lost territory, and the patriarchate was moved 
repeatedly in line with those changes.  Its status was reduced from an autocephalous 
patriarchate to a metropolitanate dependant upon Constantinople after Byzantine 
forces drove Russian troops from Bulgarian territory in 972 and occupied the country.  
After more fighting, Bulgaria finally succumbed definitively to Byzantine control in 
1014 during the reign of the Byzantine emperor Basil II.  The autocephaly of the 
Bulgarian church was abolished by 1018, leaving the episcopal seat at Ohrid as an 
archbishopric subordinate to Constantinople.150   Though initially permitted to 
continue in a largely autonomous fashion with perhaps half of its previous territory, 
148 Matthew Spinka, A History of Christianity in the Balkans: A Study in the Spread of Byzantine 
Culture Among the Slavs (Archon, 1933) 57-58. 
149 Hupchick 43-49.  See also Obolensky ch. 3. 
150 Spinka 57-72. 
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the Bulgarian church, centered around the see of Ohrid, steadily succumbed to Greek 
imperial influence in the ensuing decades.151
Numerous revolts and periods of political instability culminated in Bulgarian 
independence from the empire in 1186.  The rulers of the newly-consolidated 
Bulgarian state, viewing the Greek dominance of the see of Ohrid as untenable given 
the independence of the state, restored the autocephaly of the Bulgarian church by 
installing a Bulgarian archbishop at Trnovo.152  This unilateral break with the 
patriarchate of Constantinople was only repaired a century later following a treaty 
signed between the political, not ecclesiastical, authorities (Byzantine Emperor 
Theodore II Lascaris and Bulgarian Tsar Asen II).  Interestingly, during the Latin 
occupation of Byzantine territories following the Crusades, Tsar Kaloyan sought 
recognition from Rome of both his political sovereignty and the autocephaly of the 
Trnovo Patriarchate.  The expansion of Bulgarian territories to include Macedonia 
brought within one set of political boundaries two autocephalous archbishoprics – 
Ohrid and Trnovo – one under Rome and the other not.153  Later, when allying with a 
rival Byzantine “state in exile” at Nicaea (discussed below) to expel the crusaders 
from Byzantine territories, Tsar Ivan, Kaloyan’s successor, sought and received 
recognition from the Nicean authorities of the independence of the Trnovo 
Patriarchate, again (re)validating the autocephaly of the Bulgarian Church.154  The 
three major Balkan sees – Peü, Ohrid, and Trnovo – witnessed a very complicated 
subsequent history as each gained and lost autocephaly as political boundaries and 
151 Spinka 91-92. 
152 Spinka 101-02, and Hupchick 67-68. 
153 Spinka 101-07 
154 Hupchick 71-73.  
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fortunes shifted, a process which continued until the fall of the Bulgarian state to 
Ottoman forces in the late 14th century.155  By the early 15th century the Bulgarian 
church had been subsumed under the patriarchate of Constantinople as part of the 
Orthodox millet within the Ottoman Empire.  It would not reemerge as an 
autocephalous church until the reappearance of an independent Bulgarian state in the 
19th century.156
5.1.5 Example: The Church of Serbia 
Serbia was the other major emergent Orthodox state at the periphery of the 
Byzantine Empire during this period.  Originally vassal territory of the Byzantine 
Empire, ruler Stefan I Nemanja achieved political and ecclesiastical consolidation of 
the nascent Serbian territories, sought independence for Serbia and finally achieved 
independence from the Byzantine Empire by 1190 during a period of Byzantine 
preoccupation with Bulgarian rebellion.157  Serbia managed to declare itself a state 
independent from Byzantine control by the late 12th century and began to consolidate 
itself territorially in the ensuing decades.  Serbia eventually was able to consolidate 
and expand its holdings at the expense of a declining Byzantine Empire during the 
13th and 14th centuries.  Serbian rulers, culminating in Stefan Dusan, tried to assert 
control over much of the Balkans and even attempted to capture Constantinople itself, 
but remained unsuccessful on the eve of Byzantium’s final fall to Ottoman forces.158
155 Spinka 108-20. 
156 Spinka 127-28. 
157 Spinka 73-81, and Hupchick 82-83. 
158 Hupchick 82-94. 
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It should be noted at this juncture that after the Fourth Crusade in the 13th
century, which resulted in a temporary period of Latin control over both the 
Byzantine throne and patriarchate, contending Byzantine “states in exile” appeared in 
Nicaea, Trebizond, and Epirus, the Nicean ruler installing an Orthodox patriarch as a 
rival to the Latin patriarch occupying the see in Constantinople through the early 
decades of the 13th century.159  It was in this reconfigured political context that newly-
independent Serbia’s first ruler, Stefan II Nemanja, accepted a crown in 1217 from 
the pope, who reportedly viewed it as a way to achieve Roman Catholic inroads into 
the predominantly Orthodox Balkans at a time when the emergent Serbian state 
required ecclesiastical recognition.  However, facing local popular and ecclesiastical 
opposition to Latin dominance, Stefan subsequently secured a concurrent recognition 
of autocephaly for the Serbian church from the newly-constituted (erstwhile 
Ecumenical) patriarch at Nicaea in 1219 and was crowned king by his brother, the 
archbishop Sava, thus effecting full political and ecclesiastical recognition of the new 
Serbian state, in exchange for Serbia’s recognition of the nascent state of Nicaea.160
(Serbian autocephaly thus granted obviously also precluded ecclesiastical 
subordination to Rome.)161  The grant of autocephaly from the patriarch of Nicaea 
detached the Serbian bishopric from the control of the autocephalous archbishopric of 
Ohrid, to which the Serbian sees were subordinate, and set the stage for governance 
of the Serbian church commensurate with Serbia’s status as an independent state.162
159 See John V.A. Fine, Jr., The Late Medieval Balkans: A Critical Survey from the Late Twelfth 
Century to the Ottoman Conquest (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1987) ch. 2; and Spinka 
82-83.
160 Fine 114-19, and Spinka 83-90. 
161 Hupchick 83. 
162 Fine 114-19. 
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The occupant of the see of Ohrid at that time, Demetrius Chromatianus, objected that 
the Ecumenical Patriarch’s detachment of territories from his autocephalous 
archbishopric was an uncanonical act; the Serbian political and ecclesiastical 
authorities, however, had calculated that a request for autocephaly for the Serbian 
church was best directed to the Ecumenical Patriarch, given that Demetrius’ see of 
Ohrid “lay within the despotate of Epirus and [Demetrius] was therefore under 
political restraint to oppose the expansionist policy of Serbia.”163  Later, again at the 
behest of the Serbian king, a council of the Serbian church in 1346 elevated the 
autocephalous archbishoric of Peü to patriarchal status, with the consent of the 
autocephalous see of Ohrid and the Bulgarian church, but not with the consent of the 
Patriarchate of Constantinople, which resulted in a suspension of communion 
between Constantinople and the Serbian church that was only resolved on the eve of 
the initial wave of Turkish conquests in 1389.164  Changing political geography 
necessitated reorganization of the ecclesiastical boundaries, and the state played a 
major role in the recalibration of ecclesiastical relationships as those reorganizations 
occurred.  Serbia’s history in many ways mirrored the experience of Bulgaria, with 
the independence of the Serbian church governed largely by the political fortunes of 
the Serbian rulers in establishing a viable state independent of the Byzantine 
Empire.165
163 Spinka 87. 
164 Spinka 141-54 
165 Repeated shifts in the ecclesiastical boundaries in conformity with changing political demarcations 
– with resulting effects on the Serbian church’s autocephalous status – are detailed in Spinka 129-55. 
91
5.1.6 Example: The Church in the Wallachian and Moldovian Principalities 
Romania as a discrete entity did not exist during this period other than in the 
form of the principalities of Wallachia and Moldovia.  Each was able to acquire 
ecclesiastical recognition for a more or less independent local church commensurate 
with the political consolidation each had achieved by the 13th century.  In both cases 
ecclesiastical independence was won from Constantinople by political authorities as 
part of a broader effort toward political consolidation in response to Hungarian 
pressure against their emerging states.  Wallachian leader Nicolae Alexandru secured 
approval in 1359 for autonomy (in the form of the elevation of the bishop of the 
capital Curtea de Argeú to the level of metropolitan) from the patriarch of 
Constantinople.  Moldovian leader Alexandru the Good obtained an equivalent 
recognition of autonomy from the patriarch of Constantinople for the Moldovian 
church in 1401.166
5.1.6 Example: The Church of Georgia 
 The Georgian kingdom, Christian since the 4th century, has a very obscure 
history in terms of ecclesiastical structure.167  Subordinate at least formally to the 
Patriarchate of Antioch, the Georgian church was caught between the influences (and 
during some periods, dogmatic disputes) of the neighboring Armenian and Syrian 
churches, and by the last decades of the 5th century had established its own catholicate 
(the functional equivalent of a patriarchate) under King Vachtang.  The Patriarchate 
166 Hupchick 78-80. 
167 Unless otherwise noted, the information on the autocephaly of the Church of Georgia is drawn from 
one of the very few sources on the subject available in English: Michael Tarchnisvili, “The Origin and 
Development of the Ecclesiastical Autocephaly of Georgia,” trans. Patrick Viscuso, Greek Orthodox 
Theological Review 46.1-2 (2001): 89-111. 
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of Antioch evidently granted limited autocephaly to the Georgian church sometime in 
the 8th century specifically due to the problems posed by the Georgian church’s 
external dependency on Antioch (there was a significant period, for example, when 
dangers of travel through hostile Arab territories prevented the consecration and 
installation of a new Georgian catholicos); the Georgian church’s autocephaly 
eventually was finalized following periods of prolonged disruption between Antioch 
and Georgia.168  Its autocephaly was validated in local council held in Antioch, 
apparently in the 11th century.  The Church of Georgia remained autocephalous even 
initially following the treaty signed with Russia in 1783, which respected the 
autocephaly of the Georgian church, but which subsequently was abrogated by 
Emperor Alexander I of Russia who abolished that autocephaly in the 19th century (an 
act which L’Hullier argues is analogous to the Byzantine imperial suppression of the 
Bulgarian autocephaly in the 10th century, referenced above), pulling the Georgian 
church definitively into the Russian imperial orbit.169  An autocephalous Georgian 
church would not re-emerge until the late 20th century with the collapse of the Soviet 
Union.
5.1.7 Example: The Church of Russia 
 The emergence of the autocephalous Church of Russia occurred according to 
a similar pattern.  As noted in chapter 4, the Russian Church’s justification for 
autocephaly was based upon its need for administrative independence from a 
debilitating set of external linkages and dependencies upon Constantinople.  These 
168 Tarchnisvili 98-101. 
169 L’Hullier, “Accession to Autocephaly” 291, and Tarchnisvili 105-06. 
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dependencies were defined in terms of three key circumstances: (1) the political 
compromise of the patriarchate of Contantinople to Rome at the council of Ferrara-
Florence (1438-1449); (2) the threat posed to Constantinople by Ottoman Turkish 
forces, necessitating that compromise to win military support; and (3) the civil war 
within Russia necessitating ecclesiastical unity precisely at a period when the 
Byzantine ecclesiarchs in Constantinople were least able to provide hierarchical 
leadership.170  The Russian church dated back to the embrace of Christianity by the 
Kievan Rus’ in the 10th century at the hands of a suffragan bishop of the patriarch of 
Constantinople.  There is some dispute, however, as to whether occupants of the 
metropolitan bishop’s seat in Kiev, which oversaw the Russian church, were 
exclusively Byzantines appointed by the Patriarch at Constantinople, or whether 
alternation occurred between Byzantine and Russian candidates according to 
agreement or compromise between the emperor and the Russian political and 
ecclesiastical authorities.  Therefore it is difficult to establish precisely when the 
Russian church became autocephalous, de facto if not de jure.171
When the attempt to heal the persistent breach between the Eastern and 
Western churches at the council of Ferrara-Florence collapsed and the pro-union 
(with Rome) metropolitan of the Russian church was deposed as a result, the Russian 
church was left with a vacant see during a period when the patriarch of 
170 Gustav Alef, “Muscovy and the Council of Florence,” Slavic Review 20.3 (1961): 389-401.  Alef 
also cites alternative interpretations for the Muscovite rejection of the union decision at Florence, 
contained in I. Sevüenko, “Intellectual Repercussions of the Council of Florence,” Church History
XXIV (1955): 291-323; Deno Geanakoplos, “The Council of Florence (1438-1439) and the Problem of 
the Union between the Greek and Latin Churches,” Church History XXIV (1955): 324-46; and M. 
Cherniavsky, “The Reception of the Council of Florence in Moscow,” Church History XXIV (1955): 
347-59.  Alef also cites the contrasting views of Joseph Gill, The Council of Florence (Cambridge, 
1959); and Oscar Halecki, From Florence to Brest (1439-1596) (Rome, 1958). 
171 Dimitri Obolensky, “Byzantium, Kiev and Moscow: A Study in Ecclesiastical Relations,” 
Dumbarton Oaks Papers 11 (1957): 22-78. 
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Constantinople, charged with appointing a replacement, was also pro-union and 
therefore politically compromised in the view of Russian authorities.  Those 
authorities, facing the necessity of national consolidation in the face of civil war and 
external (Tatar) threats, responded by convening a synodal meeting in Moscow in 
1448 and appointing a Russian (rather than Greek) hierarch, Iona, as metropolitan, 
evidently as a stop-gap measure, under the assumption that a replacement would be 
forthcoming from Constantinople once the difficulties posed by the Ferrara-Florence 
compromise had been overcome.  The impetus for this decision to install unilaterally 
a Russian hierarch as metropolitan had less to do with dogmatic disputes with 
Constantinople over Ferrara-Florence than it did with political exigencies “requiring a 
united church behind the throne,” and therefore in the opinion of at least one 
specialist “the ‘necessity’ which dictated the decision to elevate Iona in 1448 was
secular.”172  With no metropolitan coming from Constantinople and local political 
conditions in Russia and Byzantium alike not conducive to a regularized 
ecclesiastical relationship, Russian political authorities made the decision to break the 
relationship.  The fall of Constantinople in 1453 made this de facto autocephaly a 
permanent fixture of the organization of the Russian church, permanently severing its 
ties with the patriarchate of Constantinople (a process replicated in large part, as we 
shall see in chapter 6, by the Russian church’s own Metropolia in North America in 
the 20th century following the Bolshevik revolution).  The situation was regularized 
from the Byzantine side only in the late 16th century when (1) the patriarch of 
172 Alef 399-401, italics added.  As evidence Alef cites a letter from Vasilii II to Emperor Constantine 
XI explaining the rationale for Moscow’s unilateral selection and installation of a metropolitan.  This 
letter evidently never reached Constantinople, but it does reflect an attempt at initial consultation 
before breaking the relationship.  See Alef 400-01. 
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Constantinople finally approved the unilateral change in status of the Russian 
metropolitan to patriarch (in 1589), and (2) this patriarchal status was officially 
confirmed by the patriarchs of Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem (in 1593).  
Thereafter the Russian church remained autocephalous until the collapse of the 
Russian imperial state, the victory of Bolshevik forces, and the suppression of the 
Russian church by the newly consolidated Soviet state.173
Thus, by the close of the imperial period, what L’Hullier has described as a 
“double standard” had emerged among the autocephalous Eastern churches.  The 
traditional patriarchates (plus ancient outliers like Cyprus and Georgia) enjoyed 
autocephalous status as an institutionally-enshrined permanent fixture of the 
“Byzantine Commonwealth,” whereas the recently-emerged churches from outside 
that commonwealth (e.g. Russia, Bulgaria, Serbia, the Romanian principalities) 
enjoyed autocephaly of a more transitory nature.  For the former, “imperial 
involvement involved the granting, confirmation or cancellation of autocephalous 
status for the Churches regarded by the Byzantines as parts of the ‘Commonwealth,’” 
whereas for the latter, “the heads of the newly-formed States had a tendency to 
appropriate for themselves the Imperial privileges, including those concerning 
autocephaly and the title of the primates of their State Churches.” 174  This split 
reflects a changing role of the state from enforcing agent to a more interventionist 
driver of organizational change, as the political geography began to shift away from 
the imperial model toward the consolidation of discrete nation-states. 
173 L’Hullier, “Accession to Autocephaly” 290-93. 
174 L’Hullier, “Accession to Autocephaly” 287. 
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5.1.8 The Imperial Period: Preliminary Conclusions 
We may at this point note a few conclusions about autocephaly during the 
imperial period.175  First, “being autocephalous did not necessarily preclude 
belonging to a larger regional entity,” insofar as independent churches could operate 
with no external administrative interference, even while being confederated within 
the political boundaries of the Roman Empire.  Second, autocephaly was not a static 
and unchangeable legal classification.  Territorial accommodation meant that 
autocephalous status could change, i.e. be revoked, when provincial reorganizations 
meant that ecclesiastical boundaries had to be redrawn.  Third, the increasing 
consolidation into a system of major sees brought with it the concurrent decrease in 
the authority of local metropolitan bishops as certain territories were drawn into the 
administrative sphere of major sees like Constantinople.176
We also may note that many of these developments arose concurrently.  Even 
during the initial stages of organizational development when territorial 
accommodation was the norm, special prerogatives particular to the see of Rome did 
not eclipse the general local administrative independence afforded to other particular 
local churches.  Later, with consolidation in the East into the pentarchic configuration 
of major sees, some churches such as Cyprus remained largely independent of 
administrative dependencies on the major sees.  As noted earlier, the Church of 
Georgia was de facto independent as early as the 5th century and, upon reconciling 
itself in the 7th century to orthodox dogma as laid out in the general council of 
175 These points are discussed in L’Hullier, “Accession to Autocephaly” 280-81. 
176 L’Hullier, “Accession to Autocephaly” 281.  See also Erickson , “The Autocephalous Church” 95-
96.
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Chalcedon, retained its de facto autocephalous status.177  Structural pluralism 
coexisted, at times uneasily, with pentarchy, but the institutional framework was 
sufficiently elastic to accommodate both. 
Finally, we should reiterate the fact that autocephaly of the newer states 
outside the boundaries of the Byzantine empire, such as Bulgaria, Serbia, and Russia, 
was often a function of the diplomatic efforts coming from the emperor.  Conceding 
varying decrees of ecclesiastical autonomy was one way for the emperor to ensure 
states of the “Byzantine commonwealth” would remain in the orbit of the imperial 
center.  Obolensky has noted: 
[A]s the history of the Empire’s relations with its northern neighbors, and 
particularly with the Balkan Slavs, so clearly illustrates, these concessions 
were apt to include the granting to the satellite states a measure of 
ecclesiastical self-government; the recognition by the Emperor Basil II about 
1020 of the autonomy of the Bulgarian Church, whose primate, the archbishop 
of Ohrid, was to be consecrated by his own suffragan bishops, the Emperor 
reserving for himself the right of appointing or nominating him, is an 
outstanding and contemporary example of this ecclesiastical diplomacy.178
5.2 The Post-Imperial Period 
The fall of Constantinople in 1453 to Ottoman forces led to both 
administrative changes and continuities for the church.  The church retained its 
institutional framework governing the means for self-regulation and organizational 
change.  However, its external environment was radically different.  The political 
authority of the Eastern Christian realm was no longer Christian, which forced new 
applications of existing institutional rules in the absence of the transitional alignment 
177 Erickson, “The Autocephalous Church” 99. 
178 Obolensky, “Byzantium, Kiev, and Moscow” 76-77. 
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between church and state.  Despite this, the persistence of some aspects of Byzantine 
political philosophy, even into the post-Byzantine era, with regard to autocephaly 
remains an important factor for our consideration.  
5.2.1 Transition to Ottoman Rule and the Changing Role of Constantinople 
Orthodox Christians within the Ottoman Empire, irrespective of nationality, 
were administered as a separate nation (millet) within the empire, of which the 
Patriarch of Constantinople179 was the appointed head.  The responsibilities of the 
Patriarch of Constantinople thereafter extended beyond the ecclesiastical to include 
increased political and jurisdictional duties as well.  The sultan consolidated the 
administration of the Orthodox millet, and while the eastern patriarchates of 
Alexandria, Jerusalem, and Antioch theoretically retained their administrative 
authority, in fact they became answerable to the Sublime Porte via the Patriarchate of 
Constantinople.  The historically autocephalous church of Cyprus had already 
become functionally dependent upon the Patriarchate of Constantinople during its 
Venetian occupation and that external dependency remained in place.  In general, and 
at least initially, the structure of the ecclesiastical territories already under the 
patriarchate of Constantinople remained as before, with local bishops answering to 
their metropolitans and the metropolitans answering to the patriarch (although, as 
mentioned above, there were also the “autocephalous” bishops answerable directly to 
179 We will continue to use this term interchangeably with “Ecumenical Patriarchate” as a matter of 
convenience.  Constantinople ceased to exist in name after this period but the patriarchate’s retention 
of the (arguably) anachronistic title signifies a concurrent retention of much Byzantine political 
philosophy – the patriarch as responsible for the entirety of the oikoumene or “inhabited realm” of the 
empire. 
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the patriarch).  Additionally, episcopal elections had to receive civil ratification from 
the Ottoman civil authority.180
This new arrangement (1) increased the administrative authority exercised via 
the Patriarchate of Constantinople over other patriarchs and the leaders of the other 
(formerly) autocephalous churches, and (2) allocated to the patriarch of 
Constantinople some of the powers that formerly belonged to the Byzantine emperors 
in the area of the recognition and suppression of autocephalous churches.181  By the 
late 15th century the Ottoman Empire had spread to encompass the emergent states 
(Serbia, Bulgaria, the Romanian principalities) with the newly-established 
autocephalous churches.182  With these states under Ottoman control the autocephaly 
of their churches was abolished by default, and were only restored selectively by 
Ottoman governmental action: it was Grand Vizier Sokollu, for example, who 
ordered the reinstitution of the Serbian patriarchate in Peü in 1557, but circumscribed 
the activities of the patriarch himself to prevent Serbian separatism from Ottoman 
control.183
It might be noted parenthetically that after the fall of the Ottoman Empire and 
the emergence of the secular Turkish state, the Ecumenical Patriarch became 
(following the 1923 population exchange with Greece) the head of only a very small 
number of Christians, which caused Constantinople to become “more inclined than 
ever before to emphasize its primatial authority [as primus inter pares] in the entire 
180 Steven Runciman, The Great Church in Captivity (New York: Cambridge, 1968) 165-179. 
181 L’Hullier, “Accession to Autocephaly” 293. 
182 See Hupchick, map 5, “Ottoman Expansion in the Balkans, 1354-1566,” The Balkans: From 
Constantinople to Communism.
183 Runciman, Great Church in Captivity 203-04. 
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Orthodox Church”184 – presumably as a way of maintaining a semblance of its 
hierarchical role following the collapse of its traditional sphere of influence. 
Recalling the discussion above of the imperial period, we may conclude that 
before the fall of Constantinople in 1204 during the Fourth Crusade – arguably the 
beginning of the final process of Byzantine political disintegration that would 
culminate two centuries later in the Ottoman victory – the “non-pentarchic” class of 
autocephalous churches (e.g. Cyprus, Georgia, arguably the patriarchate of Ohrid) all 
came into existence through conciliar decision or imperial rescript that was accepted 
or validated by the other churches.  After the reestablishment of the patriarchate at 
Constantinople in 1261, as was noted above, two new autocephalous churches had 
emerged, one of Serbia and one of Bulgaria, but these came into existence exclusively 
through agreements between civil authorities – i.e. essentially through an extra-
ecclesiastical process.185  Erickson has argued that this represents a major 
demarcation point at which the identification of church and state as coterminous 
entities took hold.
5.2.2 The Significance of the “New” Autocephalous Churches 
According to Erickson, these “new” autocephalous churches in Bulgaria and 
Serbia – like the Church of Russia to follow – had certain characteristics that 
distinguished them from the earlier “class” of autocephalous churches: (1) they “came 
into existence as one aspect of bilateral treaties between civil governments, reflecting 
184 L’Hullier, “Accession to Autocephaly” 294.  See also Harry J. Psomiades, “The Ecumenical 
Patriarchate Under the Turkish Republic: The First Ten Years,” Balkan Studies (Thessaloniki) 2 
(1961): 47-70. 
185 Erickson, “The Autocephalous Church” 106-07. 
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a tendency to regard autocephaly chiefly as the sign of an independent national state”; 
(2) the concept of autocephaly had expanded to include not only ecclesiastical but 
political independence;186 (3) the autocephaly of this new class of churches 
“increasingly became…conditional and partial, limited by treaty and juridically 
revocable”; and (4) conciliar ecclesiastical validation of new autocephalous churches 
through the pentarchic arrangement of sees gave way to a more exclusive prerogative 
enjoyed by Constantinople.187  As Erickson has noted, 
In the course of these thirteenth-century disputes, autocephaly assumes an ad 
hoc quality less affected by the Church’s earlier canonical tradition than by 
the political exigencies of the moment.  In part this is because the parties 
involved were not above juggling the canons to suit their own private ends; 
but it is also because the canons themselves, for the most part products of and 
predicated upon the existence of one Christian empire, failed to provide 
consistent and unequivocal answers to the problems of the day.  The eventual 
political and military triumph of Nicea, by restoring the empire, provided a 
respite from the jurisdictional chaos and assured continuation – and indeed 
expansion – of the authority of the patriarch of Constantinople, New Rome.  
But the canonical problems raised by the collapse of the empire remained, and 
still remain, unsolved.188
In this sense the emergence of the “new” autocephalous churches embodied 
both the vocabulary of Byzantine universalism and increasingly national 
preoccupations.  This can be seen, for example, in the rise of Muscovite Russia and 
the circumscribed tsardom it entailed: “The Muscovite grand-prince…never 
pretended to be ‘emperor of the Romans’, as the Byzantine emperors did, but only 
‘tsar’ of all Russia.  His real political ambition was to build an empire on national – 
186 Interestingly, Erickson has noted that this “was expressed above all in the right to consecrate the 
myron [holy chrism] needed for anointing an emperor.”  Erickson, “The Autocephalous Church” 109-
110.
187 Erickson, “The Autocephalous Church” 106-07. 
188 Erickson, “The Autocephalous Church” 109-110, italics added. 
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and largely secular – grounds.”189  Certainly the political maxim, embodied for 
example in a statement ascribed to Patriarch Antony of Constantinople in the late 12th
century – “It is impossible for Christians to have the Church but not to have an 
emperor” – continued to hold in the East.190  But a natural corollary developed as well 
following the collapse of the Byzantine Empire, namely that it was impossible to have 
an emperor (and by extension a kingdom, or state) without the church, which 
logistically meant a patriarch to crown and anoint that emperor, and the establishment 
of a new kingdom necessarily entailed the establishment of a church whose 
boundaries were coterminous with that state.  Likewise, the idea of the “national 
church” took hold in earnest.  Spinka has argued that “during the period of the 
Turkish supremacy, the churches in Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece became the chief 
conservers of the spirit of nationality.  In course of time, the terms Orthodox and 
Serbian, or Bulgarian, or Greek, became almost synonymous.”191  This became acute 
as the withdrawal of autocephaly and the loss of statehood sowed the seeds of the 
identification of religion with nationhood – spelling the beginning of the national 
period.  Spinka has noted that in case of Serbia, 
…the church became the heart of Serbian nationalism – a function which it 
performed till the recovery of autonomy at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century.  The patriarch in a way assumed the headship of the nation.  
Orthodoxy became synonymous with the Serbian nationality so that those 
Serbs who had accepted Islam were regarded as lost to the nation, and as 
having become Turks.192
189 John Meyendorff, “Byzantium, the Orthodox Church and the Rise of Moscow,” The Byzantine 
Legacy in Eastern Europe, ed. Lowell Clucas (New York: Columbia, 1988) 15. 
190 Cited in George P. Majeska, “Russia’s Perception of Byzantium after the Fall,” Clucas 23. 
191 Spinka 88. 
192 Spinka 154-55. 
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Finally, and in general with regard to the “new” class of autocephalous 
churches, the state emerged less as an enforcer of existing ecclesiastical relationships 
sanctioned by the institutional framework and more as a proactive agent in forming, 
recalibrating, and breaking those relationships often independent of the formal 
institutional framework and, often, church hierarchs themselves.  While the 
organizational principles set forth in the institutional framework continued to exist 
“on the books,” the degree to which they actually were able to constrain acts of 
organizational change levied by the state began to decrease.  This decrease would 
continue through the national period, reaching a nadir in the post-national period. 
5.3 The National Period 
The millet system was the key organizing principle for all Orthodox Christians 
in the Ottoman Empire, and the episcopal hierarchies were controlled by Greeks 
under the patriarchate at Constantinople.  “After the autocephalous Slavic-rite Peü
and Ohrid patriarchates were eliminated again in the 1760s, Orthodox Christians were 
under the administration of the Greek-controlled Ecumenical Patriarchate, and Greek 
cultural hegemony within the Orthodox millet went unchallenged until the middle of 
the nineteenth century.”193  The dual constraints of Ottoman administrative and Greek 
ecclesiastical control were important external dependencies that nascent Eastern 
European states sought to throw off in part through the establishment of 
193 Hupchick, The Balkans 206. 
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autocephalous churches with borders coterminous with their newly-independent 
states.194
5.3.1 Example: The Church of Serbia, Continued 
The patriarchate of Peü, its autocephaly restored in the mid-16th century, 
continued to operate with a wide degree of independence until it was abolished and 
brought under Greek ecclesiastical control in 1766.195  To that point the provinces and 
territories (which included, for example, Montenegro) jurisdictionally subject to the 
patriarchate of Peü fell within a fluid set of political boundaries between the Ottoman 
and Austrian empires (all were within the Ottoman domain prior to the war with 
Austria, and after the Treaty of Karlowicz in 1699 they fell on either side of the new 
border); altogether under the patriarchate of Peü there were some eight metropolitan 
sees, four archbishoprics, and one bishopric on the Ottoman side and two 
metropolitan sees, one archbishopric, and three bishoprics on the Austrian side.196  An 
account by Patriarch Chrysanthos of Jerusalem from 1778 reveals that these 
ecclesiastical territories were malleable and changed often according to the 
configuration of the political geography: “It ought to be further noted that the Thrones 
there are often altered, elevated or demoted, while two Provinces are often united as 
one, in the sense of both being under an Hierarch [sic], as times and needs require, so 
that not even their designation is agreed by all to be one and the same… .”197  The 
194 See Marin V. Pundeff’s chapter, “Bulgarian Nationalism,” Nationalism in Eastern Europe, ed. Peter 
F. Sugar and Ivo J. Lederer (Seattle: University of Washington, 1969). 
195 Hupchick 208. 
196 Panteleimon Rodopoulos, “Autocephaly and the Manner in Which It Is Declared: The Orthodox 
Church in Montenegro,” Greek Orthodox Theological Review 42.3-4 (1997): 215-17. 
197 Chrysanthos of Jerusalem, Syntagmation (Venice, 1778): 55, cited in Rodopoulos 215. 
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church’s organizational shape continued to be driven by changes in the political 
geography.  The role of the state as an arbiter and driver of organizational change is 
evident during this period as well.  In 1857, under pressure from the Western powers 
to implement reforms of the millet system (the number of millets had been expanded 
to include Western European Christians located within the boundaries of the Ottoman 
empire), the sultan ordered the church to convene a council to deal with problems 
associated with Greek domination of the Orthodox millet.  The patriarch of 
Constantinople felt compelled to do this and a council did in fact convene for this 
purpose in Constantinople in 1860.198
The church in the newly independent Serbian state felt that it could no longer 
exist under the administrative control of Constantinople, and in 1830 the sultan 
agreed to reinstate the autonomy of the Serbian Church.  There is much evidence 
reflecting the expanded role of the state as an agent of organizational change – MiloĞ
Obrenoviü in fact viewed the church as an institution of the state (similar to the 
situation in Greece and Russia).199  Hapsburg Emperor Leopold I granted autonomy 
to part of the Serbian Orthodox Church that existed within the Hapsburg imperial 
territories (primarily in its border regions, most of the Serbian occupants of which 
were émigrés from Ottoman territories), and established its center at Sremski 
Karlovci (Karlowicz) in 1713.200  As Hupchick has noted: 
The border Serbs’ religious autonomy harmonized well with their former 
Ottoman millet traditions and reinforced their old millet sense of group 
identity.  Direct exposure to emerging Western European national and ethnic 
concepts linked their autonomous Orthodox church organization to a growing 
198 Hupchick 242. 
199 Charles Jelavich and Barbara Jelavich, The Establishment of the Balkan National States, 1804-1920
(Seattle: University of Washington, 1977) 59. 
200 Hupchick 200. 
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sense of ethnic awareness.  By the opening of the nineteenth century the 
Orthodox border Serbs viewed the Sremski Karlovci church as their 
quasipolitical collective voice.201
The Ecumenical Patriarchate acknowledged the autonomy of the Serbian church in 
1831, but did not recognize its autocephaly until 1879.  Serbia gained territory in the 
Balkan Wars and after World War I was incorporated along with Bosnia, 
Hercegovina, Croatia and Slovenia (all former territories of the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire) and Montenegro into Yugoslavia, and in 1920 the archbishop was elevated to 
the status of patriarch.202
5.3.2 Example: The Church of Greece, Continued 
In Greece, the establishment of a national state resulted in a similar demand 
for a state church, which is to say a church independent from Constantinople.  
Following the Ottoman military defeat at the hands of Russia, Britain, and France and 
the subsequent London Protocol (1830), Greece was recognized as an independent 
state and the Western powers installed Otto, a Bavarian prince, as king.  The new 
government under Otto essentially nationalized the Church of Greece.  In the post-
revolutionary state, the church was made a department of the state under the guidance 
of Ludwig von Maurer, consciously modeled on the state churches of Russia and 
Bavaria.  This declaration of autocephaly by secular authorities caused an 
ecclesiastical split between Greece and the Patriarchate of Constantinople which was 
only resolved after 1850 when Russian authorities pressured the patriarchate of 
Constantinople to accept the fait accompli and recognize the autocephaly of the 
201 Hupchick 200. 
202 Steven Runciman, The Orthodox Church and the Secular State (Auckland: University Press, 1971) 
71-72.
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Church of Greece.  This church, which included approximately 33 bishops, was 
headed by a synod over which the Archbishop of Athens presided, with all synodal 
decisions subject to approval by a state procurator.203  Not all territories that were 
incorporated into the new Greek state fell under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the 
Archbishop of Athens; the northern Greek territories, to include Macedonia 
(incorporated after the Balkan Wars), and later the Dodecanese islands (incorporated 
after World War II) remained under the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate,204
leading to a very complicated ecclesiastical situation and sowing the seeds of 
organizational conflict later in the 20th century, as will be discussed below. 
5.3.3 Example: The Church of Bulgaria, Continued 
In Bulgaria, the rising tide of European national revolutions, along with 
increasing educational levels and exposure to nationalistic ideologies, among other 
factors, eventually did cause an increase in a uniquely Bulgarian national 
consciousness by the 1800s.  Roudometof has argued that “[t]he establishment of the 
Bulgarian Exarchate was the most visible and dramatic manifestation of the 
fragmentation of Eastern Orthodox universalism.”205  As Jelavich has noted, 
Bulgarians observed the equivalent actions taken in Greece and Serbia and 
recognized the increasingly negative impact upon their national project of Bulgaria’s 
ecclesiastical dependence upon the Patriarchate of Constantinople.  Unlike in Greece, 
the establishment of a Bulgarian national church independent from Constantinople 
203 Preceding discussion from Jelavich 71-72, and Hupchick 222-24. 
204 Runciman, The Orthodox Churches and the Secular State 69. 
205 Victor Roudometof, “Nationalism, Globalization, Eastern Orthodoxy: ‘Unthinking’ the ‘Clash of 
Civilizations’ in Southeastern Europe,” European Journal of Social Theory 2.2 (1999): 240. 
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preceded the establishment of a Bulgarian nation-state.  The political situation 
regarding the Ecumenical Patriarchate in the Balkans was such that Constantinople 
resisted calls by Bulgarian hierarchs for Bulgarian bishops to be appointed in 
Bulgarian dioceses – a key requirement for autocephaly.  The patriarchate enlisted the 
support of the patriarchates of Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem in rejecting 
Bulgarian efforts toward ecclesiastical independence.  Metropolitan Filaret of 
Moscow, however, found political advantage in a peaceful resolution of the conflict 
in favor of the establishment of a Bulgarian church, given the increasing foreign 
missionary pressure in Bulgarian lands.206
The mediation effort, once again spearheaded by the Russian ambassador to 
Constantinople, was unsuccessful however, and Bulgarian hierarchs eventually 
presented a fait accompli by replacing Greek bishops with Bulgarians.  Ottoman 
authorities, concerned about rising Christian tensions throughout its territories, 
eventually intervened to mediate the situation, essentially acknowledging the 
existence, de facto if not de jure, of an independent Bulgarian church.207
Ecclesiastical and political claims by the Greek government and Ecumenical 
Patriarchate to Bulgarian territory, plus equivalent Serbian claims to the ancient 
territories of Peü and Ohrid, further complicated the situation.  The Ottoman 
government attempted to resolve the situation by creating a Bulgarian exarchate and 
in March 1872 an exarch was named.  The patriarchate of Constantinople rejected this 
action and declared the new Bulgarian ecclesiastical entity schismatic, a decision 
rejected by the Russian, Serbian, and Romanian churches but endorsed by the Church 
206 Preceding discussion from Jelavich 129-35. 
207 See also E. Garrison Walters, The Other Europe: Eastern Europe to 1945 (New York: Syracuse, 
1988) 100. 
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of Greece.  In the end it was a process of negotiation, with political authorities 
(namely the Ottoman and Russian authorities) playing the decisive role and the 
patriarchate of Constantinople eventually accepting the fait accompli.  Revolutionary 
activities leading to the establishment of a Bulgarian state occurred later.208
Like the Serbian Church, the Bulgarian patriarchate of Ohrid became 
autocephalous in the course of the establishment of the Ottoman Empire and survived 
in its independent form until its abolition in 1767.  The patriarchate was occupied by 
mostly by ethnic Greeks as well.209  Despite its isolation, the influence of Western 
European nationalism was evidenced by the fact that by the mid-1800s a nationalist 
agenda was gaining strength, “aimed at both religious independence from the Greeks 
and political independence from the Ottomans.”210  In 1860, at the millet reform 
council, the Bulgarians were underrepresented and therefore unable to obtain the right 
to elect their own (Bulgarian, rather than Greek) bishops – again, an important 
requirement for autocephaly.  So the Bulgarians (evidently not the clergy, but rather 
influential ethnic Bulgarian merchants in Constantinople) unilaterally declared the 
Bulgarian church independent of Greek patriarchal authority.  This amounted to a 
declaration of national independence in the sense of the creation of a new Bulgarian 
millet, which the Greek hierarchs rejected.211  “The Bulgarians demanded a church of 
their own that would define, in millet terms, the geographic extent of a Bulgarian 
ethnonational territory, while the Greeks viewed that demand as a threat to Hellenism 
and the future of an enlarged Greece based on the ‘Great Idea’ [Megali Idea, calling 
208 Preceding discussion from Jelavich 129-35. 
209 Hupchick 209-10. 
210 Hupchick 210. 
211 Hupchick 242-44. 
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for the reconsolidation of the Greek nation-state along old Byzantine boundaries] and 
centered on a re-Christianized Constantinople.”212  The “Great Idea” has been 
characterized as Greek nationalist irredentism, the “Greek equivalent of ‘Manifest 
Destiny,’ of la mission civilizatrice, of ‘the white man’s burden,’ of the ‘Third 
Rome,’ or of Pan-Slavism or Pan-Germanism.”213  Russia yet again played a 
mediating role with the Patriarchate of Constantinople, but when that failed, the 
sultan recognized the independence of the Bulgarian church via an imperial decree, 
establishing in 1870 the church headed by a Bulgarian exarch headquartered in 
Istanbul.
The establishment of this new exarchate was a significant event, since it 
decoupled Bulgarian Christians from dependence upon the patriarchate and granted 
them de facto autocephaly, insofar as the Ottoman imperial decree mandated non-
interference by the patriarchate in the election of bishops or in administrative 
matters.214  This set in motion a process whereby the millet system, which subdivided 
the state along religious lines, was formalized with the establishment of an 
independent Bulgarian ecclesiastical authority, which, although initially located in 
Istanbul, was viewed as exercising authority over all parts (and, by extension, people) 
of the “Bulgarian ecclesiastical territory…wherever this authority may be located.”215
“The new Bulgarian Exarchate was granted jurisdiction over large tracts of three 
regions within the empire (Bulgaria, Thrace, and Macedonia) and the sanctioned 
212 Hupchick 244. 
213 Stephen G. Xydis, “Modern Greek Nationalism,” Sugar and Lederer 238. 
214 See the Article III of the imperial firman of 1870 establishing the Bulgarian Exarchate.  Balkanicus, 
The Aspirations of Bulgaria (London: Simpkin Marshall, Hamilton, Kent & Co., 1915) 245-49, 
reprinted in Stephen Fisher-Galati, ed., Man, State, and Society in Eastern European History (London: 
Pall Mall, 1970) 200-03. 
215 Article 39 of the Trnovo Constitution.  See Marin V. Pundeff, “Bulgarian Nationalism,” Sugar and 
Lederer 123 (footnote 50). 
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ability to acquire other territories should two-thirds of their inhabitants wish to 
join.”216  The patriarchate in Constantinople condemned the act as schismatic on the 
grounds of phyletism, defined as “the establishment of particular churches, accepting 
members of the same nationality and refusing members of other nationalities, being 
administered by pastors of the same nationality” and the “coexistence of nationally 
defined churches of the same faith, but independent from each other, in the same city 
and village.”217  In the end, however, the Ecumenical Patriarchate was faced with 
another fait accompli, because the Bulgarian church continued to operate 
independently.218  The Greeks and to a lesser extent the Serbs were concerned that 
Macedonians would vote to be included in the Bulgarian exarchate, and when this 
occurred the patriarchate of Constantinople labeled the exarchate a schismatic entity, 
but this did not stop the outflow.  To some extent this began to prefigure a nationalist 
movement among Macedonians, calling for the creation of an independent 
Macedonian state, free of control by the Ottoman state.219
5.3.4 Example: The Church in Ukraine 
Ukraine presents a useful case in which the growth of national identity 
predated the creation of both an autocephalous church (yet to be realized) and a state.
Up to World War I, with the movement toward national churches throughout Eastern 
216 Hupchick 245. 
217 Precisely the situation that evolved with the Orthodox émigré populations in North America, and to 
a lesser extent in Western Europe and Australia.  Citation of Greek version of the decrees quoted in 
text by Maximos of Sardis, cited in John Meyendorff, “Orthodox Unity in America: New Beginnings?” 
St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly 35.1 (1991) 12-13. 
218 Hupchick 244-45. 
219 Hupchick 297-99. 
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Europe, there was no concurrent achievement of separate ecclesiastical status for 
Orthodox Ukrainians within the Russian Empire – the Russian Orthodox Church 
considered Kiev as the epicenter of Russian Christianity, dating back to the 10th
century and the baptism of the Kievan Rus’.  The metropolitan of Kiev was 
subordinated to the Patriarchate of Moscow a century or so after the establishment of 
the latter as an autocephalous church free of external dependencies on the Patriarchate 
of Constantinople.  Two attempts to (re)establish autocephaly for the Ukrainian 
Church paralleled the search for Ukrainian political autonomy after 1917.  The 
Russian Orthodox Church was unwilling to grant the church in Ukraine any status 
beyond autonomy.  From the 1920s forward the Ukrainian church’s two abortive 
attempts at establishing autocephaly included “self-consecrating” its own bishops 
against Moscow’s objections in 1921 followed by a second attempt during the 
German invasion in World War II, but both attempts, lacking any external support 
(most notably from the Patriarchate of Constantinople), ending with reincorporation 
of the Ukrainian church under the Moscow Patriarchate.220
Suppressed during the Soviet period, the Ukrainian church attempted again to 
establish ecclesiastical boundaries coterminous with the Ukrainian state after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union.  The political environment in which the other Orthodox 
churches found themselves (in addition to the substantial Ukrainian émigré 
population particularly in North America) exerted considerable influence on the 
outcome of the Ukrainian ecclesiastical project.  After the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the independence of the Ukrainian state, the search for an independent 
220 See among a number of sources John S. Reshetar, “Ukrainian Nationalism and the Orthodox 
Church,” American Slavic and East European Review 10.1 (1951): 38-49. 
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Ukrainian church led to a situation in which three Orthodox entities – the Ukrainian 
Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate), the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kiev 
Patriarchate, of disputed canonical status), and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church 
(non-canonical and largely unrecognized outside of Ukraine) – competed for 
ecclesiastical jurisdiction over the Ukrainian Orthodox population.  Further 
complicating the situation was the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, suppressed and 
forcibly subordinated to the Moscow Patriarchate during the Soviet period but 
resurgent after its legalization following the Soviet collapse.  The interests of many of 
these entities converge on the idea of the establishment of an independent Ukrainian 
church, manifesting itself as an autocephalous church according to the Orthodox 
model, and even as a patriarchate centered in Kiev (an idea with support among the 
Greek Catholic population and Ukrainian Parliament but rejected by the Vatican 
given the delicate state of ecumenical relations between Rome and Moscow).   
This situation created the conditions, by the close of the 20th century, for 
Ukraine to emerge as the epicenter of ecclesiastical competition between Moscow, 
Constantinople, and Rome.  The Moscow Patriarchate viewed Ukrainian autocephaly 
as a threat (more so, arguably, than Greek Catholic encroachment), and probably as 
part of its larger competition with the Ecumenical Patriarchate, proposed autonomy 
for the Ukrainian church provided it did not secede from Moscow.  The Ecumenical 
Patriarchate, in a position inconsistent with its erstwhile opposition to autocephalies 
in the diaspora populations (discussed below), reportedly preferred the creation of a 
united autocephalous Orthodox Church in Ukraine.221  The Vatican for its part has 
attempted to balance opposing interests between the Ukrainian Greek Catholics, 
221 Phillip Walters, Editorial, Religion, State, and Society 29.3 (2001): 151. 
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Roman Catholic hierarchs favoring ecumenical relations with Moscow (for whom the 
existence of the Greek Catholic Church is unacceptable), and Catholic centralists for 
whom the existence of “local” or national (autocephalous) churches is inconsistent 
with Roman Catholic ecclesiology.222
5.4 Post-National Period 
 The national period was characterized by the tendency to define ecclesiastical 
boundaries on the grounds of national and ethnic identity.  The post-national period, 
centered primarily on the experiences of state churches during the 20th century, is 
characterized by several competing trends: (1) The tendency for (mostly 
autocephalous) state churches to expand their jurisdiction to include members of their 
own ethnic and national groups who found themselves within the borders of other 
discrete states; (2) A contest for authority between the two dominant Eastern sees, the 
Ecumenical Patriarchate in Constantinople and the Patriarchate of Moscow (the 
patriarchates of Antioch, Jerusalem, and Alexandria by the end of the 20th century 
enjoyed little more than historical prestige with the large exodus of Christians from 
222 Serhii Plokhy, “Between Moscow and Rome: The Struggle for the Greek Catholic Patriarchate in 
Ukraine,” Journal of Church and State 37.4 (1995): 849-68.  There has been a large amount of material 
published since 1991 particularly on the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church; many monographs provide 
excellent overviews.  For some additional information and analysis from a variety of disciplinary 
perspectives on the relationship between religion, history, and national identity in the search for an 
independent Ukrainian church, see also Marian Rubchak, “Ethnohistorical Construction of Identity: 
The Lviv Paradigm,” National Identities 2.1 (2000): 21-34; Hugo Lane, Review Article: “Rusyns and 
Ukrainians Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow: The Limitations of National History,” Nationalities 
Papers 29.4 (2001): 689-96; Geraldine Fagan and Aleksandr Shchipkov, “The Ukrainian Greek 
Catholics in an Ambiguous Position” and “’Rome is Not Our Father, But Neither is Moscow Our 
Mother’: Will There be a Local Ukrainian Orthodox Church?” Religion, State, and Society 29.3 (2001): 
197-213; Myroslaw Tataryn, “Russia and Ukraine: Two Models of Religious Liberty and Two Models 
for Orthodoxy,” Religion, State, and Society 29.3 (2001): 155-72; Konrad Sadkowski, “From Ethnic 
Borderland to Catholic Fatherland: The Church, Christian Orthodox, and State Administration in the 
Chelm Region, 1918-1939,” Slavic Review 57:4 (1998): 813-39. 
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the Middle East);223 (3) The increasingly complex and decreasingly efficacious role 
of the state as an enforcer of the church’s institutional rules under unprecedented 
circumstances of globalization, fragmentation, and secularization.224  The geopolitics 
and the unique political experiences of the Eastern European states in particular have 
been described elsewhere225 in considerable detail and it is beyond the scope of this 
chapter to encapsulate them all.  However, a few brief case studies will be sufficient 
to illustrate these broader trends. 
5.4.1 Trends: Émigré Populations, Jurisdictional Competition, and the Role of the 
State
The political geography of the post-national period is characterized by the 
decreasing importance of state borders and the increased movement of émigré 
populations out of predominantly Orthodox Christian countries into primarily 
Western Europe and North America.  It should be noted, however, that some of the 
cases cited, for example Ukraine and Estonia, do not themselves fit into the émigré
category; rather, their own populations were caught in the broader jurisdictional 
competition between the major sees of Constantinople and Moscow. 
223 In the case of the dispute between Moscow and Constantinople over the church in Estonia, for 
example, the holy synod of the Patriarchate of Antioch, obviously not consulted by either see despite 
its ancient prestige, declared: “We deplore that our contribution in that very important matter has been 
reduced to simply being informed.”  Peter L’Hullier, “A Challenge to Orthodox Unity,” Jacob’s Well,
Spring-Summer 1996: 3, reprinted in Sourozh 65 (1996): 38-39. 
224 Certainly the relationships between and among states in the 20th century have been characterized by 
these two countervailing forces.  There is abundant literature on this topic.  See for example Ian Clark, 
Globalization and Fragmentation: International Relations in the Twentieth Century (New York: Oxford, 
1997).
225 See for example the studies by Hupchick and Jelavich, cited earlier, as well as the very useful 
Hupchick and Cox, eds., Palgrave Historical Atlas of Eastern Europe (New York: Palgrave, 2001). 
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In the case of Western Europe the initial wave of immigrants from Russia, 
Greece, and Asia Minor occurred in the 1920s, followed by a second wave from the 
Balkans, Soviet Russia, and Romania after World War II, followed by a third wave 
from the Middle East during the 1960s and 70s.226  In the case of North America, as 
will be discussed in chapter 6, the émigré populations arrived earlier, starting in the 
1800s, joining the indigenous Orthodox populations already in the Alaskan territories 
Christianized through Russian missionary activities in the 1700s.  However, the 20th
century also saw repeated waves of new émigrés from Eastern Europe arriving in 
North America through the interwar and cold war periods, and again through the 
close of the 20th century.  In sum, the movement of Eastern Christian populations out 
of their home countries occurred at unprecedented rates throughout the 20th century, 
and this phenomenon caused considerable difficulties for the church, which attempted 
to transpose institutional rules framed in a specific state-centric context into an 
entirely different political geography devoid of many of the traditional state-based 
enforcement mechanisms.  The implications of this radically different political 
context and lack of effective enforcement was, in many cases, a widening and 
accelerating disjuncture between the institutional framework of the church and the 
organizational forms the church began to manifest during this period. 
The émigré populations came to be organized, in both Western Europe and 
North America, as separate parallel ecclesiastical communities, defined in national 
and ethnic terms, under the jurisdiction of either their respective “mother churches” 
226 Michel Sollogoub, “Orthodox Christians in Western Europe Move Towards a Local Church,” talk 
given at a plenary session of the triennial Congress of the Fraternite’ Orthodoxe en Europe Occidentale, 
31 October to 3 November 2002 at St Laurent-sur-Sevres (Vendee), published in French as a 
supplement to Service Orthodoxe de Presse, No. 273, December 2002, document 273.B; and published 
in English (in an amended version) in Sourozh 92 (2003): 8-32. 
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(primarily Russia, Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia, and the Patriarchate of Antioch) or the 
Patriarchate of Constantinople.  The ecclesiastical boundaries and identities of these 
émigré communities reflected in large part the political conditions of their countries 
of origin and mother churches.  For example, after the 1930s the Russian churches in 
Western Europe split into three jurisdictions – one under Constantinople, a diocese 
under the Moscow Patriarchate, and a jurisdiction under exiled hierarchy of the 
Russian Church – the same lines of demarcation generally seen in North America 
during the same period due to political events in Soviet Russia.  The boundaries of 
these émigré jurisdictions were “superimposed” onto the political geography of 
Western Europe, insofar as they generally did not correspond in any meaningful way 
to local civil and political boundaries, and often overlapped with or ran parallel to one 
another, both organizational features inconsistent with the institutional rules 
governing the church described in chapters 4 and 5.227  As such they represented a 
highly confused ecclesiastical situation unprecedented even during the challenges and 
difficulties of the national period.
The broader competition between Moscow and Constantinople can be 
observed in the contested status of many of these émigré or minority communities.  
Constantinople argued that during the 19th and 20th centuries it alone had been 
responsible for granting, according to its unique prerogative, autocephalous status to 
the churches of Romania, Greece, Bulgaria, Poland, Albania, and Georgia, and 
autonomous status to the churches of Lithuania, Estonia, Finland, and 
Czechoslovakia.228  The Moscow Patriarchate, on the other hand, claimed 
227 Sollogoub 14-17. 
228 Rodopoulos 215. 
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jurisdictional rights over the churches in many of those same countries, particularly 
those falling within the old Russian imperial and later Soviet spheres of influence. To 
an extent this struggle was a reflection of the broader East-West conflict during the 
cold war, with the Moscow Patriarchate representing Soviet interests and the 
Ecumenical Patriarchate receiving support from the western powers.  As the cold war 
wound down and the churches in the former Soviet bloc began to reemerge from 
decades of repression, this conflict moved to the fore as both sees struggled for 
jurisdiction over émigré populations of Eastern Christians in Western Europe and the 
United States.  The complete collapse of communism and the Soviet apparatus, and 
the loss of those territories typically considered to be within the Russian sphere of 
political (and hence ecclesiastical) influence, created great tension within the Russian 
church as it competed for influence with the Ecumenical Patriarchate, whose own 
territories had dwindled almost exclusively to the Greek Orthodox émigré populations 
plus some of the territories in the Middle East. 
5.4.2 Example: The Church in the Czech Lands and Slovakia 
The case of the former state of Czechoslovakia provides one illustration of 
this competition over influence and the difficulties the church had in transposing its 
institutional rules onto a fluid political geography.  By the late 1800s the push for 
national independence for Czechs and Slovaks, opposed by the Roman Catholic 
Hapsburg leadership, became associated among some Orthodox populations with the 
idea of an independent national church.229  Prior to Czechoslovakia’s independence in 
229 The following discussion from The Blackwell Dictionary of Eastern Christianity (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2001) 153-54.  See also Hupchick and Cox, Historical Atlas of Eastern Europe, map 40.  
119
1918 Orthodox Christians were under the jurisdiction of Serbian diocese of Dalmatia; 
after independence the creation of a national church became a possibility.  By the 
early 1920s there were two rival candidates for the position of archbishop of 
Czechoslovakia, one consecrated by the Serbian patriarch in 1921 and another backed 
by Constantinople, forcing the state to intervene and select the Serbian candidate.
Under the Soviet regime in Eastern Europe and as an extension of the Soviet state, the 
Russian Church consolidated the Orthodox jurisdiction as an exarchate of the 
Moscow Patriarchate in 1946 (which also involved either the suppression or forcible 
resubordination under Orthodox bishops of the local Greek Catholic communities), 
and declared the Czechoslovakian church autocephalous in 1951.230  However, the 
Patriarchate of Constantinople recognized the same church as only autonomous and 
under its own jurisdiction, and only recognized the church’s autocephaly in 1998.
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the split of Czechoslovakia into 
separate Czech and Slovak states, the Orthodox Church in those states reconfigured 
itself commensurate with the changed political geography in an innovative way as the 
Church in the Czech Lands and Slovakia.  This new structure incorporated four 
dioceses – the eparchies of Prazska and Olomoucko-Brnenska on the Czech Republic 
side and the eparchies of Presovska and Michalovska on the Slovakian side, all four 
administered jointly under a single metropolitan bishop in Prague.231  Thus 
Contrast the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s views of spiritual and administrative primacy over the 
Orthodox of the Czech and Slovak lands with the Moscow Patriarchate’s own very different reading of 
that history, encapsulated for example in Josef Fejsak, “The Orthodox Church in Czechoslovakia: The 
Path to Autocephaly,” Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate 12 (1981): 46-49; and Jaroslav Suvarsky, 
“The 30th Anniversary of the Autocephaly of the Orthodox Church in Czechoslovakia,” Journal of the 
Moscow Patriarchate 7 (1982): 56-61. 
230 Suvarsky 58-59. 
231 Church in the Czech and Slovak Lands, 14 Nov. 2004 <http://www.pravoslavnacirkev.cz/>.  Path: 
Pravolslavna Cirkev; Schematismus.  See also Blackwell Dictionary of Eastern Christianity 154. 
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reconsolidated and with its autocephaly recognized, the church was able to largely 
escape continued jurisdictional competition between Moscow and Constantinople 
after the 1990s. 
5.4.3 Example: The Church in Estonia 
The Baltic Republic of Estonia was not as fortunate.  A confrontation erupted 
in 1996 between the patriarchates of Moscow and Constantinople over the status of 
Orthodox communities in Estonia (by the national period a majority Protestant state).  
The Orthodox Church in Estonia, whose roots go back to the 12th century, by the 
early 20th century was administratively under the Russian diocese of Pskov (Estonia 
by 1721 was part of the Russian Empire).  When Estonia proclaimed independence in 
1920, the Moscow Patriarchate recognized the Estonian church as an autonomous 
entity, a situation similar to the Orthodox churches of Poland, Finland, and Latvia 
during that period.232  These other churches were subsequently brought under the 
administration of the Patriarchate of Constantinople during the Soviet era because, 
like the Russian Metropolia in North America, their external dependencies on 
Moscow were untenable during the worst periods of persecution in Soviet Russia.  In 
1923, due to similar concerns in Estonia, the Patriarch of Constantinople formed an 
autonomous Estonian church as a diocese of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, and by 
232 Information in this section drawn from Sergei Chapnin, “Estonia: No Love Lost Between Sister 
Churches,” Sourozh 84 (2001): 43-44; Alexander F.C. Webster, “Split Decision: The Orthodox Clash 
Over Estonia,” Christian Century 113.19 (1996): 614-21; “Rift Threatens Orthodoxy,” Christian 
Century 113.10 (1996): 319-21; “Estonian Orthodox Church,” Blackwell Dictionary of Eastern 
Christianity 183-83; and articles in Paris Service Orthodoxe de Presse et d’Information 200, July-
August 1995: 9; 201, September-October 1995: 3; and 202, November 1995: 9; all reprinted in 
Sourozh 62 (1995): 43-47. 
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1947 a synod of pre-Soviet Estonian bishops in exile in Stockholm had been brought 
under the administrative authority of Constantinople.   
In 1945, a year after the Soviet Union annexed Estonia, the Moscow 
Patriarchate reabsorbed the Russian and Estonian-speaking parishes as a diocese of 
the Russian church.  Following the fall of the Soviet Union and Estonia’s political 
independence in 1991, Moscow restored the autonomous status of the Estonian 
church; meanwhile, Constantinople never renounced the ecclesiastical jurisdiction it 
had exercised during the Soviet period.  The Estonian government intervened in 1993 
by legally registering the exiled Stockholm synod church as the official Estonian 
Orthodox Church (and refused this registration to the autonomous Estonian church 
under Moscow), effectively creating two rival churches within the same state.  In 
1996, after two years of failed negotiations with Moscow, Constantinople asserted 
full jurisdictional control over the autonomous Estonian church.  This announcement 
prompted Patriarch Aleksy II of Moscow to formally break communion with the 
Ecumenical Patriarchate.  This dispute threatened for a few months to snowball into a 
wider and much more serious ecclesiastical conflict.233  The breach was healed, at 
least temporarily, four months later when Moscow and Constantinople agreed to a 
temporary interim agreement.  Relations improved only in 2002 when both sides 
attempted to resolve questions over property rights, and Patriarch Alexy (a native of 
Estonia) made his first visit to the country after the dispute in September 2003.234
The underlying issue of jurisdictional control, however, remained unresolved. 
233 “Orthodox Dispute Spurs Protest in Estonia,” Christian Century 113.12 (1996): 394-95. 
234 Michael Tarm, “Russian Patriarch Alexy II Visits Estonia,” Associated Press 25 Sept. 2003, 
Orthodox Christian News Service 5:42 (2003), 19 Nov. 2003 
<http://www.orthodoxnews.netfirms.com>.  
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5.4.4 Example: The Church in Finland 
An analogous situation occurred with the Orthodox Church in Finland.
Ecclesiastically under the patrimony of Russia since between the 10th and 12th
centuries, external dependencies upon Moscow became untenable after 1917.  The 
church in Finland was brought under Constantinople in an autonomous status, but 
thereafter its search for autocephaly was caught in the same dynamic of competition 
between Moscow and Constantinople that characterized much of Eastern Europe 
during the 20th century.  The Finnish church sought autocephaly on the same grounds 
as the other European churches – national independence, the need to order its own 
affairs, and the difficulties posed by external dependencies (applicable, from 
Finland’s point of view, to both Moscow and Constantinople).  The church in Finland 
remained in its autonomous status under Constantinople through the end of the 20th
century (even despite an offer from Moscow in 1948 to grant autocephaly, which 
viewed Helsinki’s turn to Constantinople, like that of the minority Orthodox 
populations in Estonia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and elsewhere during the early 
Soviet period, as a temporary stop-gap measure) and never received a grant of 
autocephaly from the Ecumenical Patriarchate.235
5.4.5: Example: The Church of Greece 
The Ecumenical Patriarchate itself became involved in a jurisdictional dispute 
with the Church of Greece in 2003 over rights of final approval of bishops of the 
235 Soili Oorni, “Autocephaly and its Meaning for the Finnish Orthodox Church,” thesis, St. Vladimir’s 
Theological Seminary, 1986, chapter 3. 
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“New Lands” territories acquired by Greece after the Balkan Wars in 1912.  
Constantinople had ceded administrative authority over the New Lands territories to 
the Church of Greece in 1928 in what it considered as a temporary measure because 
of its own external dependencies and constraints imposed by the Turkish government.  
In 2003, following a series of episcopal vacancies (two bishops died and a third 
resigned) in those territories, the Church of Greece attempted to select replacements 
without securing Constantinople’s final approval as called for in previous agreements, 
prompting a dispute that continued into 2004.  The Church of Greece defended its 
right to select and appoint bishops (including the 36 bishops administering the New 
Lands) as part of its right as an autocephalous church, arguing (if not explicitly) that 
Constantinople’s privileges in the territories were not justifiable given the challenges 
of maintaining external dependencies on the Patriarchate of Constantinople located in 
Turkey, a hostile neighbor.  It also cited administrative and pastoral difficulties those 
dependencies had already posed for the patriarchate’s other jurisdictions in North 
America and Australia (an argument reminiscent of those used by the Russian church 
centuries earlier to justify its own autocephaly from Constantinople).  Constantinople 
defended its exclusive right of approval as part of its institutionally and historically 
validated privileges in the territories, and argued that the 1928 agreement remained in 
force and enjoyed legal enforcement under the Greek constitution.  Constantinople’s 
concern appeared to be that appropriation of full administrative control by the Church 
of Greece over the New Lands territories would be part of an effort to establish an 
autocephalous patriarchate for the Church of Greece and sever all external 
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dependencies on the Patriarchate of Constantinople, further reducing its 
administrative sphere of influence.236
It is useful to reiterate the degree to which the characteristic structural 
pluralism of the church was a factor in these disputes.  In the case of the New Lands 
dispute, as mentioned above, the very complex division of ecclesiastical power which 
evolved between Greece and the Ecumenical Patriarchate within the political territory 
of the Greek state lay at the heart of the problem.  As noted in chapter 4, the disputed 
island of Cyprus has its own autocephalous church of very ancient origin.  In addition 
to the New Lands territories, four other distinct administrative systems coexist within 
Greek political boundaries: (1) The Church of Greece (autocephalous); (2) the Church 
of Crete (semi-autonomous, under the Ecumenical Patriarchate); (3) the Metropolis of 
the Dodecanese (under the Ecumenical Patriarchate); and (4) Mount Athos (a 
multinational monastic center under the Ecumenical Patriarchate).237  This division of 
administrative responsibility between the Greek church and Constantinople was 
enforced through provisions in the Greek constitution and in charters of the Church of 
Greece.  In the case of the “New Lands” dispute, the mediating role came from the 
Greek state in the person of Minister of Education Marietta Giannakou, who 
236 Theodore Kalmoukos, “Patriarchate and Church of Greece Dispute Escalates,” The National Herald
8-9 Nov. 2003, Orthodox Christian News Service 5.48 (2003), 19 Nov. 2003 
<http://www.orthodoxnews.netfirms.com>; George Gilson, “Bridging the Church Rift,” Athens News
31 Oct. 2003, Orthodox Christian News Service 5:48 (2003), 19 Nov. 2003 
<http://www.orthodoxnews.netfirms.com>; “Vote Brings Churches to the Brink,” Kathimerini.com 7 
Nov. 2003, Orthodox Christian News Service 5:48 (2003), 19 Nov. 2003 
<http://www.orthodoxnews.netfirms.com>; Gilson, “Holy War Rages On,” Athens News 7 Nov. 2003, 
Orthodox Christian News Service 5:48 (2003), 19 Nov. 2003 
<http://www.orthodoxnews.netfirms.com>; Kalmoukos, “Archbishop Demetios Embroiled in ‘New 
Lands’ Dispute,” The National Herald 22-23 Nov. 2003, Orthodox Christian News Service 5.50 (2003), 
9 Jan. 2004 <http://www.orthodoxnews.netfirms.com>; “Patriarch Says 1928 Act Valid,” 
Kathimerini.com 24 Nov. 2003, Orthodox Christian News Service 5.50 (2003), 9 Jan. 2004 
<http://www.orthodoxnews.netfirms.com>. 
237 Kalmoukos, “New Lands Dispute,” “Dispute Escalates.” 
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reportedly secured a verbal agreement in May 2004 in which the Church of Greece 
would affirm its respect for the traditional prerogatives of the Patriarchate of 
Constantinople.238
5.4.6 Other Examples 
It is important to note that similar structural pluralism can be observed 
everywhere Orthodox Christian émigré populations exist, and that the jurisdictional 
disputes that arise over those populations reflect the ongoing attempt of the church to 
negotiate the new political geography imposed by the end of the cold war, increasing 
globalization, and the (arguable) waning importance of state boundaries.  While these 
disputes predominantly occur between the patriarchates of Moscow and 
Constantinople, other sees are involved as well.  The Patriarchate of Romania, for 
example, was involved since 1992 in a jurisdictional dispute with the Moscow 
Patriarchate over the Orthodox Church in Moldova.239  Also in 1992 the Patriarchate 
of Jerusalem involved itself in a dispute involving jurisdiction over specific parishes 
of the Antiochian Orthodox Archdiocese of North America, evidently leveraging ties 
of ethnicity and nationality in conflict with the canonical rights of the Antiochian 
Archdiocese.  The latter reportedly received no support from its mother church, the 
Patriarchate of Antioch, nor was it able to appeal successfully to other major 
patriarchates, including Constantinople, for help in defending what it viewed as an 
238 George Gilson, “Church Turf War Two Centuries Old,” Athens News 14 May 2004, Orthodox 
Christian News Service 6.21 (2004), 27 May 2004 <http://www.orthodoxnews.netfirms.com>; 
“Minister Says Peace Deal Will Hold,” Kathimerini.com 21 May 2004, Orthodox Christian News 
Service 6.21 (2004), 27 May 2004 <http://www.orthodoxnews.netfirms.com>; and “Archbishop Blinks 
in Church Crisis, Kathimerini.com 20 May 2004, Orthodox Christian News Service 6.21 (2004), 27 
May 2004 <http://www.orthodoxnews.netfirms.com>. 
239 Webster, “Split Decision.” 
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intrusion into its internal affairs.  The archdiocese subsequently was able to secure 
from the Patriarchate of Antioch the status of autonomy in 2003, enabling it to govern 
more directly its own administrative affairs.240  This precise nature of the rights and 
privileges granted to the Antiochian Archidiocese, versus those retained by the 
Patriarchate of Antioch, however, evidently continue to be an issue of some 
dispute.241
5.5 Conclusions 
Our brief examination of the historical evidence suggests that the 
organizational shape of the church changed significantly over time in conjunction 
with changes in regimes and shifts in political boundaries.  We have noted many 
examples of organizational elasticity, particularly in the national period and after, and 
structural pluralism.  We have observed that the state has played an increasingly 
significant role in the enforcement, recalibration, and breaking of ecclesiastical 
relationships, again particularly after the imperial period.  Finally, we have observed 
the constraining effect of the institutional framework on efforts toward organizational 
change, usually initiated by political authorities. 
This constraining effect, however, appears to have decreased over time to the 
point of becoming effectively nonbinding on instances of organizational change, 
particularly during the post-national period.  The reason for this seems to lie with the 
240 Metropolitan Philip (Saliba), “Right Faith…Wrong System,” The Word April 1996: 3, reprinted in 
Sourozh 65 (1996): 40-41. 
241 See for example the open letter by Fr. George Dimas, Secretary of the Holy Synod of Antioch in 
Beruit, regarding the Antiochian self-rule resolution, published by the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of 
Antioch and All the East, 26 April 2004, Orthodox Christian News Service 6.17 (2004), 27 April 2004 
<http://www.orthodoxnews.netfirms.com>.
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changing role of the state as enforcer.  On one hand, where the state is active as an 
enforcer it has become, during the national and post-national periods, largely a 
unilateral agent of organizational change without reference (or with cursory, post-
facto reference) to the institutional framework, as evidenced by the many declarations 
of autocephaly by political authorities with little or no participation by church 
officials.  On the other hand, when the state is absent as an enforcer or exists in a 
hostile relationship vis-à-vis the church, organizational change appears to occur 
without effective constraint by the institutional framework, as evidenced by the 
proliferation of organizational arrangements (e.g. parallel or overlapping jurisdictions 
within one political territory, characteristic of the post-national period) incongruent 
with institutional rules.  In both cases, the efficacy of the institutional framework with 
regard to organizational change is diminished.   
A logical conclusion is that the state no longer plays the enforcement role 
ascribed to it in the institutional framework developed in the Byzantine period.  We 
have observed in chapters 3 and 4 that the institutional framework developed in a 
specific political context which presupposed a role for civil (imperial) authorities co-
extensive and complementary with that of the church.  When the political context 
changed, the institutional framework’s ability to govern organizational change 
became increasingly stressed as the state assumed a more dominant and often 
oppositional, rather than co-extensive, role in promoting and regulating 
organizational change.  Regularized and reasonably consistent organizational change 
in the church, necessary to adjust to a continually changing political landscape, 
presumes reliance by the church on the state as an enforcer.  However, the state, 
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alternatively hostile, indifferent, or interventionist in the national and particularly 
post-national periods, has not been the reliable partner as envisioned in the 
institutional framework of the church.   
Therefore we may view the “modern” jurisdictional conflicts within the 
church as a function of the church’s attempt to negotiate new and radically different 
political terrain using the institutional vocabulary (e.g. autocephaly) at hand, albeit 
with less and less effective enforcement and a less and less efficacious institutional 
framework.  Hence the philosophical differences epitomized, for example, in the 
struggle between the sees of Moscow and Constantinople, “with Moscow’s 
affirmation, on one side, of absolute autocephaly, and the temptation experienced by 
Constantinople, on the other, to claim universal jurisdiction,”242 could in fact be 
viewed as the natural result of this process of negotiation of new political geography 
with neither common agreement on rules nor common recourse to enforcement.  A 
major question, then, is whether the institutional framework can function adequately 
in the post-national environment to regulate and constrain organizational change 
without the state’s reliable involvement as an enforcer.  The autocephaly of the 
Russian Metropolia in North America in 1970 provides some useful insight into this 
question, and it is to this event we now turn. 
242 Sollogoub 23. 
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Chapter 6: Organizational Change and Institutional Enforcement: A Case Study 
In chapter 5 we concluded that the state no longer plays the enforcement role 
ascribed to it during the institutional framework’s formative period, which 
presupposed a role for the church coextensive and complementary with that of the 
state.  We also concluded that changes in the political context evidently diminished 
the institutional framework’s ability to govern organizational change in a coherent 
way.  Regularized and reasonably consistent organizational change in the church, 
necessary to adjust to a continually changing political landscape, presumes reliance 
by the church on the state as an enforcer.  However, the modern states of the Christian 
East, though occasionally adopting aspects of Byzantine political philosophy for 
pragmatic political reasons (e.g. enhanced legitimacy), have not upheld and enforced 
the symphonia on which much of the institutional framework of the Orthodox 
churches rests.  Furthermore, the presence of large émigré populations in secularized 
or confessionally non-Orthodox countries entailed the transposition of the 
institutional framework onto a political geography radically different, in terms of the 
role of the state vis-à-vis the church, from that envisaged in the institutional 
framework itself. 
To return to our question from chapter 5, is the institutional framework 
sufficiently effective in the post-national environment to regulate and constrain 
organizational change without the reliable involvement of an enforcer?  The 
conclusions consistent with our alternative theory suggest a negative answer.  As 
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noted in chapters 3 and 4, the Orthodox churches were able to formulate and amend 
the institutional framework largely through the unifying efforts of a central political 
authority, operationalized in large part through ecumenical councils and secondarily 
through regional synods and other local meetings.  For the framework to govern 
effectively organizational changes in the modern context, it must be modified to 
reflect the reality of a multiplicity of modern states, a multipolar and increasingly 
secular landscape completely different from that of the Byzantine era.  Yet the very 
fact of multiple states exerting conflicting pressures on their respective churches, and 
the absence of a centralized enforcing authority, makes this modification difficult to 
achieve.
6.1 Case Study: The Autocephaly of the Russian Metropolia in North America 
An examination of the autocephaly of the Russian Orthodox Metropolia in 
North America243 in 1970 may shed some light on the question posed at the 
conclusion of chapter 5.  The case is useful because it demonstrates, first, a measure 
of the ability of the institutional framework effectively to constrain organizational 
change under modern circumstances.  It also illustrates the role of consensus among 
Orthodox churches regarding the content and application of institutional rules, and the 
importance of the state’s role in adjudicating conflicts in a manner consistent with the 
institutional rules of the church.  The Metropolia’s autocephaly was a contentious 
event that threw into relief the issue of organizational change and how it is 
243 Known variously, depending upon the point in history, as the Russian Orthodox Missionary 
Diocese in America, the Russian Orthodox Greek Catholic Church in North America, the Russian 
Orthodox Metropolia in North America (or simply, the “Metropolia”), and, after 1970, the Orthodox 
Church in America. 
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legitimately to be achieved.  This issue remains contentious and unresolved in the 
present day. 
6.1.1 The Role of Nationalism in Explaining the Autocephaly of the Metropolia 
We must begin by returning to the point originally raised in chapter 2 that 
nationalism, although not the mechanism for autocephaly, certainly is a factor 
contributing to the unrestricted organizational change, unconstrained by institutional 
rules, observed during the national and particularly post-national periods.  It has been 
widely argued that nationalism has had a divisive rather than unitive effect on Eastern 
Christian populations, particularly those dispersed outside of predominantly Orthodox 
countries.  Nationalism loomed large in the disintegration of the Orthodox émigré 
population in North America from the 1920s forward as political events in Europe 
were mirrored ecclesiastically in the United States and Canada.  As one archbishop, a 
witness to those events, noted in 1927: 
The [First] World War and the triumph of the slogan of ‘democracy’ [and] 
‘self-determination’ fanned into destructive flame that smoldering but ever 
superabundant nationalism in the Eastern Orthodox people [in 
America]...Each little group or tribe now aspired to become a distinct nation, 
and each nationalistic party determined to have a separate and distinct national 
Orthodox Church or, indeed, a Patriarchate.  This brought confusion and 
disorder enough in the Church in Europe where new or revived states sprang 
into existence; but its reaction on the Orthodox population in America where
there was no corresponding political development to justify or excuse new 
ecclesiastical organizations, was chaotic and disastrous.244
The fact that organizational changes, in the sense of fragmentation along national 
lines, were occurring without “corresponding political development” suggests that the 
244 Aftimios, Archbishop of Brooklyn, “Present and Future of Orthodoxy in America in Relation to 
Other Bodies and to Orthodoxy Abroad,” The Orthodox Catholic Review 1:4-5 (1927), cited in 
Orthodox America 196, italics added. 
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institutional framework was not effective in constraining those changes in the sense 
envisaged in the framework itself.  However, the origins of the autocephaly cannot be 
attributed exclusively to nationalism.  The Russian Metropolia in North America, a de 
facto autonomous entity in the wake of the Bolshevik Revolution, could not be 
considered simply an extension of the Soviet state apparatus and an apologist for the 
Soviet government (evidenced by the fact that there was a Russian patriarchal 
exarchate in place in North America at the time), nor could its autocephaly be viewed 
exclusively as an extension of Russian nationalism (in fact a large number of parishes 
within the Metropolia originally were Greek Catholic parishes of Carpatho-Rusyn 
origin).  Instead, the facts suggest that a variety of factors favoring autocephaly came 
into alignment in the North American case.  Nationalism was only part of the story, 
albeit a very important part. 
6.2 The Salience of the Alternative Theory 
 How well does our alternative theory hold up against the available evidence 
regarding the Metropolia’s autocephaly?  In the course of laying out the alternative 
theory in chapter 3 we identified three factors favoring autocephaly: disjuncture 
between political and ecclesiastical boundaries, disruption in the ecclesiastical 
relationship between parent and subsidiary, and alignment of political incentives.  We 
will assess each factor in turn according the available historical evidence concerning 
the Metropolia and how its autocephaly was achieved. 
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6.2.1 Factor One: Disjuncture Between Political and Ecclesiastical Boundaries 
Looking at the first factor – disjuncture between political and ecclesiastical 
boundaries – there is ample evidence that this was a major component in the process 
of the Metropolia toward autocephaly.  A Russian presence in North America, 
starting with trading and missionary activities, began in the Alaskan territories in the 
18th century with the native inhabitants of that area.  By the 19th century a Russian 
Orthodox presence had spread down to the west coast of the United States even as 
immigration from Russia and Eastern Europe increased on the east coast.  By the 
early 20th century the Orthodox “diaspora” – in fact a truly multi-ethnic patchwork of 
communities of Russian, Greek, Syrian, Romanian, former Greek Catholic, and other 
origins – were more or less aligned ecclesiastically into a single missionary diocese 
under the administrative control of the Russian Orthodox Church.  The organizational 
complexity of the situation in North America on the eve of the Bolshevik Revolution, 
however, cannot be over-emphasized.  Beyond the native Alaskan communities and 
the increasingly large numbers of Russians immigrating to North America, there were 
also (more or less under the control of the Russian missionary diocese) 24 Arab 
parishes by 1915, 19 Serbian parishes by 1916, 6 Albanian parishes by the early 
1900s, 20 Romanian parishes by 1920, coupled with repeated waves of various Slavic 
groups emigrating to North America from the 1890s through the early 1900s.245  Not 
counted here are the large numbers of Greek immigrants who began arriving roughly 
during the same period.  In summary, 
245 Mark Stokoe and Leonid Kishkovsky, Orthodox Christians in North America: 1794-1994 (Wayne, 
New Jersey: Orthodox Christian Publications Center, 1995) ch. 2, 24 Nov. 2004 
<http://www.oca.org/pages/orth_chri/Orthodox-Church-Introduction/North-America-1794-
1994/index.htm>. 
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By 1916, the majority of the roughly 300,000 Orthodox Christians in America 
were no longer Alaskan native peoples, nor Slavs in the missionary diocese: 
they were Greeks in independent "trustee" parishes. According to the 1916 US 
Census of Religious Bodies, "Eastern Orthodoxy" had been the fastest 
growing denominational family in America in the preceding decade, showing 
an incredible 25,000 percent increase in number of adherents. The rapid 
proliferation of independent Greek parishes (more than 140 were established 
between 1906-1916 alone), and to a lesser extent those "independent" 
Romanian, Bulgarian, and Ukrainian parishes which imitated them, 
overwhelmed the understaffed missionary diocese’s ability or desire to deal 
with the canonical, legal, and administrative problems they engendered.246
The diversity and rapid increase in numbers, with the concomitant increase in 
administrative difficulties, combined with the unlikelihood of return given political 
circumstances in Eastern Europe, guaranteed a situation organizationally irresolvable 
according to the institutional norms outlined in chapters 4 and 5.  The patchwork of 
ethnic parishes in North America reflected a transposition of European ecclesiastical 
boundaries in miniature onto an entirely different political landscape.  There was no 
direct correlation between ecclesiastical affiliation and state borders and no political 
authority available or able to adjudicate effectively or definitively the inevitable 
resulting jurisdictional disagreements, and to enforce rules to guarantee institutionally 
consistent organizational decisions. 
6.2.2 Factor Two: Disruption in the Relationship Between Parent and Subsidiary 
In terms of the second factor – disruption in the ecclesiastical relationship 
between parent and subsidiary – it was clear that the Bolshevik Revolution was a 
major turning point not only for the Metropolia itself but for the adjacent jurisdictions 
outlined above.  Monies for the Metropolia ($1,000,000 requested by 1916) had 
246 Stokoe and Kishkovsky ch. 2.
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ceased flowing from the Russian synod by March 1917.247  Furthermore, in the years 
following the revolution the nascent organizational unity of Orthodox communities in 
America was split by tensions between politically opposed forces: representatives of 
the communist co-opted Living Church in Russia, socialist agitators in America, 
Russian nationalists, and a growing sense of ethnic separatism on the part of other 
non-Russian and non-Slav groups to that point more or less unified within the 
diocese.248  Different groups competed with one another, each claiming to be the 
authentic and canonical representatives of the Russian Church on American soil.  It is 
difficult to overstate the extent of the administrative collapse on the North American 
continent that came in the wake of the Russian Revolution and the political 
turbulence in other confessionally Orthodox countries.  John Meyendorff, for 
example, has noted that “[t]he territorial principle was universally applied in the 
Orthodox Church until it was formally broken for the first time in America in 
1921”249 – broken by the complete collapse of canonically regular relationships 
between émigré groups in the West and their national churches of origin.  One 
Lebanese hierarch, who governed a portion of the once-unified Metropolia in North 
America (his very presence in the hierarchy spoke to the level of multinational 
Orthodox integration that had existed up to 1917), described in 1927 the state of 
administrative disarray: 
Each little group of Orthodox people produced some new party or leader who 
wished to set up in America a Church based solely on the national or racial 
derivation of its adherents. The inclusive unity and coordination of Orthodoxy 
as such in America regardless of nationality or language was forgotten in this 
247 Orthodox America 177. 
248 Stokoe and Kishkovsky ch. 5. 
249 Meyendorff, “The Ethnic Principle of Church Administration” 105-06. 
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sudden over-emphasis upon political or tribal distinctions based upon the 
reorganization of the map of Europe. The true ideal of one Orthodox Catholic 
Church in America for the growing thousands of Americans born and reared 
in Orthodoxy was lost in the over-zealous patriotic desire of the immigrant 
generation to parallel in America the national resurrections taking place in 
Europe. The situation was most favorable for ambitious and self-seeking 
ecclesiastical adventurers and politicians; and these appeared in every 
group.250
By the end of the 1920s the Metropolia had more or less collapsed as an 
organization, and the ecclesiastical situation became, in institutional terms, highly 
irregular.  A synod of Russian bishops in exile in Serbia (the Karlovci Synod), 
claiming to represent the canonical Russian church, attempted to assert control over 
the Russian Orthodox diaspora populations in North America, Western Europe, and 
Asia.251  Later this was followed by the establishment in North America by Moscow 
of an exarchate of the Russian church itself, now firmly under Soviet control, leading 
to multiple authorities each claiming to represent the canonical church in America. 
All evidence points to a nearly total loss of communication between the 
Metropolia and the Moscow Patriarchate in the wake of the Bolshevik Revolution.252
This was to an extent anticipated by the All-Russia Sobor (conciliar ecclesiastical 
assembly) of 1917, a watershed event itself disrupted by the Revolution, which 
granted broader rights of self-government for the Metropolia, since regular relations 
with Moscow would be increasingly problematic.253  In a 29 September 1923 
250 Aftimios, Archbishop of Brooklyn, “Present and Future of Orthodoxy in America,” Orthodox 
America 196-97. 
251 Stokoe and Kishkovsky ch. 6. 
252 Details regarding the history of the Russian Church up to the Bolshevik Revolution, through World 
War II, and into the cold war can be found in, among others, John Curtiss, Church and State in Russia: 
The Last Years of the Empire, 1900-1917 (New York: Columbia, 1940); Curtiss, The Russian Church 
and the Soviet State: 1917-1950 (Boston: Little, Brown, & Co., 1953); and Dimitry Pospielovsky, The 
Russian Church Under the Soviet Regime: 1917-1982, 2 vols. (New York: St. Vladimir’s Seminary 
Press, 1982).
253 Orthodox America 173. 
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statement, Russian Patriarch Tikhon confirmed the election of Metropolitan Platon to 
head the Metropolia in North America.  However, in 1924 a statement attributed to 
Tikhon abruptly deposed Platon for engaging “in public acts of counter-revolution 
directed against the Soviet Power” (which were not specified) and summoned him 
immediately to Moscow, leaving the status of his successor ambiguous (a situation 
mirroring that of the Russian church itself vis-à-vis the Ecumenical Patriarchate in the 
15th century, as noted in chapter 5).254  The Metropolia also refused to sign an oath of 
loyalty to the Soviet government.255  Given the contradictory directives coming from 
the Moscow Patriarchate and the rapidly deteriorating political and ecclesiastical 
relationship between the patriarchate and its North American subsidiary, the 
Metropolia in its own 1924 council, which convened in April in Detroit, decided to 
(1) declare the diocese temporarily self-governing (e.g. de facto autonomous), (2) 
provide for continuing administration under Metropolitan Platon (implicitly 
recognizing his deposition to be a canonically irregular act by a politically co-opted 
hierarchy in Moscow), and (3) develop a constitution that would enable the church in 
America to operate in a normal fashion until the relationship with the Church of 
Russia could be regularized.256
An 18 October 1946 memorandum regarding the “Status of the Russian 
Orthodox Church in America” (in preparation for the 1946 Cleveland Sobor) provides 
254 Account of the Fourth All-American Sobor, convened in Detroit, MI from 2-4 April 1924, 
according to a summary of the results provided by Alexis Liberovsky, archivist for the Orthodox 
Church in America.  The full text of the 1923 and 1924 statements of Patriarch Tikhon to Metropolitan 
Platon, no. 41 dated 29 September 1923, and no. 28 dated 16 January 1924, are published in Serafim 
Surrency, The Quest for Orthodox Church Unity in America (New York: Ss. Boris and Gleb Press, 
1973) A124-25. 
255 Metropolitan Theodosius, Archbishop of Washington, “The Path to Autocephaly and Beyond,” 
originally published in The Orthodox Church 31:6-7 (1995): 7, reprinted in Sourozh 62 (1995): 1-12. 
256 Excerpt from documents of 1924 Detroit Sobor (Council), published in Surrency, pp. A126. 
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additional evidence.  The memorandum noted that there was a close relationship 
between the existing Orthodox hierarchy in Russia and the Soviet government, and 
that the majority of the faithful in the United States were American citizens living 
under very different political conditions than those in Soviet Russia, and “[t]hese two 
facts do not preclude any canonical subordination of our Church to the Moscow 
Patriarchy, but force us to insist on receiving for our Church a wide autonomy which 
would remove all influence of the Soviet government, direct or indirect, on our 
Church.”257  Subsequently at the 7th All-American Sobor in Cleveland in November 
1946, a resolution was passed advocating (1) severing administrative ties with the 
hierarchy of the exile Russian Church Abroad (the Karlovci Synod), (2) regularizing 
the relationship of the church in America with the Moscow Patriarchate provided the 
church in America would retain its autonomy, and (3) should the Moscow 
Patriarchate refuse those conditions, the church in America should continue in its 
condition of de facto autonomy.258  Other evidence points to ongoing pressure against 
the Metropolia by the Soviet government and the Karlovci Synod, and internal 
schisms by dissident hierarchs (e.g. the Carpatho-Rusyn bishops Stefan Dzubai and 
Adam Filippovsky), which the Metropolia, lacking a canonically regular relationship 
with the Moscow Patriarchate, had great difficulty resolving.259
The Moscow Patriarchate responded to these moves toward independence by 
calling the breach with Moscow a schism and placing the Metropolia under 
257 “Memorandum on the Status of the Russian Orthodox Church in America,” 18 October 1946, 
signed in New York by M. Karpovitch, N. Timashev, G. Fedotov, Peter Zubov, and George Novitzky, 
cited in Surrency A136-40. 
258 Resolution of the 7th All-American Sobor Held in Cleveland, Ohio, 26-28 November 1946, cited in 
Surrency A141. 
259 Pospielovsky 283-93. 
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interdiction (although remaining in sacramental communion with it).260  The 
Metropolia in North America continued in its de facto autonomous status through the 
1960s, consolidating itself administratively and financially along the way, until 
rapprochement with the Russian Orthodox Church, and subsequently autocephaly, 
was achieved.  Until that time, as with the Russian Church vis-à-vis Constantinople in 
the 15th and 16th centuries, the Metropolia viewed its external dependencies upon 
Moscow as unsustainable and therefore no longer binding.  Despite the interests of 
the Soviet government to the contrary and (no doubt government sponsored) 
ecclesiastical pressures brought to bear by rival bodies in North America, these 
organizational changes occurred evidently without obstruction. 
6.3.3 Factor Three: Alignment of Political Incentives 
The salience of the third factor – alignment of political incentives – can only 
be understood within the geopolitical context in which the autocephaly of the 
Metropolia occurred.261  In the late 1940s the political posture of the Russian church 
mirrored that of the Soviet state, evidenced by its overt hostility to the Vatican, to the 
World Council of Churches (WCC), to “schismatic” groups such as the Metropolia, to 
anything that could be viewed as a threatening agent of Western (anti-Soviet) 
influence.  The fact that the Russian church set up an exarchate on North American 
soil is testament to its denial, in line with Soviet interests, of the legitimacy of the 
260 Thomas Hopko, Questions and Answers on Autocephaly ([New York]: [St. Vladimir’s Seminary 
Press], 1971). 
261 I am indebted to Prof. John H. Erickson for his guidance in locating events surrounding the 
autocephaly of the Metropolia in the geopolitical context of the cold war.  This section is derived in 
large part from that guidance, cross-referenced against other materials.  Errors in this section are the 
sole responsibility of this author. 
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Metropolia.  In fact the cold war played itself out, as in other spheres, though 
ecclesiastical proxy wars in which the activities of churches were viewed as 
extensions of state power.  The activities of the Soviet state in this area are well 
documented.262  Obviously the West played its role by proxy as well (for example, the 
election of Athenagoras as Ecumenical Patriarch evidently was the result at least in 
part of American involvement – Athenagoras was a U.S. citizen and arrived in 
Istanbul on board a U.S. Presidential aircraft).  However, as the cold war moved from 
“peaceful coexistence” toward détente, there was a corresponding change in the 
attitudes of the Russian Church and the Metropolia towards one another.  This shift 
was evident in the participation by the Russian church in the World Council of 
Churches as a representative of the socialist bloc and its response to the ecumenical 
overtures of Pope John XXIII in the 1960s,263 and the warming of the Moscow 
Patriarchate’s relations with the Metropolia. 
The various reasons the Metropolia sought autocephaly from the Russian 
Church are well-documented and need not be recapitulated in their entirety here.264
Its primary stated goal was the regularization of its ecclesiastical life, not only to 
legitimize itself in the view of other autocephalous churches (given that the 
262 See, for example, Curtiss, The Russian Church and the Soviet State, and Pospielovsky, The Russian 
Church Under the Soviet Regime (particularly the chapters in vol. 2).  Cf. also William Fletcher, 
Religion and Soviet Foreign Policy: 1945-1970 (London: Oxford, 1973). 
263 Relevant documents and background can be found in, among others, John Borelli and John 
Erickson, eds., The Quest for Unity: Orthodox and Catholics in Dialogue: Documents of the Joint 
International Commission and Official Dialogues in the United States, 1965-1995 (New York: St. 
Vladimir’s Seminary Press; Washington: United States Catholic Conference, 1996); and also in 
Edward Kilmartin, Toward Reunion: The Orthodox and Roman Catholic Churches (New York: Paulist 
Press, 1979) chs. 1 through 3, and appendix. 
264 For details see Surrency chs. 2 through 6, plus appendix; Constance Tarasar and John Erickson, eds., 
Orthodox America: 1794-1976: Development of the Orthodox Church in America (New York: OCA 
Department of History and Archives, 1975) chs. 5 through 8; “Documents of the Autocephaly of the 
Orthodox Church in America,” St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly 15:1-2 (1971): 42-80; and also 
documentation (with a different interpretation) in Russian Autocephaly and Orthodoxy in America: An 
Appraisal (New York: Orthodox Observer Press, 1972) 45-72. 
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Metropolia had been in an undefined state of de facto autonomy for decades), but it 
also would promise to improve cooperation among the still-divided parallel Orthodox 
jurisdictions in North America.  An autocephalous Orthodox Church in America, 
recognized as such through a canonical process (although exactly what that meant 
remained ambiguous), also hopefully would stem the tide of disgruntled 
congregations leaving the Metropolia to put themselves under competing jurisdictions 
perceived as more canonical. 
The precise reasons behind the Moscow Patriarchate’s decision to grant 
autocephaly to the Metropolia are less clear, but it is apparent that there was an 
alignment of incentives favoring autocephaly in the political context of détente.  In 
addition to the change in political climate, it was becoming clear to the Moscow 
Patriarchate by the 1960s that its exarchate in North America no longer was fulfilling 
a useful function.  Acceptance of autocephaly from the Metropolia offered a face-
saving way to effectively extricate the Russian church from its relationship with the 
exarchate, the parishes of which were proving neither financially nor politically 
advantageous to Moscow.  Certainly any improvements in foreign (Western) 
perceptions of Russian religious life would have been in line with Soviet foreign 
policy priorities during the period from the late 1960s through the 1970s, and the 
Russian church remained an instrument of the Soviet government in achieving these 
goals (e.g. through the WCC and other international forums).265  By granting 
autocephaly to its Metropolia, the Russian church itself presumably also hoped to 
gain allies in the West, which could prove useful as a hedge against the future policies 
of the Soviet government.  It would place the Russian church in a more attractive 
265 Pospielovsky 469-71. 
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light vis-à-vis the West and help counterbalance the image of the Russian church as 
primarily a tool of the Soviet regime.  Expected improvements in ecumenical contacts 
and the priorities of the WCC also were priorities for the Russian Orthodox Church at 
the time.   
We do know that the Russian church remained an instrument of Soviet foreign 
policy even when that policy took on a less anti-Western posture.  The head of the 
Russian church’s department of external relations during this period, Nikodim Rotov, 
implemented policies that were directly congruent with Soviet foreign policy 
priorities.  Pospielovsky has argued that 
Nikodim’s policies…responded to Khrushchev’s policies of peaceful 
coexistence, of enlarging and strengthening the contacts of the Soviet Union 
with the foreign world – in short, of attempting to come out of isolation.  It 
was Nikodim who lead the Moscow Patriarchate into the World Council of 
Churches (although the decision to do so had been made under his 
predecessors).  It was Nikodim who cofounded and joined the Prague Peace 
Conference, as well as a number of interconfessional dialogue undertakings in 
the West.  It was he who discontinued the attacks against the Vatican and 
established very close links with it.  It was eventually under him and on his 
initiative that the Orthodox Church in America was granted autocephaly.266
The issue of whether the autocephaly itself occurred as a result of initiatives 
from Moscow (the Patriarchate) versus the United States (the Metropolia) is open to 
debate.267  Still, viewed in this context, the rapprochement between the Russian 
church and the Metropolia in the late 1960s makes more sense.  The Metropolia had a 
reason to seek autocephaly and the Moscow Patriarchate, in line with adjusted Soviet 
foreign policy priorities, had a variety of incentives to grant it.  In 1966 and again in 
266 Pospielovsky 361. 
267 It has been argued anecdotally that the influential priest and theologian Alexander Schmemann was 
instrumental from the Metropolia’s side in engineering the grant of autocephaly.  Schmemann passed 
away prematurely in 1983 and his memoirs, published posthumously (and post-dating the events 
surrounding the autocephaly), do not provide details of his specific role with regard to the negotiations 
leading to the autocephaly.  See The Journals of Father Alexander Schmemann: 1973-1983, trans. 
Juliana Schmemann (New York: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2000). 
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1967, the Metropolia approached the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Constantinople to 
seek a grant of autocephaly, having been rebuffed by the Moscow Patriarchate in 
previous years.  The Ecumenical Patriarch, however, also rebuffed the Metropolia, 
reminding them that it was the responsibility of the Russian church to resolve the 
problem (a position from which the Ecumenical Patriarchate would reverse itself, 
evidently for political reasons, immediately after the autocephaly was granted).  The 
official reason was that the Ecumenical Patriarchate then viewed the situation of the 
Russian church as having returned to a semblance of normalcy following the 
difficulties of the Stalinist period.  Unofficially, however, it appears that the Russian 
church exerted pressure against the Ecumenical Patriarchate possibly via the Russian 
Exarchate in Paris, evidence that the rivalry between these two dominant 
patriarchates, in the context of larger geopolitical rivalries, continued to play itself 
against the background of détente.  It also is possible that Constantinople did not 
expect anything substantive to come out of negotiations between the Metropolia and 
the Russian Orthodox Church.  The shock expressed by the Ecumenical Patriarchate, 
made clear in its response to the Moscow Patriarchate’s tomos granting autocephaly, 
was viewed by the American architects of the autocephaly as disingenuous in light of 
the fact that Constantinople had been aware of the status of the negotiations with 
Moscow throughout.  To emphasize, the autocephaly of the Metropolia must be 
viewed in the broader context of the rivalry between the two patriarchates.268
268 See Metropolitan Theodosius, “Path to Autocephaly and Beyond.” 
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6.3.4 Assessment 
These three factors – changed ecclesiastical boundaries, the need for 
ecclesiastical regularization, and the congruence of political interests – help explain 
the Russian church’s decision to grant autocephaly to the Metropolia in 1970, 
autocephaly being the institutionally-sanctioned organizational option of greatest 
benefit to both sides.  The Russian church justified its decision to grant autocephaly 
on several premises.269  First, it viewed itself canonically as the parent church to the 
Metropolia, the latter having originated first as a mission and subsequently as a 
diocese of the former, and therefore the patriarchate had, according to Moscow’s 
interpretation of the institutional framework, the exclusive canonical right to grant 
autocephaly.  Second, the Orthodox émigré populations in North America, originally 
under Russian administrative control, had subdivided into jurisdictions largely 
controlled or overseen by their respective churches of origin.  Hence the Moscow 
Patriarchate had a legitimate pastoral responsibility for its own North American 
subsidiary in particular, if not the whole North American Orthodox émigré population 
in general.  Third, the Metropolia was considered to be at a sufficiently mature stage 
of organizational development as to be capable of self-government, having as it did 
sufficient bishops and clergy, theological schools, and resources at hand to operate 
without Moscow’s oversight.  Far from being merely a function of nationalism,270 the 
269 These premises are laid out in, among others, Hopko, “Questions and Answers.” 
270 Interestingly, John Meyendorff, another priest and theologian of the Metropolia intimately involved 
in the autocephaly, argued in an open letter that, in fact, it was the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s 
opposition to autocephaly for the church in America, rather than the autocephaly itself, that was rooted 
in nationalism.  Arguing that (1) the road to autocephaly did include pan-Orthodox consultations and 
(2) affirming the right of the Moscow Patriarchate to grant autocephaly to its daughter church, he noted: 
“Personally, I have wasted a great deal of ink and energy defending the prerogatives of the Ecumenical 
Patriarchate.  I do not disown a word of what I have written.  But I declare that in America the 
Ecumenical Patriarchate has erred in its responsibility to act as a unifier and has made itself only the 
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North American autocephaly reflected instead the Metropolia’s organizational 
response to a changed political landscape and to a changed relationship with the 
Russian church. 
6.4 Implications: Organizational Change and Institutional Enforcement 
The interpretation of the institutional rules cited by both the Metropolia and 
the Moscow Patriarchate to justify the autocephaly was not shared by other Orthodox 
churches.  The reactions and public disagreements over the legitimacy of the 
autocephaly of the Metropolia – specifically in terms of the Moscow Patriarchate’s 
right to declare it in principle and the manner in which it was declared in the North 
American case in particular – all illustrate the lack of consensus regarding how the 
institutional rules were to enable or constrain organizational change.  In this sense the 
autocephaly of the Metropolia provides a good index for the efficacy of institutional 
rules and the impact of weak or non-existent enforcement of those rules.  
6.4.1 The Importance of Consensus in the Application of Institutional Rules 
In the case of the Metropolia, the responses and reactions of the other 
Orthodox churches with populations or jurisdictions in America, to include the other 
four ancient patriarchates, all point toward concern over the “canonicity” of the 
autocephaly but also displayed a marked lack of consensus over what “canonical” 
meant.  A few months after autocephaly was granted, Ecumenical Patriarch 
Athenagoras appointed Archbishop Iakovos of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of 
agent of Greek nationalism.” John Meyendorff, “The Problem of the Autocephaly of the Orthodox 
Church in America,” original published in French in Contacts 72 4e Trimestre (1970): 309-10, 
reprinted in English in Surrency A169-70. 
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North and South America as Patriarchal Exarch Plenipotentiary with “the right to 
preside over consultations and meetings of the Orthodox Canonical Bishops in 
America…provided that the existing Canonical ties of each hierarch with his own 
mother Church are fully and unilaterally preserved and further continued until the 
time the entire question of the Orthodox Churches in the diaspora is undoubtedly and 
finally regulated…by the [forthcoming] Holy and Great Synod… .”271  This decision 
can be interpreted as an attempt by the Ecumenical Patriarchate to assert a measure of 
control over the North American situation and to prevent further organizational 
fragmentation through autocephaly, while guaranteeing protection of the 
patriarchate’s interests on North American soil against Russian encroachment. 
Patriarch Nikolaos of Alexandria, in a 16 December 1970 response to the 
Ecumenical Patriarchate, condemned the autocephaly of the Metropolia as null and 
void “without historical and canonical basis,” and argued that in order that the 
autocephaly “not become the cause of disastrous consequences, the Patriarchate of 
Moscow should have waited for the question of the future of the Russians in diaspora 
to be investigated, discussed, and decided with finality by all Orthodox in the Great 
Synod of the Orthodox Church now in preparation.”  Perhaps significantly the letter 
refers to the problem of a specific diaspora population, rather than the question of 
autocephaly more generally.272  Above all, the content of the letter reflects a concern 
about the inadequacy of formal rules (canons) governing organizational change in 
light of unprecedented shifts in ecclesiastical boundaries in the post-national period.
271 “Decree Issued in December 1970 Patriarch Athenagoras to Archbishop Iakovos,” protocol no. 
1160, published in The Orthodox Observer Feb. 1971: 4, reprinted in Surrency, pp. A174-75. 
272 Letter of Patriarch Nikolaos of Alexandria to Ecumenical Patriarch Athenagoras, 16 December 
1970, published in English translation in Russian Orthodoxy and Orthodoxy in America: An Appraisal
45-67.
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The unique difficulties of this environment posed challenges the institutional 
framework as configured was ill-equipped to resolve. 
Patriarch Elias IV of Antioch noted in official correspondence that “an 
autocephalous Church in America [can] exist only as a result of an agreement 
between the Autocephalous Churches, principally between those retaining 
jurisdiction[s in] America….We in the Church of Antioch take this stand: that 
only...autocephalous Churches in consultation and agreement can claim an 
‘Autocephalous Church in America.’”273  This statement reflects an interpretation that 
the institutional rules call for ecumenical sanction of autocephaly, a view at variance 
both with Moscow’s interpretation that it is the parent’s right to confer autocephaly 
on its mature subsidiary, and Constantinople’s view of its own unique prerogatives 
vis-à-vis the Orthodox diaspora. 
Patriarch Benedictos of Jerusalem, echoing the response of Antioch, argued in 
17 March 1971 correspondence that granting autocephaly is “the prerogative of the 
whole Church.”  However, he also made an unprecedented argument regarding the 
need for popular consent of the faithful to be governed by new ecclesiastical 
arrangements as a prerequisite for autocephaly.  Finally, the patriarch referred “the 
entire question of the Orthodox Diaspora, and specifically that of America” to “the 
Holy and Great Synod of our Eastern Orthodox Church now in preparation.”274  The 
statement taken as a whole is similar to that of Alexandria, insofar as it essentially 
recognizes the inadequacy of the institutional framework and the need for 
273 Letter of Patriarch Elias IV of Antioch (presumably to Metropolitan Ireney,), 22 July 1971, 
published in English translation in Russian Orthodoxy and Orthodoxy in America: An Appraisal 45-67. 
274 Letter of Patriarch Benedictos of Jerusalem to Ecumenical Patriarch Athenagoras, 17 March 1971, 
published in English translation in Russian Orthodoxy and Orthodoxy in America: An Appraisal 45-67. 
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modification.  It is at variance with the other churches, however, in its introduction of 
the concept of popular mandate, which is found nowhere in the canonical content of 
the institutional framework governing organizational change. 
The response provided by the Church of Greece, in the person of Archbishop 
Ieronymos, president of the Greek Holy Synod, was the most extensive and closely 
argued.  The archbishop argued that “it is the undoubted jurisdictional rights over a 
territory that constitute the indispensable condition for the right to appoint a bishop, 
not the claiming of jurisdictional rights as a result of having appointed a bishop there.  
The appointment and establishment of a bishop in a particular place cannot be used as 
a means of jurisdictionally annexing that place.”  Quoting a statement by Ecumenical 
Patriarch Joachim III (presumably circa 1908), the archbishop affirmed: “It is obvious 
that neither the holy Church of Greece, which has been granted by our Patriarchate 
the status of being autocephalous but with strictly defined jurisdictional boundaries, 
nor any other Church or Patriarchate could canonically extend their authority beyond 
the boundaries of their jurisdictions, apart from our Apostolic [sic] and Patriarchal 
Throne; this, both by virtue of the privilege accorded to it to ordain bishops within the 
barbaric nations which are even beyond defined ecclesiastical jurisdictions, and by 
virtue of having the right deriving from its seniority to extend supreme protection to 
the said Churches in foreign territories.”  In sum, the archbishop continued, “[o]nly 
the Ecumenical Throne can justifiably extend its authority beyond its own territorial 
jurisdiction,” and the Patriarch of Moscow, like any other patriarch save the Patriarch 
of Constantinople, had jurisdiction only over his own realm, defined largely by the 
political boundaries of the state within which his church was located.  Connecting the 
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particular rights of the Ecumenical Patriarchate with the requirement for conciliar 
validation, the archbishop affirmed “that whether as a result of decisions of 
Ecumenical or local Synods or as a result of other procedures, the promotion of a 
church to the status of being autocephalous and independent has been all along a 
question for the whole Church to decide.”  Therefore, everything the Patriarchate of 
Moscow did vis-à-vis the diaspora populations “without the consent of the Senior 
Throne – such as the naming by the Patriarchate of Moscow of the Churches of 
Poland, Czechoslovakia, and now of America, as autocephalous – is dangerously 
inordinate and anti-canonical, and decisions of this kind are void and 
condemnable.”275  This latter statement, indicative of the jurisdictional competition 
between Constantinople and Moscow as the two dominant Orthodox sees, illustrates 
clearly that the objections to the autocephaly clearly involved not simply canonical 
(institutional) objections but political ones as well. 
6.4.2 The Importance of Third-Party Enforcement of Institutional Rules 
These letters more or less represent the breadth of the argumentation 
surrounding the issue of autocephaly in the post-national period.  There was (as 
hinted at in the letter by the Greek Synod) much effort put forth in explicating “the 
canonically established and universally accepted procedures” for establishing 
autocephaly.276  The wide variety of opinions offered by all the major Orthodox sees, 
275 Letter of Archbishop Iernymos, President of the Holy Synod of the Church of Greece, to 
Metropolitan Pimen, Locum Tenens of the Patriarchate of Moscow, 23 March 1971, published in 
English translation in Russian Orthodoxy and Orthodoxy in America: An Appraisal 45-67. 
276 This phrase was used in another such corrective letter concerning “The Irregularity of the Russian 
Autocephaly in America,” attributed to Metropolitan Emilianos, Permanent Representative of the 
Ecumenical Patriarchate at the World Council of Churches, published in Russian Autocephaly and 
Orthodoxy in America: An Appraisal 68. 
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however, demonstrates a complete lack of consensus as to what those “universally 
accepted procedures” – institutional rules – for autocephaly were to be, i.e. whether 
autocephaly properly is to be declared by the parent church, by the Ecumenical 
Patriarchate, by a general council, or by some combination of all three methods.  
With no adjudicating third party to enforce a particular outcome, the fait accompli 
process characteristic of the national and post-national periods was exemplified by 
the case of the Metropolia.  Autocephaly was declared unilaterally (or perhaps more 
accurately bilaterally, solely between the Metropolia and Moscow with no input from 
Constantinople or elsewhere), with selective reference to the institutional framework 
to justify post facto a decision made exclusively between parent and subsidiary, 
which was followed by widespread disagreement and eventual acceptance (de facto if 
not de jure) among the community of Orthodox churches.  The institutional 
framework remained useful insofar as it could be cited as justification for the 
organizational change implemented.  However, the formal rules themselves did not 
appear to constrain the organizational change in any substantial way. 
If our theory is valid, we may attribute the inability of institutions to constrain 
this instance of organizational change to the lack of effective third-party enforcement.  
And that enforcement itself would have been difficult to achieve in the post-national 
context of multiple states exerting conflicting pressures on their respective churches, 
combined with the absence of a universally-accepted authority.  Therefore one state 
could not enforce a particular organizational outcome affecting parallel jurisdictions 
in North America to the satisfaction of all other parent churches, many of which were 
in competition with one another.  Hence the autocephaly of the Metropolia illustrated 
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the limits of third-party enforcement in a post-national environment.  One of the chief 
architects of the autocephaly of the Metropolia, Alexander Schmemann, summarized 
the situation this way: 
The canonical chaos in America is not a specifically "American" phenomenon. 
Rather, Orthodoxy here is the victim of a long, indeed a multi-secular disease. 
It was a latent disease as long as the Church was living in the old traditional 
situation characterized primarily by an organic unity of the State, the ethnic 
factor and the ecclesiastical organization. Up to quite recently, in fact up to 
the appearance of the massive Orthodox diaspora, ecclesiastical stability and 
order were preserved not so much by the canonical "consciousness," but by 
State regulations and control. Ironically enough it made not much difference 
whether the State was Orthodox (The Russian Empire, the Kingdom of 
Greece), Roman Catholic (Austro-Hungary) or Muslim (the Ottoman Empire). 
Members of the Church could be persecuted in non-Orthodox States, but 
Church organization—and this is the crux of the matter—was sanctioned by
the State and could not be altered without this sanction. This situation was, of 
course, the result of the initial Byzantine "symphony" between Church and 
State, but after the fall of Byzantium it was progressively deprived of that 
mutual interdependence of Church and State which was at the very heart of 
the Byzantine theocratic ideology.277
6.5 Conclusions 
Given what we know based on the information presented above, in response 
to our question from chapter 5 – is the institutional framework sufficiently effective 
in the post-national environment to regulate and constrain organizational change 
without the reliable involvement of an enforcer? – we might venture an answer in the 
negative.  Our case study, which is congruent with the broad trends outlined in 
chapter 5, seems to support this answer.  What, then, is the significance of this 
answer?  First, it suggests we may be able to make some reliable predictions 
277 Schmemann, “Problems of Orthodoxy in America: The Canonical Problem,” St. Vladimir's 
Seminary Quarterly 8.2 (1964): 67-85.  Cf. Schmemann “Byzantine Theocracy and the Orthodox 
Church,” St. Vladimir’s Seminary Quarterly 1.2 (1953): 5-22. 
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regarding future organizational change in the Orthodox churches, specifically that 
trends point toward continued organizational change (in the direction of 
fragmentation, rather than reconsolidation) largely unconstrained by formal 
institutional rules.  Second, it tells us something significant about the institutional 
framework itself, namely that for some reason the framework does not seem to be 
evolving, or evolving fast enough, commensurate with rapid changes in the political 
geography.  To understand why we will have to return to the rudimentary models of 
institutional change outlined in chapters 3 and 4.  These two rather provocative 
conclusions will be traced out in greater detail in chapter 7. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusions 
We have attempted in the preceding chapters to explain the process of 
organizational change more generally, and the phenomenon of autocephaly more 
specifically, via the theory that the Orthodox Church organizes itself against the 
political landscape in consistent ways governed and constrained by the church’s 
institutional framework.  We have attempted to validate this theory by citing evidence 
that the organizational shape of the church has changed significantly over time in 
conjunction with changes in regimes and shifts in political boundaries.  We have 
observed the extent of the institutional framework’s ability to constrain organizational 
changes in the Orthodox churches.  And we have attempted to make the case for the 
importance of the state in the enforcement, recalibration, and breaking of 
ecclesiastical relationships.  What conclusions can we draw from the preceding 
discussion specifically about the Orthodox Church as an organization, and more 
theoretically about institutions in general? 
7.1 The Church: Organizational Considerations 
 As mentioned at the conclusion of chapter 6, we may be able, based upon our 
alternative theory combined with what we now know about efficacy of the 
institutional framework, to make a few broad characterizations regarding 
organizational change in the church.  First, it appears likely that continued 
organizational changes will result in further subdivision and fragmentation, in the 
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form of autocephaly and through corporate toleration of existing and future 
“irregular” ecclesiastical situations (such as the problem of parallel and competing 
jurisdictions in North America and Western Europe).  Autocephaly continues to be a 
form of organizational change with some form of institutional sanction or validity that 
enables ecclesiastical entities to justify organizational decisions toward independent 
self-government.  Although there have been some recent attempts to resolve irregular 
forms of ecclesiastical organization, these rarely result in reincorporation of 
previously divided groups.278  The church seems unable to avail itself of any 
mechanism to resolve the status quo into some institutionally consistent alignment of 
ecclesiastical and political borders. 
 A second generalization, related to the first, is that the institutional framework 
will have a decreasingly effective ability to constrain this general tendency toward 
organizational subdivision, absent resurgent enforcement by a political power.  We 
already have demonstrated how lack of consensus regarding institutional content, 
combined with lack of effective enforcement, have contributed to the situation of 
acute fragmentation among Orthodox churches.  Given that there are few 
countervailing trends toward consolidation,279 and little expectation that the formal 
278 The Moscow Patriarchate, for example, negotiated during late 2003 and into 2004 with the Russian 
Orthodox Church Outside Russia (ROCOR) in an attempt to heal the long-standing breach with that 
body and restore ecclesiastical relations.  Agreement along those lines is unlikely to result, however, 
either in the subsuming of ROCOR under the Moscow Patriarchate or the amalgamation of ROCOR 
into its erstwhile rival jurisdiction, the autocephalous Orthodox Church in America (former Russian 
Metropolia, described in chapter 6).  “His Holiness Patriarch Alexy Met With His Eminence 
Metropolitan Laurus and the delegation of the Russian Church Outside of Russia,” Moscow 
Patriarchate 1 June 2004, Orthodox Christian News Service 6.23 (2004), 15 Jan 2005 
<http://www.orthodoxnews.netfirms.com>. 
279 This is a generalization and admittedly there are exceptions.  There have been some instances of 
reconsolidation of previously divided jurisdictions, even in the post-national period.  The Ukrainian 
Orthodox Church, for example, was divided into two jurisdictions in the United States until 1996, 
when they were united under the auspices of the Ecumenical Patriarchate under a single metropolitan 
bishop.  “A Brief History of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the USA,” The Ukrainian Orthodox 
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institutional rules can be modified to the agreement of all, there are few prospects for 
any constraint on organizational change, save for the occasional intervention of the 
state, provided the state in question is politically strong enough and constitutionally 
able to intervene.  Historically these interventions usually have been in the direction 
of conforming ecclesiastical boundaries to specifically national, rather than territorial, 
boundaries (as was the norm at the time of the development of the institutional 
framework), and therefore will trend toward continued subdivision rather than 
reconsolidation.280
Third, the dominant trends of resurgent nationalism and statism are likely to 
continue to play themselves out through ecclesiological “proxy wars,”281 foremost 
and perhaps exclusively between the patriarchates of Moscow and Constantinople 
(and often also with Rome).  The battleground for these proxy wars is the disputed 
émigré populations in Western Europe and North America, as well as ecclesiastically 
contested areas such as Ukraine.  Recalling chapter 5, as Nichols has noted, after 
about the 15th century the Orthodox world collapsed largely into two imperial camps, 
one Byzantine-cum-Ottoman and the other Russian.  Each possessed its own sphere 
of influence, and each provided the political center of gravity to ensure at least 
nominal enforcement and adjudication of organizational change.  Jurisdictional 
competition between Moscow and Constantinople continued through the national 
period, with Moscow pulling nascent national churches out of Constantinople’s orbit 
during the 19th century and Constantinople reciprocating against a weakened post-
Church of the United States of America, 15 Jan. 2005 <http://www.uocofusa.org>.  Path: Index; 
History. 
280 See for example Nichols 108. 
281 Thanks to Prof. John Erickson for highlighting this concept and its terminology. 
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imperial Russian church in the 20th.282  The evidence cited regarding the post-national 
period suggests that there is no sign of this competition abating, as Constantinople 
tightens its control over its diminished but still significant area of influence and 
Moscow witnesses a resurgence of the Russian national church in the wake of the 
Soviet collapse. 
It is significant that the experience of the Russian Metropolia in North 
America effectively forced autocephaly onto the agenda of the forthcoming general 
council of the Orthodox Church (a meeting intended to be ecumenical and potentially 
binding and so is to include representatives from all the Orthodox churches).  It is 
likewise significant that preparatory committees for that council effectively ceased 
their work during the mid-1990s, precisely as the ecclesiastical proxy wars heated up 
over issues such as autocephaly and jurisdictional rights and prerogatives following 
geopolitical changes in the wake of the cold war.  It is unlikely that, given these 
conditions and the lack of a universally acknowledged (and empowered) enforcing 
agent, such a council will meet in the near future.  Until it does, no formal and 
universally agreed-upon changes to the institutional framework will be forthcoming. 
The diversity of interpretation outlined in the case study in chapter 6, both in 
terms of the formal institutional rules themselves and how they might be changed, 
continues to apply on the issue of autocephaly.  The argument that the existence of 
parallel ecclesiastical jurisdictions within a single set of political borders is 
uncanonical (i.e. inconsistent with the formal rules of the church) is itself not 
universally held.  Even for those who argue that it is, there is a definite lack of 
consensus as to what change, particularly outside of confessionally Orthodox states, 
282 Nichols 108-11. 
157
is to occur to restore an institutionally acceptable form of organization.  As one 
bishop remarked in 1999 with reference to émigré Orthodox populations, “[t]he 
presence of several Orthodox bishops in this city [Paris] does not undermine the 
[canonical] order of the Orthodox Church or the idea that there should be one bishop 
in a city, since each of the canonical bishops takes care of the members of his Local 
Church.”283  This interpretation implies an understanding of “local church” ultimately 
in national or ethnic terms decidedly at odds with the Orthodox Church’s institutional 
framework (e.g. the canonical condemnation of phyletism), and represents the wide 
latitude church officials enjoy in interpreting the institutional framework – 
demonstrating the elasticity available through informal rules when the formal ones 
are not perceived as efficacious.
Another bishop argued in 2003 that local autonomy (though not autocephaly) 
was not mutually exclusive with loyalty to a patriarchate located within another set of 
political borders.  Rather, such an arrangement would provide a means toward 
canonical unity, insofar as local independence became a prerequisite for eventual 
administrative regularity and unification of parallel ecclesiastical structures:  
It seems absolutely clear to me that the only way forward is to…combine 
loyalty to the Patriarchate [of Moscow] with internal autonomy…showing the 
other jurisdictions [in Western Europe] what can be done within the Moscow 
Patriarchate, how it is possible to live with the local autonomy that enables a 
diaspora community to react appropriately to the very real challenges it faces.  
By doing so we will be giving a lead to the other Orthodox Churches in the 
diaspora, since only by their achieving local autonomy will it be possible to 
bring them all together to form a truly all-embracing local Orthodox Church in 
Britain and in Western Europe.284
283 Bishop Konstantin, representative of the holy synod of the Patriarchate of Serbia, in a statement at 
the enthronement of Bishop Luka in Paris in 1999, cited in Sollogoub 25 (see footnote 2). 
284 Basil, Bishop of Sergievo, “The Diocese of Sourozh in the Historical Context of the Russian 
Diaspora in Western Europe, the USA and Elsewhere in the World,” Statement at All Saints Cathedral, 
London, 16 Feb. 2003, <http://www.sourozh.org/news/basil160203.htm>.  Italics in original. 
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Like individual hierarchs, the two major patriarchal competitors for 
jurisdictional primacy, Constantinople and Moscow, have interpreted corporately the 
institutional framework differently at different times.  This difference is less usefully 
viewed as competition between governing philosophies, e.g. Constantinople 
resurrecting Byzantine political philosophy through a recapitulation of the Megali
Idea and Moscow representing a renewed attempt to further imperial aspirations 
through an ideology of “Moscow as the Third Rome.”  Rather, the more useful 
explanation, in light of our theory, may be that these two ecclesiastical centers, 
lacking of effective and authoritative institutional interpretation and enforcement, are 
locked in a competition for primacy in an arena ungoverned by a single dominant 
political authority who could definitively adjudicate the dispute.  The Moscow 
Patriarchate, according to Sollogoub, has
reaffirmed that the Russian Orthodox Church will continue to “manifest its 
pastoral care for all its children who live outside the frontiers of the Russian 
State.”  It launched an appeal in the direction of the faithful of the ‘diaspora’ 
who “for well-known historical and political reasons [have] temporarily left 
their Mother Church and placed themselves under the jurisdiction of the 
Patriarchate of Constantinople,” assuring them that the Russian Church 
intends to “protect [them]” and to “encourage [their] voluntary return to [their] 
spiritual roots under the authority of the Patriarch of Moscow.”285
The Patriarchate proposed, in anticipation of the forthcoming general council, an 
interpretation of the institutional rules that effectively reasserted the principle of 
territorial accommodation, whereby political territories (e.g. North America, Western 
Europe, Australia) with multinational parallel émigré populations could be 
285 Sollogoub 26. 
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consolidated into a single, territorially-based autocephalous church.286  The Moscow 
Patriarchate has been working to reunite all parts of the Russian diaspora under its 
jurisdiction, possibly even allowing for sufficient internal autonomy to make reunion 
attractive to the Russian hierarchy in exile since the Revolution.287  Patriarch Alexy II 
of Moscow made this concrete when he announced in 2003 the intention to 
consolidate all Russian churches in Western Europe into a single metropolitan district 
(i.e. a metropolia) that would be autonomous (one step short of autocephaly), in the 
sense that it would have the right to administer itself and choose its own metropolitan 
bishop, with Moscow retaining the right to confirm that metropolitan.  This 
theoretically autonomous metropolia would serve “as the foundation for the future 
canonical establishment of a multinational Local Orthodox Church of Western 
Europe, to be built in the spirit of conciliarity by all the Orthodox faithful living on 
those countries.”288  This approach implies a view of church organization that 
presupposes Moscow as the predominant see and effectively precludes the 
jurisdictional authority of the ecumenical patriarchate – an evolving informal 
institutional rule that, although contested, is gaining wider acceptance in ecclesiastical 
circles.289
286 Pospielovsky 453-54. 
287 Bishop Basil, “The Diocese of Sourozh in the Historical Context of the Russian Diaspora in 
Western Europe, the USA and Elsewhere in the World.” 
288 Letter of Patriarch Alexy II of Moscow and All Russia, Sourozh 92 (2003): 1-5.  See also “Patriarch 
Alexis II Urges Russian-Trend Orthodox Parishes in Western Europe to Unite,” Russian Information 
Agency Novosti 8 April 2003, Orthodox Christian News Service, 15 Jan. 2005 
<http://www.orthodoxnews.netfirms.com/Patriarch%20Alexis%20II%20Urges.htm>. 
289 Evidence for this may be seen, just in the context of relations between Rome and the Eastern 
Churches, in the weight Moscow has carried regarding opposition to papal visits to Orthodox states 
(Russia and Serbia) and Rome’s reluctance (despite Ukrainian support) to recognize a Greek Catholic 
patriarchate in Kiev based largely on united Orthodox opposition led by Moscow. 
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Constantinople, for its part, continues to interpret the institutional framework 
in such a way as to assert its unique and unqualified jurisdictional primacy 
particularly over the Orthodox émigré communities.  However, this has not yielded a 
consistent institutional interpretation regarding the advisability of autocephaly in the 
context of that primacy.  Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew in 1992 argued that 
ecclesiastical subdivision through autocephaly leads inexorably to organizational 
disunity.  While not arguing against autocephaly per se, he categorically condemned 
unrestricted ecclesiastical subdivision and fragmentation through autocephaly. 
The path of autocephaly for all these Local Churches is not a path of unity of 
Orthodoxy.  I think that today Christianity’s presence must be strong and 
unanimous.  But separatism produces nothing.  Take Yugoslavia which 
consists of several states: if just as many autocephalous churches are 
established, unity will definitely weaken. … As to these Churches, decisions 
will be made in accordance with real needs.  This is not only for communities 
and states, in which they exist, to decide: at times we meet with subjective 
criteria and nationalistic motives demanding church independence and 
running counter to the genuine interests and needs of a Local Church.290
Yet Constantinople continues to recognize that autocephaly reflects something 
specific and durable in the Orthodox Church’s institutional framework of formal and 
informal rules, even if its operationalization remains a topic of dispute.  In 1993 a 
preconciliar document produced under the auspices of the Ecumenical Patriarchate 
affirmed the institutional legitimacy of autocephaly: 
The institution of autocephaly expresses in an authentic way one of the 
fundamental aspects of the Orthodox ecclesiological tradition concerning 
relations between the local Church and the universal Church of God.  The 
profound connection between the canonical institution of ecclesiastical 
autocephaly and Orthodox ecclesiastical teaching concerning the local Church 
justifies the concern of the autocephalous local Churches to solve existing 
290 Interview to Crois-Evenements (in French), following the meeting at the Patriarchate with the heads 
of the thirteen other autocephalous churches on 13-15 March 1992, reprinted (in English) in Journal of 
the Moscow Patriarchate 6 (1992): 49-51. 
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problems with regard to the correct functioning of the institution, as much as it 
does their willingness to participate, through their detailed contributions, in 
the enhancement of this institution for the advancement of the unity of the 
Orthodox Church.291
Ultimately, barring effective intervention by an acknowledged and accepted 
third party enforcer, the jurisdictional competition between Moscow and 
Constantinople, with the already autocephalous churches playing largely a sideline 
role, is likely to continue.  This is not to say that the state does not continue to play a 
role in arbitrating ecclesiastical organizational disputes.  Russian President Vladimir 
Putin, for example, attempted to engage the Vatican with an eye toward Russian 
Orthodox-Roman Catholic reconciliation during a period when the Moscow 
Patriarchate was (and still is) unwilling or unable to do so.  Likewise, Russian 
Patriarch Alexy II in 2003 praised Bulgarian President Georgi Parvanov for the 
latter’s attempts to heal the persistent schism within the Bulgarian Orthodox Church 
between the canonical patriarch, Maxim, and his rival, Innokentii, who accused 
Maxim of collaboration with communists during the Soviet era.292  Senior Greek 
government officials eventually were able to compel a resolution to the New Lands 
dispute between the Patriarchate of Constantinople and the Greek Holy Synod as 
noted in chapter 5, healing a temporary rupture in relations between the Church of 
Greece and Constantinople in April 2004.
291 “Autocephaly and the Way in Which it is to be Proclaimed,” adopted text of the Interorthodox 
Preparatory Commission for the Great and Holy Council, Orthodox Center of the Ecumenical 
Patriarchate, Chambesy, Switzerland, 7-13 November 1993, reprinted in George Beorin and Philip 
Tamoush, eds., A New Era Begins: Proceedings of the 1994 Conference of Orthodox Bishops in 
Ligonier, Pennsylvania (Torrance, CA: OPT, 1994) 115. 
292 “Head of Russian Orthodox Church Praises Bulgarian President for His Efforts to End Religious 
Schism,” Associated Press 21 Jan. 2003, reprinted in Orthodox Christian News Service 5.48 (2003), 20 
Nov. 2003 <http://www.orthodoxnews.netfirms.com>. 
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The record of attempts at state enforcement has been and likely will continue 
to be mixed.  As always, it is usually (and logically) political advantage motivating 
these interventions by state authorities in church organizational disputes.  Given that 
these interventions occur by definition only at the state level, however, institutional 
problems that involve the whole constellation of Orthodox churches transcend state 
boundaries and therefore may remain resistant to state-sponsored solutions.  It is 
evident, however, that autocephaly remains an organizational option with durable 
institutional sanction and utility, and both church and state continue to avail 
themselves of that option when it is advantageous for both to do so.  The case of the 
Russian Metropolia in North America is the latest evidence of this tendency.  Since 
the formal institutional rules provide no clear roadmap for organizational change in 
the post-national era, and since the state no longer reliably plays the sympathetic 
enforcement role ascribed to it in the formal rules, both church and state tend to resort 
to a fluid combination of flexible interpretations of the formal rules, emerging 
customs, and informally accepted practices to readjust ecclesiastical boundaries to fit 
political ones when such adjustments are advantageous for both.  We might conclude 
preliminarily, then, that this highly unstructured set of informal rules is what actually 
governs organizational change in the Orthodox Church in the modern era, and that the 
formal rules – though remaining “on the books” – play a decreasingly important role.  
This claim would be controversial to those who argue that the formal rules are 
normative in the Orthodox Church, however, and certainly more in-depth research 
would be necessary to properly evaluate this claim. 
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7.2 The Church: Institutional Considerations 
The foregoing discussion raises more complicated theoretical questions about 
the church’s institutional framework itself, and what institutional theory tells us 
should happen to that framework.  It is useful in considering these questions to return 
to our definitions from chapter 3.  Institutions, we noted, “exert patterned higher-
order effects on the actions, indeed the constitution, of individuals and organizations 
without requiring repeated collective mobilization or authoritative intervention to 
achieve these regularities.”293  Organizations in turn “are created with purposive 
intent in consequence of the opportunity set resulting from the existing set of 
constraints…and in the course of attempts to accomplish their objectives are a major 
agent of institutional change.”294  We noted that this implies a sort of reciprocity 
between organizations and institutions, in which organizations actually have an 
incremental modifying effect upon their own institutional framework.  It is logical to 
assume, based upon this definition, that we should expect to see changes in the 
institutional framework of the Orthodox Church evolving out of the church’s attempts 
as an organization to negotiate new political terrain for which its existing set of 
formal institutional rules are ill-equipped to handle. 
Yet we do not observe evidence of such institutional changes, at least among 
the formal rules of the church.  Local synods and meetings have been held, usually to 
deal with problems of local concern such as disciplinary issues, but such meetings 
293 Ronald Jepperson , “Institutions, Institutional Effects, and Institutionalism,” W.W. Powell and P.J. 
DiMaggio, eds., The New Institutionalism in Organizational Sociology (Chicago: University Press, 
1991): 143-63, cited in Elisabeth Clemens and James Cook, “Politics and Institutionalism: Explaining 
Durability and Change,” Annual Review of Sociology 25 (1999): 444-45. 
294 North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance 5. 
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have been limited in scope and no changes have been made to the formal institutional 
rules (primarily the disciplinary canons), particularly those governing organizational 
change.  Such changes would be unlikely until another general (ecumenical) council 
convenes – changes to a disciplinary canon voted at a general council would not be 
accepted corporately by the constellation of Orthodox churches unless those changes 
were voted at another general council.  In this context, which has endured for a very 
long period (on the order of centuries), the only visible change has been in the arena 
of informal rules, for example conventions that have emerged to govern 
organizational behavior in the absence of clear formal rules, as noted above.  Since 
there seems to be little general agreement on the means by which autocephaly 
formally may be granted, it is unclear how any consensus opinion could migrate over 
time into the general usage of the church, and become accepted as part of the 
institutional framework. 
Why has formal institutional change not occurred in the Orthodox Church?  
We could argue, in line with institutional theory as outlined by North, that the change 
in relative prices (fundamentally, the disconnect between political and ecclesiastical 
boundaries) has remained “simply a source of recontracting within the framework of 
existing rules,” with no incentive for any of the ecclesiastical players to 
fundamentally restructure the framework itself.295  Even if, as North notes, 
institutional change is “overwhelmingly incremental,”296 there has been very little 
detectable change in the church’s formal institutional rules for several centuries 
(acknowledging that the major corpus of Eastern canon law is well over 1,000 years 
295 North 86. 
296 North 89. 
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old, as noted in chapters 3 and 4), despite various local attempts at systemization.  A 
plausible reason might be found, again, in the lack of effective enforcement, itself due 
in part to the changing political landscape (evolution of the modern state) and the 
changing relationship between church and state (increasing secularization).  Still, 
since changing enforcement itself is a factor in the evolution of institutional 
frameworks,297 the relative stability of the Orthodox Church’s institutions suggests 
that perhaps the lack of enforcement has created some sort of disincentive to change 
(at least to formal change through general council). 
The ultimate significance, then, of the Orthodox Church as an object of study 
for institutional theory may be that more attention must be paid to the internal links 
between changes in relative prices, enforcement, and actual, demonstrable changes in 
the institutional framework.  If the institutions in question were embodied in the 
United Nations charter or the European Union constitution, evidence of institutional 
change would be detectable through changes to the relevant legal documents, 
production of new ones, and the legal processes through which those changes 
occurred.  In the case of the church this function is accomplished exclusively through 
councils.  Institutional change would be evidenced by the voting of new disciplinary 
canons and the modification of old ones in council.  Alternatively, we might consider 
evidence that compliance with the formal rules is merely pro forma and that 
increasing reliance on informal rules is itself evidence of institutional change – formal 
rules, though “on the books,” fall into disuse and irrelevancy, as suggested above.
Yet this does not seem to be entirely the case with the Orthodox churches, insofar as 
they (1) continually affirm the framework of formal rules as part of their institutional 
297 North 83ff. 
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identity, and (2) continue to look in earnest toward the future opportunity when 
modification of those rules might be possible.  The Orthodox churches have affirmed 
explicitly, in the preparatory documents for the forthcoming general council, that 
issues of organizational change (namely, autocephaly and how it is declared) must be 
addressed.  This implies the recognition that existing formal rules are inadequate and 
that modification of those institutions is necessary.  If no council convenes then the 
formal rules cannot be modified. 
Another possibility is that institutional change in the Orthodox Church occurs 
not gradually but perhaps more suddenly and dramatically.  If, as Fiori argues, “we 
suppose that modern history is connoted by the increasing pace (or acceleration) of 
change, a consequence is that the past (including traditions and customs) is 
progressively less able to create stable institutions.”298  This implies what Fiori has 
termed an “anti-gradualist” approach to institutional change, one in which “radical 
change is a possibility which is realized when a set of contingencies occur (otherwise 
it may long remain potential).”299  Such a concept is complementary to North’s idea 
of gradual change, rather than in competition with it: either type might be used to 
explain institutional change in a given instance.  However, much work remains to be 
done with regard to this avenue of institutional theory, which “stresses the role of 
contingencies in the process of institutional change: the more [formal and informal] 
rules conflict, the more contingencies can determine the result of process, and the less 
the past (embodied in informal rules) is able to condition the direction of change.”300
298 Stefano Fiori, “Alternative Visions of Change in Douglass North’s New Institutionalism,” Journal 
of Economic Issues 36.4 (2002): 1025-44. 
299 Fiori 1044. 
300 Fiori 1043-44. 
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To the extent an analytical approach to anti-gradualistic types of institutional change 
is articulated, it may prove helpful to understanding why formal institutional change 
has not occurred within the Orthodox Church.
Yet another possibility regarding institutions, particularly intriguing in light of 
our study here, is that that the analytical focus should be not so much on why 
institutions are not changing, but rather on what makes them so remarkably stable.
Pierson, for example, has highlighted the paucity of research addressing the issue of 
“institutional resilience” and has identified, largely in the rational choice literature, a 
number of important factors inhibiting change of any kind: that institutions resolve 
coordination problems among actors, that multiple options for veto of change at 
various levels inhibit change, and that commitments or investment by actors in the 
framework itself makes change both “difficult” and “unattractive.”301  Pierson’s 
hypothesis – that “all other things being equal, an institution will be more resilient, 
and any revisions more incremental in nature, the longer the institution has been in 
place”302 – appears quite applicable given what we know of the formal institutions of 
the Orthodox Church as outlined in the preceding chapters.  The formal rules of the 
church, by codifying both existing informal institutions as well as new ones, have 
provided a means for actors (both ecclesiastical and secular) to coordinate their 
interaction without continual renegotiation – significant for an organization like the 
Orthodox Church which has such a wide expanse both geographically and 
chronologically.  At the same time, drawing upon Goodin’s analysis, the multiple 
301 Paul Pierson, “Explaining Institutional Origins and Change,” chapter draft from manuscript of 
“Politics in Time: History, Institutions and Social Analysis,” 2002, 34-41, 21 Oct. 2004 
<http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~pierson/>.  See also Stacey and Rittberger, “Dynamics of Formal 
and Informal Institutional Change” 867. 
302 Pierson 41. 
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levels of hierarchy at which modification of rules must occur promote institutional 
stability and increase the costs of change.303  The hierarchical nature of the church, 
combined with its reliance on conciliar (as opposed to “top-down,” as with the see of 
Rome304) decision making, multiplies the opportunities for individual actors or 
coalitions of actors to derail attempts to modify institutions, and likewise increases 
the costs and risks of (and hence decreases the incentives toward) change.
Ecclesiastical and secular actors alike are heavily “invested” in the particular 
configuration of costs and benefits associated with the system of institutional rules, 
and modifications to those rules may simply be too costly for the actors to initiate.305
We could argue, then, that profitable areas of further exploration regarding 
institutional change in the Orthodox Church could include path dependence306 and the 
reasons why formal institutions remain highly durable and change-resistant, 
particularly when they have been in place for a very long time.  As Pierson has noted, 
“Actors do not inherit a blank slate that they can remake at will when their 
preferences shift or unintended consequences become visible.  Instead, actors find 
that the dead weight of previous institutional choices seriously limits their room to 
maneuver.”307  It may be that the Orthodox Church finds itself sufficiently 
encumbered with the accumulated weight of its very long institutional past that any 
extensive change to its formal rules would be very difficult to achieve.  Increasing 
303 Robert E. Goodin, “Institutions and Their Design,” in Robert E. Goodin, ed., The Theory of 
Institutional Design (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 1-53, cited in Pierson 37. 
304 The argument here is not that councils are not operative or important in the Roman Catholic Church 
but rather that dogmatically, Rome has “institutionalized” the realization that it is the papacy that 
convenes a council, validates its ecumenical status, and ratifies its binding resolutions.  The modern 
papacy is in a sense the “referee” ensuring a council’s legal convocation and outcome, at least in 
theory.
305 Pierson 42-46. 
306 See North ch. 11. 
307 Pierson 46. 
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reliance on more flexible informal conventions enables it to accommodate more 
immediate organizational requirements, against the day when formal institutional 
change becomes possible.  In any event, the body of evidence provided by the 
Orthodox Church could be very fruitful for future examinations of the durability of 
institutions.
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